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Abstract 
This thesis examines the prospects for a theory of metaphysical modality according to 
which modal truth is determined by conventional rules governing the terms in a natural 
language. I label this theory ‘linguistic modal conventionalism’, or ‘LMC’. My focus is 
on articulating and responding to a specific objection to LMC: the objection that 
conventionalism about the modal features of objects and propositions leads to 
conventionalism about ordinary objects and non-modal truth.  
The first part of the thesis sets out the theoretical background for LMC by describing its 
empiricist and naturalistic motivations, its historical background, and its modern variants. 
I argue that modern versions of LMC are able to respond to the Quinean and Kripean 
challenges that faced the theory’s positivist predecessors. The middle part of the thesis is 
devoted to describing the threat of object and truth conventionalism. I argue that the tight 
connection between an object’s conditions of existence and its modal properties means 
that conventionalism about modal properties leads to conventionalism about objects 
themselves. Similarly, the modal nature of a proposition’s truth conditions means that 
conventionalism about modal features of propositions leads to conventionalism about 
non-modal truth.  
The final chapters of the thesis present a way for LMC to respond to these threats. I argue 
that the theory should do away with the problematic ontology by rejecting modal features 
of objects and propositions, and providing truth conditions for modal sentences in terms 
of linguistic rules directly. After describing the metaphysics and semantics of this 
position, I conclude by responding to a number of potential objections for LMC, and by 
arguing that it satisfies the empiricist and naturalist desiderata by which it is motivated.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Linguistic Modal Conventionalism: Promises and Threats 
The nature of modality is a topic of ongoing interest to metaphysicians. This is fitting 
given the central role modal assertions play in the practice of philosophy itself. Often, the 
‘armchair reasoning’ employed by philosophers involves consideration about what would 
hold in some hypothetical circumstance, or what follows from the possibility of some 
scenario. Descartes’ famous conceivability argument for dualism, for example, relies on 
the premise that the body and mind are possibly distinct to demonstrate that they are 
actually distinct. More generally, philosophical arguments involving thought experiments 
rely on the possibility of cases described. Even logical validity is sometimes construed 
modally, as when a valid argument is defined as one in which it is necessary that if the 
premises are true, the conclusion is true. Of course, modal reasoning is not just the 
province of philosophers; it also plays a significant role in everyday human reasoning. 
Reasoning with counterfactuals is particularly ubiquitous; an example is when you 
conclude that if you had left any later, you would have missed the train. 
Given that we take modality for granted in our reasoning, we owe an account of what is 
said by modal sentences and what it takes for them to be true. By their very nature, modal 
claims are about how the world might be, or how it must be, rather than about how it in 
fact is. As such, they have been a source of worry for empiricists, who hold that 
knowledge should be gained primarily through empirical investigation and the use of the 
senses. After all, many empiricists have held, the investigations of science reveal how the 
world is, not how it might be or must be. Modal properties have also worried 
metaphysical naturalists, who wish to construct an ontology free of abstract objects and 
other ‘strange’ non-physical entities. Both troubling features of modality bear comparison 
with similar features of moral properties. J. L. Mackie puts the problem succinctly:  
‘If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a 
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if 
we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception 
or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.’1  
The very same concerns apply to objective modality: for those inclined towards 
empiricism and naturalism, modal properties like necessity and possibility are somewhat 
mysterious. Like moral properties, modal properties cannot be detected using our senses, 
                                                     
1 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Reinventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977) p.38. 
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even through microscopes or telescopes. As a result, it is difficult to see how we can 
come to know about these properties, or what these properties are like.  
Linguistic modal conventionalism (LMC) offers a way to account for modality within an 
empiricist and naturalist framework. On the one hand, LMC promises to fit modality into 
a naturalistic ontology by taking it to depend on conventional features of the way we use 
language. On the other hand, it promises that doing so will permit an empiricist 
explanation of modal knowledge, since familiarity with the conventions of language can 
be used to explain knowledge of modal truths. Modern versions of LMC, including those 
espoused by Alan Sidelle and Amie Thomasson, have their roots in the logical positivist 
theories of the early 20
th
 century such as Ayer’s and Carnap’s.2 The shared basic tenet of 
both historical and modern views is that necessity depends on or reduces to analyticity. 
As a first approximation, these theories hold that some sentences have the status of being 
analytic, and that all and only such sentences have the property of being true necessarily. 
While particular accounts of what’s required to earn this status differ, they in general 
agree that a) analyticity is conventional, and b) a sentence owes its analyticity to its 
meaning.
3
 In fact, ‘truth by convention’ and ‘truth in virtue of meaning’ are both 
‘slogans’ that have been associated with analyticity.  
Since LMC takes modality to depend on analyticity, and analyticity itself is determined 
by a sentence’s meaning, modality must also be dependent on meaning according to 
LMC. There are many ways this might be cashed out. For example, one might argue that 
a sentence is analytic when its meaning suffices for its truth, and that sentences with this 
property are also necessary. Alternatively, one might argue that a sentence is analytic and 
necessary when its truth is determined by semantic rules. Several such proposals will be 
discussed over the course of this thesis, in particular in chapters 1, 2 and 5. LMC also 
treats other modal properties of sentences, such as possibility, impossibility and 
contingency, as determined by a sentence’s status as analytic or otherwise. As a first 
approximation, the theory endorses the following biconditionals:  
 ‘Necessarily, S’ is true iff ‘S’ is analytic. 
 ‘Necessarily, not S’ is true iff ‘Not S’ is analytic. 
                                                     
2 See in particular Alan Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), Amie L. Thomasson, Ordinary Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) and Amie L. Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ Philosophical Topics 
Vol.35, Nos. 1&2 (2007): pp.135-160. Historical versions of the theory including Carnap’s in Rudolf Carnap, 
Meaning and Necessity 2nd ed., (1956; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Ayer’s in A. J. 
Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1946), will be discussed in chapter 
1. 
3 Theories of analyticity and their implications for LMC will be discussed in detail in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Historical accounts of analyticity will also be outlined in chapter 1, and some more recent theories will be 
discussed in chapter 2.  
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 ‘Possibly, S’ is true iff ‘Not S’ is not analytic. 
 ‘Possibly, not S’ is true iff ‘S’ is not analytic. 
 ‘Contingently, S’ is true iff ‘S’ and ‘Possibly, not S’ are true. 
 ‘Impossibly, S’ is true iff ‘Necessarily, not S’ is true. 
Read at face value as material conditionals, these biconditionals do not yet contain much 
information; they represent the bare bones of a theory that is fleshed out in different ways 
by different theorists. Each version of LMC is committed to a stronger relationship 
between necessity and analyticity than mere material equivalence; they say it is because a 
sentence is analytically true or false that it is necessary or impossible. The truth of these 
biconditionals should be viewed as reflective of a deeper and more complex dependency 
relation that holds between analyticity and necessity.
4
 Theories owe an account of the 
nature of the sentences whose modal status is explained, the nature of analyticity, and the 
nature of the dependency relation at issue.
5
 Ultimately, these biconditionals may even end 
up false once a more complex dependency relation between analyticity and necessity is 
described. For example, it should be noted that modern theories accept various 
counterexamples to the above biconditionals in the form of necessary synthetic sentences 
such as ‘Water is H2O.’
6
 
As noted above, the second feature generally attributed to analyticity is conventionalism. 
That is to say, whether or not a given sentence qualifies as analytic is treated as 
depending on conventional features of language use. For example, a sentence might 
qualify as analytic because of ‘our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion,’7 or 
due to ‘conventions we have adopted concerning how we will describe things.’8 This 
convention-dependence carries through to modal truths, according to LMC. Since 
necessity depends on analyticity, and analyticity depends on conventions, necessity 
depends on conventions too.  
Despite its empiricist promise, LMC also faces some threats. Some of these threats are 
old, and considerable work to render them toothless has been done by recent defenders of 
linguistic approaches to modality. This applies particularly to the threat posed by Quine’s 
critique of the analytic / synthetic distinction, and to the threat posed by Kripkean 
                                                     
4 See section 8.2.2 for a discussion of the nature of the dependency relation that might hold between 
conventional features of a sentence and its modal status according to LMC. 
5 For example, it is important to say whether LMC is interested in explaining the modal status of sentence 
types or tokens and whether the sentences are part of a natural language or an artificial language. These issues 
are addressed in section 2.4.7. 
6 See Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation and Thomasson, Ordinary Objects for examples. These 
issues receive considerable attention in chapters 2 and 7 of this thesis. 
7 Ayer, Logic, Truth and Language p.31. 
8 Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation p.35. 
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necessary a posteriori truths. My project in this thesis is to argue for the existence of a 
less familiar threat to LMC, and provide a way for the theory to respond to that threat. 
The worry is that by treating modality as conventional, LMC may be committed to 
widespread conventionalism about ontology and truth, which is problematic in its own 
right and sits uncomfortably with the empiricist and naturalist motivations of LMC. In the 
course of constructing a theory that can avoid such widespread ontological 
conventionalism, I’ll also build on the work done by others to incorporate necessary a 
posteriori truths into the framework of LMC. 
The remainder of this introduction sets the groundwork for this project. Firstly, in section 
I, I elucidate the notion of modality that LMC seeks to explain. Sections II and III explain 
the epistemological and metaphysical motivations that make LMC worthy of defence, and 
section IV translates those motivations into some desiderata that the theory should aim to 
meet. Finally, section V provides a brief outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis.  
 
I. Modality: the target of analysis 
As outlined above, LMC takes modality to be determined in some way by conventional 
features of language or meaning. Modality, however, comes in a variety of flavours. For 
example, what’s logically possible is what is compatible with the laws of logic. Similarly, 
what’s physically possible is what is compatible with the laws of physics. An ethical 
theory will deliver a set of ‘moral possibilities’, or equivalently, a set of actions that are 
permissible according to the theory. While many actual actions contravene what’s 
morally possible, no actual truths contravene what is logically possible or physically 
possible. One of the contributions made by Kripke was to popularise the notion of 
metaphysical modality. Metaphysical modality has been characterised in a number of 
ways.
9
 Broadly speaking, metaphysical possibilities are ‘way things might be’ in the most 
generous sense of the term. Often, it is accepted that the ways things might be are a 
proper subclass of the logical possibilities.
10
 For example, ‘Some bachelor is married’ is 
not a logical contradiction, but it also is not a metaphysical possibility; there is no way 
things might have turned out such that there were married bachelors. However, logical 
necessities such as ‘If p then p’ hold in every metaphysical possibility. On the other hand, 
we usually accept that there are more ways things might be than there are physical 
                                                     
9 For an overview, see Daniel Nolan, ‘The Extent of Metaphysical Necessity,’ Philosophical Perspectives 
Vol.25 (2011): pp.313-339.  
10 Although Nolan notes than some logics will include theorems that are metaphysically contingent. For 
example, in some indexical logics ‘I am here now’ is a theorem, even though it is metaphysically possible for 
I, the speaker, to be located in a different place at a given time of utterance. (Ibid, p.314). 
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possibilities. While the laws of physics tell us that it is impossible for anything to travel 
faster than the speed of light, it remains a metaphysical possibility that the laws of 
physics might have been different such that things travel faster than light speed. 
Similarly, electromagnetism might have behaved differently, or magic might have been 
real, and so on. 
The target of analysis for modern versions of LMC is generally taken to be metaphysical 
modality.
11
 In line with those accounts, metaphysical modality, or modality ‘in the widest 
sense,’ will be my analysandum throughout the thesis. As such, unqualified uses of 
‘modality’ should be read as referring to metaphysical modality unless otherwise stated. 
Similarly, unqualified uses of modal terms such as ‘necessity’, ‘possibility’ and so on 
should be read as referring to metaphysical necessity, metaphysical possibility, and so on. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that any theory of metaphysical modality may provide the 
resources for an account of other modalities. The prospects of expanding the account in 
such a way are particularly good if other modalities are viewed as restricted forms of 
metaphysical modality. Physical possibility, for example, might be treated as what’s 
metaphysically possible holding fixed certain truths about the physical nature of the 
world. Potential concerns that arise for LMC given the relationship between metaphysical 
modality and other modalities are discussed in section 8.2.3 of this thesis.  
 
II. Epistemological motivations 
Despite the threats it faces, LMC is worthy of investigation due to a number of theoretical 
advantages that render it prima facie more attractive than its rivals in at least some 
respects. The first of these is epistemological. Put briefly, LMC seems to do better than 
prominent rivals at explaining how it is that we gain epistemic access to modal truths 
‘from the armchair,’ or how a priori reasoning results in modal knowledge.12 Accounts of 
our epistemic access to modal truths differ; yet it is commonly accepted that this 
                                                     
11 In Necessity, Essence and Individuation, Sidelle often uses the phrase ‘metaphysical necessity’ to pick out 
the kind of non-conventional, worldly necessity he wants to reject. However, he makes clear that his account 
is of how things might be in the sense described above. Thomasson explicitly restricts her discussion to 
metaphysical modality in ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics,’ p.135. 
12 References to worries about modal epistemology can be found in a number of sources. For examples see 
Stephen Yablo, ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 
53, No. 1 (1993) pp.3-4 and Thomas Holden, ‘Hume’s Absolute Necessity,’ Mind Vol.123, No. 490 (2014) 
p.389. Sidelle argues at length that his theory does better than its rivals in terms of an explanation of modal 
knowledge. See Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation pp.86-104. Thomasson also cites 
epistemological worries for rival theories of modality. See ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of 
Metaphysics’ p.136. 
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knowledge is not empirical in nature.
13
 Rather, acts such as imagining, conceiving or 
intuiting are widely cited as granting epistemic access to modal truths. Any 
metaphysician who wishes to accept that modal knowledge is acquired using this or 
similar methodology must be able to explain how the kinds of entities or facts she posits 
as the basis of modality are the kinds of entities or facts about which we could discover 
truths using this sort of mental act. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many metaphysical theories of 
modality struggle to provide such an explanation. 
One widely cited mechanism for acquiring modal knowledge is conceiving. Stephen 
Yablo argues for an account according to which your conceiving that p involves p’s being 
represented to you as possible.
14
 Given that representing p as possible is part of what it is 
to conceive that p in Yablo’s sense, your state of conceiving is veridical, on Yablo’s 
view, so long as p is in fact possible.
15
 He argues that any state of affairs that is 
conceivable is metaphysically possible; or at least, that conceivability in his sense is very 
good evidence for metaphysical possibility. In order to understand why this would be the 
case, however, we need a metaphysical theory of modality that can explain why acts of 
conceiving provide this epistemic access to possibility. What is possibility such that our 
ability to represent p as possible usually corresponds to the genuine possibility of p?
16
 
This question is difficult to answer for a range of metaphysical theories of modality. 
David Lewis, for example, famously argues that modal facts are determined by goings on 
at concrete worlds that are isolated from us in space and time. It is possible on his view 
that there is a talking donkey, for example, if and only if a talking donkey exists in at 
least one such concrete world.
17
 It is somewhat mysterious, however, how mere acts of 
conceiving could grant us knowledge about the goings on at these isolated worlds. 
Plausibly, in order to know about talking donkeys there must be at least some causal 
chain, no matter how long, connecting them to us.
18
 
                                                     
13 At least, it isn’t wholly empirical in nature. Knowledge of a posteriori necessities such as ‘Necessarily, 
water is H2O’ plausibly requires empirical knowledge. However, empirical knowledge alone won’t suffice 
even for knowledge of a posteriori modal truths. See chapters 2 and 7 of this thesis for further discussion.  
14 Yablo, ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’ Discussion of this topic by a number of authors can be 
found in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne eds., Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2002).  
15 Yablo, ‘Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?’ pp.4-7. 
16 Yablo himself notes that many authors have been sceptical about why we should think conceivability is a 
good guide to possibility. 
17 David Lewis, On The Plurality of Worlds, (1986; reissued Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001). See 
especially sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
18 A number of authors have criticised Lewis’s modal metaphysics on the basis that it does not allow for an 
adequate modal epistemology. See for example Ross P. Cameron, ‘Lewisian Realism: Methodology, 
Epistemology, and Circularity,’ Synthese Vol.156, No.1 (2007): pp.143-159 and chapter 9 of John Divers, 
Possible Worlds (London: Routledge, 2002). Lewis’s own defence of his modal epistemology can be found in 
On the Plurality of Worlds pp.108-115.  
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Things hardly seem better for those who analyse modal sentences as expressing claims 
about abstract, rather than concrete, possible worlds.
19
 After all, causal chains between us 
and abstract objects are just as mysterious as causal chains between us and 
spatiotemporally isolated concrete objects. George Bealer has posited a faculty of 
‘intuition’ through which we learn about such entities.20 However positing such a faculty 
does little to relieve the mystery of its operation. Similar worries arise for essentialist 
views such as Kit Fine’s and E.J. Lowe’s.21 Each of these philosophers posits the 
existence of ‘essences’ had by objects that can be used to provide an explanation of 
modality more broadly. However, knowledge of essences requires explanation just as 
knowledge of modality does.  
Ultimately, it would be preferable if modal knowledge could be explained using familiar 
resources. LMC promises to do just that; it opens the way for an explanation of our 
armchair methods of modal discovery without recourse to mysterious faculties of 
intuition, or knowledge in the absence of causal connections. If modal facts depend on 
conventional features of language use, we as the instigators of the conventions can come 
to know the modal facts through familiarity with the rules of our own language. For 
example, if the truth of ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is due to a conventional 
decision to abbreviate ‘unmarried man’ with ‘bachelor,’ my knowledge of the relevant 
convention can be used to explain my knowledge of the modal truth. Furthermore, this 
account offers an explanation for why modal knowledge is usually a priori. Armchair 
methods reveal modal truths because the tools required to work out what the rules of 
language mandate and permit, and therefore what is necessary and possible, are had by 
competent speakers in the armchair. According to LMC, my representation of some 
sentence as expressing a possibility is usually veridical because for S to be possible is just 
for S to be non-contradictory given its meaning.
22
 
One way to put this advantage had by LMC is in terms of a potential solution to a 
Benacerraf style dilemma posed for modal knowledge. Famously, Benacerraf argued that 
                                                     
19 For examples of such theories see Robert Merrihew Adams, ‘Theories of Actuality,’ Noûs Vol.8, No.3 
(1974): pp.211-231, Alvin Plantinga, ‘Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism,’ 
Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 1 (1987): pp.189-231 and Robert Stalnaker, Ways a World Might Be: 
Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). See also Divers, Possible 
Worlds Part III for discussion. 
20 See George Bealer, ‘The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism,’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 
1, (1987): pp.289-365 and George Bealer, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance,’ in Gendler 
and Hawthorne eds. Conceivability and Possibility.  
21 Kit Fine, ‘Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture,’ Philosophical 
Perspectives Vol. 8 (1994): pp.1-16, E. J. Lowe, ‘Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence,’ Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 62 (2008): pp.23-48, and E. J. Lowe, ‘What is the Source of Our Knowledge 
of Modal Truths?’ Mind, Vol. 121, No. 484 (2012): pp.919-950.   
22 Of course, this account is not immune from objections. Objections concerning our knowledge of linguistic 
conventions are discussed in section 8.1 of this thesis.  
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there was no satisfactory way to adequately provide both a semantics and an 
epistemology for mathematical sentences.
23
 He argued that what was required to fulfil 
both tasks was a set of truth conditions for mathematical sentences that a) say what must 
hold in order for mathematical sentences to be true, while b) accounting for how 
knowledge of their truth is possible. The first task involves providing a metaphysics for 
mathematics, since in order to state the conditions under which mathematical sentences 
are true, an account must be provided of what makes them true. However, the second task 
requires that the metaphysical account provided is compatible with our knowledge of 
mathematics. The issue raised by Benacerraf was that current theories seemed to succeed 
at the first task at the expense of the second. For example, Platonists about mathematical 
objects can provide an adequate semantics for mathematical language, but they struggle 
to explain our epistemic access to objects construed as abstract.  
Christopher Peacocke has argued that Benacerraf-style problems arise in a number of 
areas of philosophy, suggesting a general ‘integration challenge’: for any discourse, a 
satisfactory account must provide a semantics that allows for a plausible epistemology.
24
 
Peacocke, along with Lewis and Stalnaker, has suggested that an integration challenge 
arises for modal claims.
25
 An adequate account of modal sentences must be able to 
provide a metaphysical story about the conditions under which they are true, while also 
explaining our knowledge of their truth. The modal metaphysical views mentioned above 
(e.g. Lewis’s, Fine’s, etc.) tend to opt for an adequate semantics at the expense of a modal 
epistemology; they give truth conditions for modal sentences in terms of entities such as 
abstract or concrete possible worlds, but are unable to adequately explain our knowledge 
of when those truth conditions are fulfilled.
26
 On the other hand, LMC has the potential to 
meet the integration challenge by fulfilling both of Benacerraf’s requirements; if modal 
truth depends on conventional meaning, knowledge of modal truth can be explained in 
terms of knowledge of meaning.
27
  
It might be objected that the purported epistemological advantage had by LMC is only an 
advantage insofar as you accept methodological naturalism or empiricism. If you think 
                                                     
23 Paul Benacerraf, ‘Mathematical Truth,’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol.70, No.19 (1973): pp.661-679. 
24 Christopher Peacocke, Being Known (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). See especially chapter 1. 
25 See Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds pp.108-115, Stalnaker, Ways a World Might Be chapter 2. 
26 However, Peacocke (Being Known, chapter 4) himself argues that he has a solution to the integration 
challenge for modal sentences that avoids commitment to mind-dependent truth conditions. Also, Lewis notes 
that his view might be accused of failing to provide an integrated metaphysics and epistemology, and argues 
that in fact he can account for our modal knowledge, given his modal metaphysics. (Lewis, On the Plurality 
of Worlds pp.108-115.) See Stalnaker Ways a World Might Be chapter 2 for a reply to Lewis’s arguments.  
27 John Divers and Daniel Elstein have suggested that a promising anti-realist strategy is to reverse the order 
of explanation suggested by the integration challenge. If we start by looking at the function of our modal 
beliefs and the conditions under which we acquire them, we can then given an account of modality itself to 
suit. See J. Divers and D.Y. Elstein, ‘Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity,’ Philosophical Studies Vol. 
158, No. 1 (2012): pp.109-130. 
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empirical investigation is a privileged way to discover truths, or that the methods of 
philosophy should be continuous with the methods of science, you may be sympathetic to 
the reasons cited above to favour LMC. On the other, if you take a priori investigation to 
be capable of revealing deep truths about the structure of reality you may remain 
unconvinced. Those who find a Bealer-style faculty of intuition unproblematic, for 
example, may take themselves to have a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of 
entities such as abstract possible worlds or essences. Such a combination of views may 
provide a ‘rationalist’ solution to the integration challenge. Of course, LMC need not set 
out to convince everyone of its worth. Many philosophers in fact prefer naturalistic 
methodology over rationalism, and have good reasons to do so.
28
 Those who fall into this 
category have need of an account of modality that fits their broader philosophical 
position. Given that popular modal metaphysical theories struggle to provide a satisfying 
naturalistic account of modal epistemology, other options are worth exploring for 
naturalists. 
For those who don’t come to the debate with firm rationalist or empiricist commitments, 
it’s worth noting independent reasons to prefer the style of explanation for modal 
knowledge promised by LMC over a Bealer-style modal intuition. Firstly, LMC promises 
to provide an account of modal knowledge that is reductionist in that modal epistemology 
is explained in terms of pre-established means of knowledge acquisition. In doing so, the 
account is also parsimonious in that it allows for us to make do with fewer distinct ways 
of acquiring knowledge. If the line of explanation suggested on behalf of LMC proves 
fruitful, our knowledge of modality can be fully explained in terms of other kinds of 
knowledge; in particular, in terms of our knowledge of our own linguistic conventions. If 
so, there is no need to posit an extra faculty of intuition simply for the sake of explaining 
modal knowledge.
29
 
 
III. Metaphysical motivations 
LMC also promises a number of metaphysical advantages over its rivals; by treating 
modal truth as determined by conventional features of language, LMC has the potential to 
be metaphysically naturalist, reductionist and parsimonious. Unsurprisingly, the latter of 
                                                     
28 See Daniel Nolan, ‘Naturalised Modal Epistemology,’ in R. Fischer and F. Leon eds. Modal Epistemology 
after Rationalism (Springer, forthcoming) for an overview of the reasons to be attracted to naturalist 
epistemology, and in particular a naturalist modal epistemology.  
29 In Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance Bealer argues that the faculty of intuition provides 
us with knowledge in a range of cases, not just in the modal case. However, those of a methodological 
naturalist persuasion may well think they can do without intuition in those cases too, at least in Bealer’s sense 
of ‘intuition’. 
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these two advantages are related. If LMC is able to reduce modal facts to facts about 
language use, it is also able to avoid commitment to sui generis modality. As with the 
epistemological advantages had by LMC, it is worth taking some time to note how rival 
theories do when it comes to these metaphysical desiderata. Interestingly, primitive 
modality of one kind or another is a common feature in a number of well-known theories 
of modality. For example, Plantinga analyses modal truths in terms of goings on at 
abstract ‘states of affairs’, but argues that an account of which states of affairs can obtain 
together must irreducibly make use of modal notions.
30
 Similarly, Adams argues for 
‘world-stories’ which are defined as maximal consistent sets of propositions; any 
proposition is taken to be possibly true if it is a member of at least one world-story.
31
 
However, the modal notion of consistency is left as primitive. Finally, Stalnaker argues 
that modal sentences should be analysed in terms of quantification over possible worlds, 
and that propositions can be reduced to sets of possible worlds; however, the notion of a 
possible world once again remains primitive in his theory.
32
 These theories fail to be 
reductionist, and by the same token fail to be parsimonious; by requiring irreducible 
modal notions they commit themselves to extra primitives in their overall metaphysical 
theory. 
Arguably, the essentialist views of Fine and Lowe also involve a commitment to 
unwanted primitives insofar as essence is left unreduced. Lowe provides an analysis of 
essence in terms of ‘real definitions’ of objects.33 These definitions are not intended to be 
linguistic, but instead tell us ‘what a thing is’; they tell us about the properties that define 
an object’s identity. However, the notion of a ‘real definition’ could well be a modal 
notion in disguise; after all, the role of real definitions appears to be to tell us what 
properties something must have in order to retain its identity. If so, primitive modality 
remains in Lowe’s conception of an essence. 
Lewis’s concrete realism has the advantage that it is genuinely reductionist, and thereby 
avoids commitment to primitive modality. If modal truth is determined by goings on at 
worlds just like our own physical universe, no primitive consistency relation or essence is 
required. Nonetheless, Lewis’s view fails to be parsimonious along a different axis; 
despite avoiding primitive modality, it is burdened by the ontological commitment 
incurred by the worlds themselves. Lewisian realism entails the existence of an infinite 
number of concrete universes where we thought there was just one. As such, his view 
                                                     
30 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’ in Matthew Davidson ed., Essays in the Metaphysics of 
Modality  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): pp.103-121. 
31 Adams, ‘Theories of Actuality’. 
32 Stalnaker, Ways the World Might Be, chapter 1. 
33 Lowe, ‘What is the Source of Our Knowledge of Modal Truths?’ 
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avoids ontological commitment to extra types of entity only by taking on ontological 
commitment to an infinite number of tokens within a familiar type: concrete objects like 
tables, chairs, and so on.
34
  
By contrast, LMC has the potential to be reductionist while also remaining parsimonious 
along both axes; it avoids extra ontological commitment both among types of entity and 
within types of entity. As described above, LMC aims to provide an account of the truth 
of modal sentences in terms of the linguistic practices in which speakers engage. Unlike 
notions such as essence, conventions of language use earn their place in our picture of the 
world independently of whether they can be used to explain modality. As such, if LMC 
succeeds in its reduction it will qualify as genuinely parsimonious. Of course, it remains 
to be seen whether the details of LMC can be spelled out in such a way that primitive 
modality is avoided. As we’ll see in chapter 2, one way to explicate the conventions of 
language that determine modal truth is in terms of linguistic rules. Genuine reductionism 
would then require an account of those rules that does not rely on modal notions. Whether 
such an account can be given is discussed in section 8.2. 
A final metaphysical advantage had by LMC is its ability to meet the requirements of a 
demanding metaphysical naturalism. In the literature, accounts of which properties count 
as natural properties differ. One view is that a metaphysical naturalist ought to accept in 
her ontology all and only those objects and properties to which the ideal scientific theory 
is committed.
35
 However, as Philip Pettit notes, there is substantial disagreement over 
which kinds of entities fall into this category. For some, entities such as universals, 
objective chances and even abstract possible worlds may count as natural. According to 
others, however, the only naturalistically respectable entities are space-time points, bits of 
matter, and physical properties had by space-time points and bits of matter.
36
 Lewis’s 
theory of possible worlds can retain naturalist credentials on both the stricter account of 
naturalism and the more permissive one.
37
 On the other hand, many of the theories of 
modality discussed above will count as naturalistic only on the more permissive account, 
                                                     
34 Joseph Melia has argued that Lewis’s ontology is not even parsimonious when it comes to types of entities, 
since it is committed to a very large number of objects that are qualitatively unlike any actual objects (for 
example golden mountains and talking donkeys). See Joseph Melia, ‘A Note on Lewis’s Ontology,’ Analysis 
Vol. 52, No. 3 (1992): pp.191-192. A reply on behalf of Lewis can be found in Divers, Possible Worlds 
p.155. 
35 Philip Pettit and Michael Rea both make this claim. See p.247 of Philip Pettit, ‘The Nature of Naturalism,’ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol.66 (1992): pp.245-266 and Michael Rea, ‘Naturalism and 
Material Objects,’ in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland eds., Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (London: 
Routledge, 2000) pp.110-132. 
36 See Pettit, (Ibid p.247) and Rea, (Ibid p.111) for two brief overviews of the kind of entities self-identifying 
naturalists have been willing to countenance.  
37 Lewis’s ontology also includes sets, since entities like properties and propositions are defined as set 
theoretic constructions out of possible objects and worlds. However, any plausible version of LMC is also 
likely to require commitment to sets and so cannot claim advantage over Lewis’s view in that regard.   
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insofar as they are committed to entities such as abstract possible worlds and essences. 
LMC promises to qualify as naturalistic relative to strict versions of naturalism as well as 
permissive ones. Plausibly, the facts about languages and the practices of language users 
that determine modal truth according to LMC themselves reduce to facts about physical 
goings on in the world.   
 
IV. From motivations to desiderata 
These epistemological and metaphysical advantages had by LMC provide it with 
sufficient motivation to render the project of defending the theory from various objections 
worthwhile. For the most part, these advantages will be taken for granted in this thesis, as 
my focus will be on LMC’s threats, rather than its promises. However, any final version 
of the theory must at least show potential for living up to many or all of its motivations. 
With that in mind, I will loosely set out some desiderata for LMC that are derived from 
the advantages discussed above. These desiderata will be revisited in chapter 8, where the 
theory developed in chapters 6 and 7 is weighed in terms of its capacity to meet them.  
Desideratum 1: The metaphysics of modality provided by LMC must be compatible with 
a plausible account of our knowledge of modal truths, thereby meeting the integration 
challenge posed by Benacerraf and Peacocke. Furthermore, LMC must be compatible 
with an empiricist, methodologically naturalistic account of our modal knowledge.  
Desideratum 2: The metaphysics of modality provided by LMC must meet three 
conditions. It must be reductionist in that it avoids commitment to primitive or unreduced 
modal notions, and it must be parsimonious when it comes to both ontological types and 
tokens. The theory must also conform to a strict metaphysical naturalism.  
Desideratum 3: LMC must be able to provide a satisfying response to prominent 
objections. This includes existing challenges such as Quine’s critique of the analytic / 
synthetic distinction and the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, as well as the 
challenges described in chapters 3-5 of this thesis. This final desideratum will be the 
primary focus of the remainder of the thesis, beginning with a discussion of Quinean and 
Kripekan challenges in chapters 1 and 2. 
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V. A map of the thesis 
I begin in chapter 1 with an overview of the historical background of linguistic modal 
conventionalism, beginning with the logical positivists and finishing with the challenges 
posed by Quine and Kripke. This chapter provides helpful context through discussion of 
why the theory was developed and why it lost favour. I will argue that the philosophical 
concerns that led many to reject LMC can be answered. In part, this task has already been 
tackled by defenders of LMC such as Sidelle and Thomasson; I will accept some aspects 
of their case, and argue that other parts need extra development. Doing so will be the task 
for chapter 2. There, I describe the positions of Sidelle and Thomasson in detail, paying 
particular attention to the way each theorist incorporates necessary a posteriori truths into 
a linguistic approach to modality. The two accounts of the necessary a posteriori are 
similar, and show promise. However, I argue that both depend on a notion of actual-world 
dependence that is left unexplained. Chapter 2 also provides a defence of analyticity in 
light of Quinean objections, making use of the work of Sidelle and Thomasson among 
others. Finally, it includes a brief overview of other conventionalist and / or deflationary 
modal theories, and sets up parameters that a theory must meet to qualify as LMC.  
In chapters 3, 4 and 5 I present a new source of objection for LMC. Beginning in chapter 
3, I argue that the theory is in danger of commitment to conventionalism about ordinary 
objects, and indeed, about any entities that possess modal properties. One such argument 
comes from Sidelle, who aims to demonstrate that LMC is incompatible with object 
realism insofar as in combination, the two views become committed to logical 
contradictions. Sidelle’s preferred solution to the problem is to reject object realism and 
accept a conventionalist theory of objects. However, I argue that such a commitment is 
problematic in light of LMC’s motivations and ought to be avoided if possible. I also 
present a second route from LMC to object conventionalism: given that the existence and 
identity conditions of objects are modal in nature, conventionalism about an object’s 
modal properties leads to conventionalism about the object itself.  
Chapter 4 examines whether Thomasson’s work, potentially in combination with Stephen 
Schiffer’s work on ‘pleonastic properties,’ can be used formulate a version of LMC that 
avoids object conventionalism. I argue that this avenue for defending the theory fails. In 
doing so, I argue for a dilemma facing LMC. On the one hand, there is a ‘weak’ version 
of the theory that avoids object conventionalism; however, its commitments are so 
minimal that the view fails to constitute a genuine theory of modality. On the other hand, 
there is ‘strong’ version of theory that constitutes a genuine theory of modality, but is 
committed to object conventionalism. In chapter 5, I argue that a structurally isomorphic 
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dilemma can be established when it comes to modality and truth. Plausibly, LMC should 
treat the content of sentences (perhaps construed as propositions) as qualifying as 
metaphysically necessary, or contingent, and so on due to the conventions of language 
governing the sentences themselves. However, insofar as the truth conditions of 
propositions are modal, conventionalism about the modal status of those propositions 
leads to conventionalism about non-modal truth. On the other hand, weaker versions of 
LMC that avoid this commitment fail to constitute genuine theories of modality.  
In chapters 6 and 7, I outline a strategy for LMC to respond to the objections set out in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. I argue that both horns of the dilemma can be avoided by doing away 
with problematic ontology. In particular, that means denying the existence of modal 
properties had by objects, and of modal statuses had by propositions or sentence contents. 
Then, the truth conditions of both de re and de dicto modal sentences can be given 
without reference to such entities; instead they make reference directly to the features of 
language upon which LMC takes modality to depend. Chapter 6 describes the 
metaphysics of this account, and chapter 7 describes its semantics. Specifically, chapter 7 
gives an overview of how possible worlds can be constructed within the context of LMC, 
and provides some basic truth conditions of modal sentences in terms of such worlds. In 
doing so, I return to the issue of the necessary a posteriori discussed in chapter 2 by 
providing an account of how LMC can make use of actual-world dependence to explain 
the necessity of sentences like ‘Water is H2O.’ 
Finally, in chapter 8, I revisit the desiderata described in sections II and III of this 
introduction, and provide replies to a number of objections facing the version of LMC 
articulated in chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Rise and Fall of Linguistic Modal Conventionalism 
In order to assess the prospects for a modern linguistic modal conventionalist theory, it is 
helpful to begin by establishing the position’s theoretical background. This chapter will 
provide that background in the form of an overview of the history of LMC, beginning 
with the logical positivists, continuing through Quine’s critique of positivist theories, and 
ending with issues that arose for those theories in light of the work in the philosophy of 
language and metaphysics done by Kripke and Putnam. It will pave the way for in depth 
discussion and critique of two modern variants of the theory in the next chapter: those of 
Alan Sidelle and Amie Thomasson. The purpose of this chapter is to bring to light the 
specifics of certain historical theories and the issues that faced them, as well as to provide 
a sense of how and why attitudes to linguistic theories have changed over time. I will 
argue that the principal arguments against LMC that led to its loss of favour can be 
combated. Throughout, I’ll draw attention to where historical instantiations of the theory 
stand in relation to the desiderata for LMC established in the introduction: empiricism, 
epistemological and methodological naturalism, reductionism and parsimony. I’ll begin in 
section 1.1 will with a broad outline of logical positivism and how the movement came to 
be associated with LMC. I’ll then describe two positivist modal theories: those of Ayer 
and Carnap. Next, section 1.3 addresses Quine’s influential rejection of the analytic / 
synthetic distinction and the consequences it had for Ayer and Carnap’s views. I’ll finish 
in sections 1.4 and 1.5 by discussing the work of Kripke and Putnam and its relevance for 
positivist LMC. Finally, I’ll conclude by revisiting the desiderata established in the 
introduction, and in particular the final desideratum listed: a satisfactory linguistic theory 
must be able to withstand prominent critiques, such as those levelled by Quine, Putnam 
and Kripke. This will provide useful context for the discussion of Sidelle and Thomasson 
in chapter 2, both of whom focus on meeting the Kripkean challenge for their respective 
linguistic theories.  
 
1.1 Logical positivism and early linguistic theories of modality. 
In order to situate particular linguistic theories of modality endorsed by the logical 
positivists, it will help to begin with a broad discussion of the motivations and central 
tenets of the positivist movement, as well as the developments in science and philosophy 
that helped to bring it about. In particular, Einstein’s general relativity theory was highly 
influential in the ideas of many of the philosophers who were associated with the Vienna 
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Circle and became known as logical positivists.
38
 The influence of relativity theory 
derived from its apparent incompatibility with the traditional Kantian view of a priori 
knowledge. Kant had argued that a significant part of scientific knowledge was synthetic 
a priori, and gained via the use of ‘pure intuition’. In particular, this included Euclidian 
geometry, and the parts of Newtonian physics that describe space-time in terms of it.
39
 
However, the emergence of non-Euclidian geometries through the work of Helmholtz and 
others began to undermine this position; if coherent non-Euclidian systems of geometry 
could be constructed, it was difficult to maintain the position that Euclidian geometry was 
‘true’ as revealed by pure intuition.40 Einstein’s work finally rendered Kant’s position 
altogether untenable since it showed that the best scientific theory of space-time made use 
of non-Euclidian rather than Euclidian geometry.  
The early logical positivists began as neo-Kantians who struggled to explain knowledge 
of geometry and its role in scientific theory. Ultimately, these philosophers concluded 
that a break with Kant was necessary and that the synthetic a priori had to be rejected. 
Two important figures in this process were Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach. Both 
developed new ideas about the role played by geometrical theories in broader physical 
theories and our knowledge of them.
41
 While both Schlick and Reichenbach rejected the 
idea that geometry was synthetic a priori, neither replaced it with the view that geometry 
was a posteriori and straightforwardly subject to empirical experimentation.
42
 While 
empirical results such as Einstein’s clearly had bearing on which geometrical theory 
correctly describes space-time, the early positivists did not conclude that any geometrical 
system was testable on its own; rather, they took geometry to form part of a wider 
                                                     
38 A good overview of the implications of general relativity for the positivists can be found in Michael 
Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), introduction 
and ch. 3, and J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) chs. 1, 3 and 9.   
39 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd rev. ed., trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (New York: Wiley Book 
Co., 1943). Relevant sections include pp.97-112 (A148-A158), pp.38-39 ( A46-A48). See Friedman, 
Reconsidering Logical Positivism ch. 3 and Coffa, The Semantic Tradition for analysis of Kant on analyticity, 
pure intuition and the a priori. Kant’s view of geometry as synthetic a priori is due, according to Coffa ch. 3, 
to his narrow conception of analyticity. For Kant, concepts have components, and the act of analysis involves 
breaking them down into those components. No sentence is analytic unless the predicate concept is literally a 
part of the subject concept. Geometrical sentences fail this test. 
40 Coffa ch. 3 includes discussion of the work of Helmholtz and the reaction of neo-Kantians.  
41 See Hans Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, trans. University of  California 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) , Moritz Schlick, ‘The Philosophical 
Significance of the Principle of Relativity’ and ‘Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of Modern Physics?’ in 
Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1), ed. Henk L. Mulder and Barbaba F. B. van de Velde-Schlick, trans. Peter 
Heath (Dordrecht: D Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp.153-189, pp.322-334 and Moritz Schlick, ‘Are 
Natural Laws Conventions?’ in Philosophical Papers (Vol. 2), ed. Henk L. Mulder and Barbara F. B. van de 
Velde-Schlick, trans. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 
pp.437-445. 
42 Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism pp.6-7, p.60 argues that the positivists’ theory of geometry 
does not qualify as ‘empiricist’ in the tradition of Kant’s British empiricist opponents.   
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scientific theory that faced the test of experience as a whole.
43
 Reichenbach argued that 
scientific theories include two kinds of posits that play distinct roles within the theory.  
On the one hand, he took there to be empirical posits that make predictions about the 
world and are testable via observation. On the other hand, however, in order for those 
posits to have any content or meaning, the concepts and terms involved had to be clearly 
defined. This was the role of the other posits in the theory. As such, Reichenbach argued 
that scientific theories include both ‘axioms of connection’ that are empirical and testable, 
and ‘axioms of coordination’ that are ‘constitutive’; they define the terms involved in the 
theory, and must be established before empirical investigation can begin.
44
 Schlick agreed 
with Reichenbach on the need for constitutive principles but argued that they should be 
treated as conventions, ‘in Poincaré’s sense.’45  
Importantly, both Reichenbach and Schlick treated geometry as forming part of the 
conventional or ‘constitutive’ part of the theory.46 Their central disagreement with Kant 
was over his treatment of geometry as synthetic. At first glance, the treatment of 
geometry as conventional or definitional may seem in conflict with the original 
motivation of these new views. After all, in order to accommodate the shift from Newton 
to Einstein, it must be the case that geometry can be revised in light of empirical 
evidence. However, no conflict arises because for Reichenbach and Schlick, geometry is 
subject to revision despite being definitional. Reichenbach in particular is famous for 
endorsing a relative a priori. Within a given theory, geometrical posits were treated as 
definitional of concepts such as ‘line’ and ‘point’; but empirical investigation could 
motivate moving to a new scientific theory, and therefore revising the definitional 
principles in such a way that these concepts were redefined.
47
 This view was taken up and 
expanded by Carnap in his ‘The Logical Syntax of Language,’ and later, his ‘Meaning 
and Necessity.’ Carnap saw the matter of which sentences were definitional as relative to 
                                                     
43 For example, Reichenbach, The Theory of Relativity p.59 says, ‘In the literature the problem of consistency 
has usually been discussed only with regard to individual principles... But in this way the question is not 
formulated correctly. The problem is not whether one individual principle can be retained but whether the 
whole system of principles can always be preserved.’ 
44 See Reichenbach The Theory of Relativity pp.34-47, pp.52-55.   
45 Schlick, ‘Critical or Empiricist Interpretation of Modern Physics?’ p.333. 
46 For example, Reichenbach p.76 says, ‘Mathematics is indifferent with regard to the applicability of its 
theorems to physical things, and its axioms contain merely a system of rules according to which its concepts 
can be related to each other... Therefore, the axioms of geometry could not assert anything about the 
epistemological problem of physical space.’ And Schlick, ‘Are Natural Laws Conventions?’ p.437, says 
‘Henri Poincaré developed the procedure of convention with reference to the propositions of geometry... by 
calling attention to the fact that those propositions in their application to the spatial properties of bodies are to 
be regarded as conventions.’ 
47 An important difference between Reichenbach and Schlick is that for Reichenbach, one and the same posit 
can be a priori and analytic in one theory, but a posteriori and synthetic in the context of another theory. For 
Schlick, if a posit is conventional it is conventional in all theories. (See Friedman Reconsidering Logical 
Positivsm pp.66-68 for discussion.)  
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a formal language; according to him, the rules of a language determine which sentences 
are analytic in that language.
48
  
The response taken by the positivists to relativity theory was therefore to conclude that 
there was no synthetic a priori. Rather, the posits of a scientific theory were treated as 
belonging to one of two camps: they must be either constitutive of meaning, or empirical. 
This view paved the way for the formation of the verificationist theory of meaning, 
according to which all meaningful sentences are either analytic or have direct 
observational consequences.
49
 Verificationism is in direct opposition to the Kantian 
synthetic a priori since it denies that there are any meaningful, synthetic sentences that 
are only knowable a priori. Rather, any meaningful sentence that is knowable only a 
priori must be analytic. This combined emphasis on empirical methods and the logical 
analysis of language can justifiably be called the core of the positivist movement, which 
is often aptly termed ‘logical empiricism.’ The movement was strongly anti-rationalist, 
rejecting the ‘pure intuition’ of Kant and replacing it with a respect for the empirical 
methodology of science. However, it did not go so far as to require that all knowledge 
was empirical; rather, its proponents argued that some knowledge could be gained by the 
logical analysis of the language of science.  While empirical investigation was the job of 
scientists, the task of the analysis of language was considered to be the job of 
philosophers.
50
 
It can now be made clear how and why the logical positivists came to endorse a linguistic 
theory of modal truth. In fact this position on modality is naturally suggested by the 
positivist position on a priori knowledge and the role of philosophy. Modal sentences 
make claims that are not about what is actually the case; rather they are about what must 
be the case or what could possibly be the case. Therefore, they are typical examples of 
claims the truth of which cannot be discovered empirically. In order to find out whether it 
is necessary that all bachelors are unmarried, doing a survey of bachelors won’t get you 
very far. You might discover that all bachelors are actually unmarried, but this alone is 
not sufficient determine whether this is necessarily the case. Similarly, there are no 
experiments you can run in order to determine whether unicorns or talking donkeys are 
possible or impossible. All you’ll find is that actually there are none. If modal claims are 
                                                     
48 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, trans. Amethe Smeaton (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1937), Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity 2nd ed. See also Friedman, Reconsidering 
Logical Positivism ch. 7 for discussion.  
49 Ayer is perhaps most famous for endorsing a verificationist theory of meaning. See A. J. Ayer, Language, 
Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. pp.35-41. 
50 For example Carnap says in the foreword to ‘The Logical Syntax of Language’ (p.xiii) ‘That part of the 
work of philosophers which may be held to be scientific in its nature – excluding the empirical questions 
which can be referred to empirical science – consists of logical analysis... Philosophy is to be replaced by the 
logic of science – that is to say, by the logical analysis of the concepts and sentences of the sciences...’  
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not susceptible to empirical investigation, then they are of dubious standing according to 
the positivists unless their truth is somehow definitional. That is to say, the truth of modal 
sentences must be connected with the ‘constitutive’ or analytic parts of a theory. Luckily, 
there was a natural way for the positivists to take modal truths to depend on language. For 
a sentence to be true necessarily is for there to be a sense in which it cannot be false. As a 
result, a positivist treatment of modal sentences requires there to be a feature of language 
that guarantees the truth of some sentences. Of course, the positivists already made use of 
exactly such a feature: analyticity. At least relative to a theory, framework or language, 
any sentence that is analytic cannot be false in that language, and is therefore true 
necessarily. 
For this reason, it made sense for positivists to treat any sentence that had the feature of 
analyticity as also having the feature of necessity. Given that the positivists already 
claimed that all a priori sentences were analytic, they tended to treat analyticity, apriority 
and necessity as co-extensional properties of sentences, with the latter two features being 
dependent on the former. The sentences that could be known in the absence of empirical 
investigation and were true necessarily were taken to be all and only those whose truth 
was guaranteed by the meanings of the sub-sentential terms. Hence, a linguistic theory of 
modality was adopted; modal sentences were taken to depend for their truth on the 
meanings of terms. 
In summary, positivist linguistic theories of modality had their roots in a philosophy of 
science that arose due to the work of Einstein and the need to explain the role of geometry 
in general relativity. The posits of scientific theories were taken to be of two kinds: the 
conventional, analytic, a priori, necessary posits that define the terms of a theory, and the 
synthetic, a posteriori, contingent posits that are subject to scientific experimentation. 
Importantly, even the former can be given up in light of evidence if new definitions of 
terms are required.
51
 This is what the positivists took to have occurred in the shift from 
Newtonian physics with its Euclidian geometry to Einsteinian physics with its non-
Euclidian geometry. The positivists took the analytic and a priori parts of scientific 
theory to provide a role for philosophy; the job of philosophers was to analyse the 
conventional, definitional posits of theory. Given that modal sentences are generally a 
priori, a linguistic treatment of modality became natural. Relative to a theory or 
                                                     
51 Different positivist theories have different commitments about the sense in which analytic / a priori posits 
can be ‘given up’. While Reichenbach can be read as claiming that one and the same sentence is a priori 
relative to one theory and a posteriori relative to another, Carnap is better represented as claiming that 
moving to new analytic posits involves a change in meaning. Also note that not all positivists would 
explicitly endorse the claim that apriority, analyticity and necessity are co-exentensional. Ayer and Carnap 
are clear examples of positivists who do. (See sections 1.2 and 1.3 below.) 
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framework, the necessary sentences were taken to be all and only those that were 
analytic.  
Logical positivism, along with its linguistic theory of necessary truth, remained popular 
up until the middle part of the 20
th
 century. At this point however, the movement came 
under attack, leading to a change in philosophical orthodoxy which included a move 
away from positivism and LMC. On the one hand, the positivists failed to achieve some 
of their own stated goals. Perhaps most prominently, the attempt to create an adequate 
verificationist criterion of meaning was unsuccessful. On the other hand, positivist 
presuppositions were critiqued from a number of sources. Quine’s critique of analyticity 
in ‘Truth by Convention’, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’ 
was influential in a widespread rejection of the analytic / synthetic distinction.
52
 Later, the 
work of Kripke and Putnam in the philosophy of language led to the adoption of semantic 
views that appeared to be in conflict with central claims made by positivist linguistic 
theories.
53
 The next sections will outline the versions of LMC endorsed by Ayer and 
Carnap, as well as the critiques that followed. 
   
1.2 A. J. Ayer 
Ayer’s is perhaps the name most closely associated with the logical positivist movement. 
He supported a wholesale verificationism about meaning, which is articulated in his 
‘Language, Truth and Logic’.  Broadly, the verification principle says that a sentence is 
meaningful if and only if it is either a) tautological, or b) in principle verifiable on the 
basis of empirical observation. More precisely, Ayer argues that a sentence is in principle 
verifiable if some ‘experiential proposition’ can be deduced from it in conjunction with a 
set of premises when that proposition cannot be deduced from the set of premises alone.
54
 
An experiential proposition here is defined as a proposition that makes an assertion about 
some actual or possible observation. If a sentence is non-tautological and fails to meet 
                                                     
52 W.V. Quine, ‘Truth by Convention,’ in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 
1966) pp.70-99 W. V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’ The Philosophical Review Vol. 60, No. 1 
(1951): pp.20-43, W. V. Quine, ‘Carnap and Logical Truth,’ Synthese Vol. 12, No. 4, (1960): pp.350-374. 
53 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), Hilary Putnam, 
‘Meaning and Reference,’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 70, No. 19 (1973): pp.699-711, Hilary Putnam, 
‘The Meaning of “Meaning”,’ in Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp.215-271. 
54 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, pp.38-39. Ayer recognised that this renders any sentence whatsoever 
meaningful according to the verification principle, since any experiential proposition E can be deduced from 
any sentence S in conjunction with ‘If S then E’, when ‘E’ cannot be deduced from ‘If S then E’ alone. This 
renders S meaningful on Ayer’s criterion. In the introduction of the second edition of Language, Truth and 
Logic he amends his verification principle in light of this, restricting the kinds of sentences that can be 
conjoined with the sentence of interest to deduce the experiential proposition. Nonetheless, it is now widely 
accepted that attempts to produce a plausible verificationist criterion of meaning have failed.  
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Ayer’s criterion for verifiability, there can be no empirical observation relevant for 
determining its truth, and it therefore lacks meaning on his view.
55
 Ayer considers 
sentences of this kind to be ‘pseudo-sentences’ and argues that many of the assertions 
made in traditional metaphysics lack meaning in this way.  It is clear then that Ayer takes 
seriously the divide between empirical and definitional posits discussed in the previous 
section; all meaningful sentences are either tautological or empirical in nature.  
What then of the tautological sentences? Ayer treats being tautological as the same 
property had by sentences as being analytic. In order to gain a grip on Ayer’s account of 
what it takes for a sentence to be analytic it is useful to consider some of the phrases he 
uses. He says of the analytic:
56
 
 ‘...a proposition is analytic if it is true solely in virtue of the meaning of its 
constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either confirmed or refuted by any 
fact of experience.’ (p.16) 
 ‘…the reason why these propositions cannot be confuted in experience is that 
they do not make any assertion about the empirical world, but simply record our 
determination to use symbols in a certain fashion.’ (p.31) 
 (Of the analyticity of mathematics and logic) ‘…we cannot abandon them 
without contradicting ourselves, without sinning against the rules which govern 
the use of language, and so making our utterance self-stultifying.’ (p.77) 
 ‘…a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of 
the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts 
of experience.’ (p.78) 
 ‘And this applies to all analytic propositions. They none of them provide any 
information about any matter of fact. In other words, they are entirely devoid of 
factual content. And it is for this reason that no experience can confute them.’ 
(p.79) 
These quotes make clear that for Ayer, analytic propositions are definitional in nature, 
and are devoid of factual content; they do not depend for their truth on any extra-
linguistic facts. They are also treated by Ayer as conventional, as indicated by his 
assertion that they ‘simply record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion.’  
Further analysis suggests that Ayer supported the idea that analytic sentences are true 
necessarily, and what’s more, that they owe their necessity to their analyticity. He 
provides as an example the sentence ‘A material thing cannot be in two places at once’ 
                                                     
55 Ibid, p.35. 
56 In text page numbers in the following paragraphs refer to Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. 
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(p.58). He says of this sentence that it is ‘linguistic’ rather than empirical and accepts that 
it expresses a necessary proposition, saying, ‘...it is necessary only because we happen to 
use the relevant words in a particular way’ (p.58). Later, he refers to propositions’ 
analyticity as ‘the sole ground of their necessity’ (p.84).57 For Ayer, a linguistic approach 
to modality goes hand in hand with the rejection of the synthetic a priori. He says, ‘For 
while it is true that we have a priori knowledge of necessary propositions, it is not true, as 
Kant supposed, that any of these necessary propositions are synthetic. They are without 
exception analytic propositions, or, in other words, tautologies’ (p.84). 
Ayer’s writing gives us insight into the kind of linguistic theory of modality he endorsed. 
He clearly argues that all a priori and necessary sentences are analytic. What’s more, 
both apriority and necessity are explained by analyticity. He also indicates a number of 
features that are had by analytic or ‘tautological’ sentences, and therefore by necessary 
ones. For example, they are definitional, conventional and independent of extra-linguistic 
facts. Unfortunately, however, Ayer does not offer an explicit theory of how conventional 
linguistic practices come to determine which sentences are analytic and which are not. 
For this reason, while it is clear that Ayer takes all and only necessary sentences to be 
analytic sentences, we are unable to establish much more detail for his version of LMC.  
Nonetheless, Ayer’s positivist commitments suggest he would have considered his theory 
to satisfy some of the desiderata established for LMC in the introduction. In particular, 
Ayer would have embraced the value of providing an empiricist explanation of our modal 
knowledge. Indeed, doing so was a core project of the positivist movement in which he 
was a key player. Ayer’s belief that a priori knowledge can only be explained if 
sentences known a priori are tautological indicates his suspicion of rationalist 
epistemology. It is less clear that Ayer would have embraced the desiderata of 
metaphysical naturalism, parsimony or reductionism. In fact, unless claims about the 
relative parsimoniousness of theories, or about what reduces to what, are treated as 
analytic, they are just the kind of metaphysical claims of which Ayer would have been 
suspicious.  
 
1.3 Rudolf Carnap 
Like, Ayer’s, Carnap’s LMC centred on the claim that all and only necessary sentences 
are analytic sentences. Unlike Ayer, however, Carnap established a detailed theory of 
                                                     
57 Nowadays we would be more careful to distinguish the necessity of a sentence from that of a proposition. 
(This distinction is of great importance for LMC, as we will see in chapter 5 of this thesis.) In Ayer’s writing, 
however, the content of a sentence is not clearly distinguished from the sentence itself. 
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what it takes for a sentence to be analytic in a language. Carnap’s account of analyticity 
changed over time, beginning with a purely syntactic account in ‘The Logical Syntax of 
Language’, and evolving to a semantic account in ‘Meaning and Necessity’. This 
semantic account was supplemented further in his ‘Meaning Postulates’ and ‘Empiricism, 
Semantics and Ontology.’58  
The earlier syntactic theory of analyticity has in common with the later view that which 
sentences qualify as analytic is relative to the language in which they occur. In section 17 
of his ‘The Logical Syntax of Language’, Carnap formulates his ‘principle of tolerance’, 
saying that ‘it is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions’ and, 
‘in logic there are no morals’.59 The idea expressed in the principle of tolerance is that the 
non-empirical part of a theory, which includes logic, is not a matter for discovery but 
instead is determined purely by the conventionally specified rules of the language. Which 
sentences are analytic is up to us as the speakers of the language. As noted above, 
analyticity in the ‘Logical Syntax’ is defined syntactically. The syntax of a language is 
given by a set of ‘formation rules’ determining which strings of symbols (sentences) are 
permissible, and a set of ‘transformation rules’ determining when one sentence can be 
derived from another sentence.
60
 Carnap defines a notion of logical consequence which 
tells you when one sentence is derivable from another given the rules of a language. A 
sentence is analytic when it is a consequence of any sentence whatsoever.
61
 
It is only later, when he develops his semantic theory of analyticity in ‘Meaning and 
Necessity’, that Carnap comes to treat necessity and analyticity as the same property. He 
offers his ‘L-truth’ as an explicatum for ‘what Leibniz called necessary truth and Kant 
called analytic truth’.62 Carnap’s description of analyticity, his explicandum, is ‘truth 
based on logical reasons or meaning alone,’ independent of ‘the contingency of facts.’63 
As such, Carnap’s account of L-truth is intended as an explication of analyticity: his aim 
is to make this concept precise. In order to do so, he makes use of the notion of a ‘state 
description’, which is defined as a class of sentences that contains for every atomic 
sentence expressible in a language either it or its negation and not both.
64
 If a state 
description contains a sentence, it is treated as true at the state description. If a state 
description contains the negation of a sentence, it is false at that state description. 
                                                     
58 Rudolf Carnap, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie Vol. 4, No. 
11 (1950): pp.20-40 and Rudolf Carnap, ‘Meaning Postulates,’ Philosophical Studies: An International 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition Vol. 3, No. 5 (1952): pp.65-73. 
59 Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language  pp.51-52. 
60 Ibid, p.2. 
61 Ibid, p.39. 
62 Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p.8.  
63 Ibid, p.10. 
64 Ibid, p.9. 
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Complex sentences will also be true or false at each state description, and their truth 
values are determined as you would expect by those of the atomic sentences and the rules 
laid out in the classical truth tables. For example, if ‘S’ is true at a state description, ‘~S’ 
is false. If ‘S’ and ‘T’ are both true at a state description, ‘S & T’ is true, and so on.65 
On Carnap’s view, there will be a state description for every maximal class of sentences 
that can all be true together in the language under consideration. That is to say, for each 
maximal, consistent class of sentences, there will be a state description at which all and 
only those sentences are true. For this reason, state descriptions play the role of what we 
refer to now as ‘possible worlds’. In fact, Carnap explicitly states that a state description 
gives a ‘complete description of a possible state of the universe’.66 Using the notion of a 
state description, we come to a definition of L-truth: according to Carnap, a sentence is L-
true if and only if it is true at every state description. Given that L-truth is intended as an 
explicatum for analyticity and necessity, it also holds on Carnap’s account that a sentence 
is analytic and necessary if and only if it is true at every state description.  
Based on the rules for truth at a state description described above we can already see that 
some sentences count as L-true on Carnap’s view.  Given how a state description is 
defined, for example, the law of the excluded middle must be true necessarily. Since 
every state description contains either ‘S’ or ‘~S’, and ‘S  ~S’ is true at a state 
description so long as either ‘S’ or ~S’ is true there, ‘S  ~S’ will be true at every state 
description. In fact, all the laws of classical propositional logic will be true at every state 
description and therefore necessary. Carnap also notes, however, that there will be cases 
of necessary truths that are not what we ordinarily classify as logical truths. For example, 
since according to Carnap ‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ are synonymous, ‘All humans 
are rational animals’ is L-true.67 Carnap explicitly states that some sentences of this 
nature are L-true, but he does not elaborate in ‘Meaning and Necessity’ on what makes it 
the case that these sentences are true at every state description.
68
 While we are told that 
analyticity and necessity are both equivalent to L-truth, and that L-truth is truth at every 
state description, the account cannot be complete until we are told exactly which truths 
are true at every state description, in addition to the logical ones.  
                                                     
65 Ibid, p.11. 
66 Ibid, p.9. 
67 Ibid, p.9. 
68 Carnap does say that the sentence ‘All humans are rational animals’ is L-true because it can be ‘established 
without referring to facts by merely using the semantical rules of S1, especially 1-2’. (Meaning and Necessity, 
p.15) Here, S1 is the language Carnap is discussing, and 1-2 is a set of rules of designation noting that 
‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ ‘mean the same’. This suggests that synonymy has a role to play in 
determining what is true at every state description, but no further elaboration is provided.  
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This gap is filled in Carnap’s later papers ‘Empiricism Semantic and Ontology’ and 
‘Meaning Postulates’. In the latter paper Carnap argues that we make it the case that 
certain non-logical sentences are true in every state description. For example, we make it 
the case that ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is true at every state description and therefore 
necessary, by laying down a meaning postulate: (x)(Bx  ~Ux). By doing so, we 
guarantee that for every state description and for every constant a in the language, either 
‘Ba’ and ‘Ua’ will both be true, or ‘Ba’ will be false. Importantly, these postulates are 
stipulated according to Carnap, not discovered. He says of the rule cited above, for 
example, that it is ‘not a matter of knowledge but of decision.’69 Which sentences are true 
in every state description will therefore be determined by the rules for state descriptions 
combined with the meaning postulates. This story is supported by the arguments made in 
‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, where Carnap expands on the notion of a 
linguistic framework by defining it is a system of language that can be introduced to 
describe a new domain. A framework comes with linguistic rules and meaning postulates 
that determine what is analytic according to the framework. For example, when 
introducing the framework of numbers, the rules will make it the case that sentences such 
as ‘Five is a number’ are analytic.70 
In summary, Carnap’s LMC treats the necessary (analytic) truths as those that hold in 
every state description, which is itself determined by stipulated meaning postulates. A 
language will contain rules determining when one truth can be derived from another (such 
as the truth tables for the logical connectives), plus meaning postulates, which are 
stipulated. These will determine which sentences are true at which state description and 
therefore which sentences are true at all state descriptions, or in other words, are L-true. 
Since L-truth is equivalent to analyticity and necessity, we get the result that the modal 
status of a sentence is in fact a matter of postulation; it is determined by the meaning 
postulates that by convention, we have stipulated to hold.  
Like Ayer, therefore, Carnap endorses a linguistic theory according to which all 
necessary sentences are analytic. In fact, he treats the properties of ‘being analytic’ and 
‘being necessary’ as equivalent. Unlike Ayer, however, Carnap has a detailed theory of 
when a sentence gets to qualify as analytic. Carnap may well have embraced the 
epistemological desiderata set up in the introduction. He wishes to avoid reliance on 
rationalist epistemology, and his commitment to empiricism is made clear in a number of 
places. For example, in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ Carnap claims that all 
meaningful statements are either empirical or determined to be true or false by the rules 
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70 Carnap, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, pp.21-25. 
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of the linguistic framework.
71
 As a key logical positivist, this guiding principle is central 
in Carnap’s treatment of necessity as equivalent to analyticity. However, this principle 
also underlies a potential suspicion of the metaphysical desiderata set out in the 
introduction. Factors such as reductionism and parsimony would not be treated by Carnap 
as virtues of framework in their own right. Nonetheless, they may be thought to 
contribute to pragmatic considerations that warrant the choice of one framework over 
another. 
 
1.4 W. V. Quine 
 Quine was a critic of the 20
th
 Century empiricist movement from within. In three central 
papers, ‘Truth by Convention’, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ and ‘Carnap and Logical 
Truth’, Quine argues that the notion of truth by convention is incoherent, and that we 
ought to reject the analytic / synthetic distinction altogether. His criticisms are levelled in 
particular at analyticity as characterised by Carnap. If successful, Quine’s case against 
analyticity has significant implications for LMC; if there is no special class of sentences 
that count as analytic, LMC has no way of distinguishing the necessary sentences from 
the contingent ones, the possible from the impossible, and so on. What’s more, Quine’s 
critique of analyticity has been highly influential, and is widely credited as decisive 
against analyticity.
72
 
Quine’s attack on analyticity begins in ‘Truth by Convention’. As noted above, being true 
by convention was a property that many of the positivists associated with analyticity. This 
is certainly the case for both Ayer and Carnap; Ayer treats analytic sentences as made 
true by stipulation, and for Carnap it is meaning postulates that determine which 
sentences are true in every state description. Quine’s stated aim in ‘Truth by Convention’ 
is to ‘question the sense’ of the notion of a sentence’s being true as a matter of 
convention.
73
 He argues that stipulated definitions are incapable of grounding the truth of 
a sentence; they are only capable of expressing a sentence that’s already true in a new 
way. For example, say that ‘1km’ is stipulated to mean that same as ‘1000m’. According 
                                                     
71 Ibid, pp.22-23. 
72 For example, J. A. Fodor and E. Lepore, ‘Why Meaning (Probably) Isn’t Conceptual Role,’ Philosophical 
Issues Vol. 3 (1993) p.27 note that ‘these days, practically everybody thinks that the a/s [analytic / synthetic] 
distinction is unprincipled.’ They consider commitment to this distinction to be sufficient reason for rejecting 
a theory of meaning. And, Paul Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered,’ Noûs Vol. 30, No. 3 (1996) p.360. 
notes ‘This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic / synthetic distinction: In his classic 
early writings on analyticity… Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true 
purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not.’ See also Hilary Putnam, ‘The Analytic and the 
Synthetic,’ in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, pp.33-69. 
73 Quine, ‘Truth by Convention’, p.70. 
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to Quine, ‘1km = 1000m’ is not true by definition. Rather, it expresses an antecedently 
true self-identity: ‘1000m = 1000m’. So, the first sentence is transformable into a logical 
truth by swapping synonyms for synonyms, but it owes its truth to whatever made the 
original logical sentence true. Unless the logical sentence ‘1000m = 1000m’ is true by 
convention, ‘1km = 1000m’ isn’t either.74  
The remainder of the paper deals with the question of whether or not logic itself can be 
true by convention. Quine suggests that one way for logic to be true by convention would 
be if we were to stipulate the truth values that are to be had by logical sentences. In effect, 
this is the strategy adopted by Carnap. However, Quine argues that this strategy faces a 
dilemma. On the one hand, particular logical sentences are infinite in number, so it would 
be impossible to stipulate truth values for each one individually. (Assuming an infinite 
number of constants for sentences, we cannot stipulate the truth of ‘S  S’, ‘T  T’, and 
so on for all the logical sentences.) On the other hand, truth values for particular logical 
sentences could be derived from general, stipulated logical truths, for example, via truth 
tables. (For example, we could stipulate that all sentences of the form    are to be 
true.) However in order to derive the particular logical truths from the general ones, logic 
would need to be used, generating an infinite regress. 
In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine takes a weaker notion of analyticity as his target. 
Some believers in analyticity do not require that there are sentences owing their truth to 
convention alone. Those falling into this camp want no more than what Quine himself 
appeared to countenance in ‘Truth by Convention’: that some sentences are analytic in the 
sense that they are transformable into a logical truth by substituting synonyms for 
synonyms.
75
 Quine takes aim even at this form of analyticity in ‘Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism’. His attack is two-pronged. Firstly, he argues that the notion of analyticity at 
issue cannot be explicated in a non-circular way. In order to specify when sentences are 
analytic in the sense outlined we would require an account of ‘synonymy’, a notion that 
Quine argues is no better understood than analyticity itself. More generally, Quine claims 
that semantic notions such as analyticity and synonymy are interdefined in such a way 
that none can be independently characterised, and as a result, that all should be rejected. 
This part of Quine’s critique was taken up again in his paper ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, 
where he argues that if an independently specified account of analyticity cannot be given, 
to say that a sentence is analytic amounts to little more than saying that it appears 
obviously true. However, he says, mere obviousness is unable to play the central role 
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75 This definition of analyticity is widely cited. Bohossian, (‘Analyticity Reconsidered’ p.366) attributes it to 
Frege. See section 3 of Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into 
the Concept of Number, trans. J. L. Austin, 2nd ed (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953). 
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assigned to analyticity by Carnap and others. Most relevantly for LMC, the mere 
obviousness of a sentence cannot explain its necessity. This prong of Quine’s attack is 
rejected by some as failing to achieve its purpose, since many meaningful philosophical 
concepts are similarly interdependent.
76
  
Nonetheless, Quine’s second main line of argument in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ has 
been extraordinarily influential.
77
 In the final section of the paper, Quine argues 
persuasively for a holistic theory of verification. He argues that there is no distinction to 
be made in scientific theories between theoretical posits that are purely definitional or 
stipulative, and those that are up for empirical refutation or confirmation. Rather, he 
argues, scientific theories face evidence as a whole.
78
 If the evidence does not fit with the 
theory, the theory must be adjusted to fit the evidence; but any theoretical postulate can in 
principle be revised. While some theoretical posits are less likely to be revised than 
others, none are altogether immune. This implies that sentences cannot meaningfully be 
divided, as both Ayer and Carnap suggest, into those that are empirically testable (the 
synthetic sentences) and those that are true in virtue of meaning (the analytic sentences). 
Quine’s conclusion is that the analytic / synthetic distinction ought to be rejected 
altogether. 
If Quine is right, there are no sentences that owe their truth to convention alone. What’s 
more, there is no interesting distinction between analyticity and syntheticity, even in the 
sense of being transformable into a logical truth by substituting synonyms for synonyms. 
This conclusion had significant consequences for the positivist movement in general, 
which relies on the notion of analyticity in a number of ways. Firstly, if no sense can be 
made of the notion of analyticity, the positivists cannot use it to explain a priori 
knowledge in the context of an empiricist epistemology. And, most importantly for us, 
any theory that treats necessity as determined by or equivalent to analyticity, including 
the versions of LMC endorsed by Ayer and Carnap, must be rejected if there is no such 
thing as analyticity. If Quine is right, a sentence’s necessity cannot be explained by its 
analyticity, since no sentence has the property of analyticity. 
 
 
                                                     
76 See, for example Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, Paul Boghossian, ‘Analyticity and Conceptual 
Truth,’ Philosophical Issues Vol. 5 (1994): pp.117-131, David J. Chalmers, ‘Revisability and Conceptual 
Change in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”,’ Journal of Philosophy Vol. 108, No. 8 (2011): pp.387-415. 
77 Chalmers’ ‘Revisability and Conceptual Change’ and Putnam’s ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’ both cite 
Quine’s argument from holism as influential in widespread rejection of analyticity. 
78 Note that this objection may not apply to all positivist views. For example, Reichenbach’s relative a priori 
appears to allow that an a priori posit can be given up without a change in meaning.  
29 
 
1.5 Saul Kripke 
The relationship between the notions of necessity and apriority is central in Kripke’s 
‘Naming and Necessity’. One of the most influential features of the book is Kripke’s 
argument, now widely accepted, that some sentences are true necessarily, but knowable 
only a posteriori. Kripke argues early on in the book that the notions should be 
distinguished in principle; after all, necessity is a metaphysical notion, to do with what 
can be, and apriority is an epistemological notion, to do with what we can know.
79
 Later, 
however, Kripke argues the two notions are not just different in principle but also fail to 
be co-extensional in fact; he argues that there are at least some sentences that are 
necessary but are not knowable a priori. Among them Kripke includes identity statements 
between names, for example ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and between natural kind terms, 
for example ‘Water is H2O’, as well as some sentences ascribing properties to individuals 
and kinds.
80
 The mere existence of necessary a posteriori truths is a threat to logical 
positivist views. Recall that for logical positivists such as Ayer, the analyticity of a 
sentence guarantees both its necessity and its apriority. And moreover, the only way for a 
sentence to be either necessary or a priori is by being analytic. In other words, analyticity 
is necessary and sufficient for both necessity and apriority. This means that necessity and 
apriority mutually guarantee each other too, which is straightforwardly incompatible with 
the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. 
Of course, the core claim of LMC is that necessity is guaranteed by analyticity, and the 
existence of the necessary a posteriori is not incompatible with this claim considered in 
isolation. A quick fix to LMC’s overall picture that preserved the core claim would be to 
deny that analyticity guarantees apriority; perhaps some sentences are analytic and 
therefore necessary, but knowable only a posteriori. Kripke’s necessary a posteriori 
sentences, such as ‘Water is H2O’, might be like this. However, this quick fix conflicts 
with the motivations of the logical positivist position. After all, one of the core tenets of 
logical positivism was that all true sentences belong to one of two kinds: the analytic 
ones, that are knowable a priori, and the empirical ones, that are knowable only a 
posteriori. The quick fix involves accepting that some sentences fall into a third category: 
analytic and a posteriori. The existence of this category would require explanation in 
terms agreeable to broader positivist principles. The reason the positivists took analyticity 
to entail apriority was that having the features associated with analyticity (truth by 
convention, independence from facts, and so on) was thought to be sufficient for having 
the features associated with apriority (knowability independent of experience). The quick 
                                                     
79 Kripke, Naming and Necessity pp.34-38. 
80 Ibid, pp.97-105, pp.116-129. 
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fix suggested above would require a principled explanation of why analyticity sometimes 
fails to guarantee apriority and other times succeeds. 
What’s more, it’s difficult to see how the sentences that Kripke claims are necessary a 
posteriori could be viewed as analytic by the positivists discussed in this chapter. As we 
saw above, a sentence is analytic for Ayer when its truth is based on stipulated 
definitions. For Carnap, a sentence is analytic when it’s true in all state descriptions, and 
this is also a matter of stipulation. But sentences such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ or 
‘Water is H2O’ are not plausibly true due to stipulated definitions. After all, in order to 
work out if they are true we have to go and investigate the world; mere analysis of our 
own language won’t be enough. To make this point clearer, consider the following 
science fiction example. Say that our best current astronomical charts tell us that star A is 
distinct from star B. Suppose that in the future, however, astronomers discover that they 
are one and the same; there’s just one star where we thought there were two. Currently, 
we believe that the sentence ‘Star A is star B’ is false. In the future, we discover that it’s 
true. What’s more, as an identity statement between names, we’ll have discovered that 
it’s necessarily true, according to Kripke. Given our beliefs now, however, it is absurd to 
suggest that the truth of ‘Star A is star B’ is stipulated or conventional. There is clearly no 
linguistic convention in place according to which ‘Star A’ and ‘Star B’ are to apply to the 
same objects. If there were such a convention, we’d be able to work out that ‘Star A is 
Star B’ is true without waiting for the observant astronomers’ discovery.81  
A second quick fix must also be rejected: LMC should resist the temptation to deny that 
necessary a posteriori sentences exist. Given that sentences like ‘Water is H2O’ and 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ are clearly a posteriori, the way to resist Kripke’s argument 
would be to deny that they are necessary. One way to do so would be to give up on the 
necessity of identity, thereby falling foul of Leibniz’s Law. According to Leibniz’s Law, 
if object A is identical to object B, A and B must share all of their properties. So if water 
is identical to H2O, water must share all the properties of H2O. However, if water and 
H2O are only contingently identical, water has the property of being necessarily identical 
to water, but H2O lacks that property. The second way to deny the existence of the 
necessary a posteriori is to deny that terms like ‘water’ pick out the same thing in every 
situation in which they refer at all, which is a key plank of Kripke’s argument. This 
option will also be rejected, for reasons to be discussed shortly.  
In large part, the deeper source of the conflict between Kripke and the positivist theories 
of apriority and necessity comes from different approaches to the semantics of names and 
                                                     
81 Essentially, this case mirrors the real life example of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus.’ 
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natural kind terms. Kripke’s rejection of the kind of semantic view that went hand in hand 
with linguistic theories of modality forms a significant part of his argument for the 
necessary a posteriori. To make this conflict clear, it will help to outline Kripke’s view of 
the semantics of names and how it differs from Carnap’s. A large part of ‘Naming and 
Necessity’ is devoted to arguing against what Kripke calls the ‘Frege-Russell’ view of 
meanings of names.
82
 This is the view that the meaning of a name is not just its referent; 
instead, these theories say that along with its referent, a name also has a descriptive 
meaning. For example, the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ might be ‘the teacher of Alexander’ 
and the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ might be ‘the evening star’. Kripke argues that this view is 
wrong for a number of reasons. For one thing, if ‘Aristotle’ means the same thing as ‘the 
teacher of Alexander’, you would expect ‘Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander’ to be a 
necessary truth. But it seems that Aristotle could easily have chosen not to teach at all, or 
could have died before he had a chance to teach. As such, ‘Aristotle was the teacher of 
Alexander’ is contingent. Secondly, if names were synonymous with descriptions, you 
would expect people who counted as ‘knowing the meaning’ of those names to know that 
the thing referred to by the name had the properties expressed by the description. For 
example, someone who knew the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ must know that Aristotle taught 
Alexander. However, it seems that this is not the case either. Many people probably know 
nothing more about Aristotle than that he was a philosopher, and yet we do not accuse 
them of failing to grasp the meaning of the name.
83
  
Kripke argues that the Frege-Russell view should be rejected in favour of what he calls a 
‘Millian’ conception of the meaning of names; a name should be taken to simply have its 
referent as its meaning, rather than a referent plus a description, or any other non-
extensional meaning. On this view, a name is a ‘mere tag’. So, the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ 
is just the man himself, and the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ is just the planet Venus. Kripke 
argues that this Millian conception of names motivates the claim that names are rigid 
designators.
84
 He argues that a name picks out the same individual in every world at 
which it refers at all. So, if ‘Aristotle’ picks out Aristotle in the actual world, it will pick 
out Aristotle in every world, rather than say Plato or Alexander in other worlds. 
According to Kripke, the same applies to kind terms like ‘water’. If names and kind terms 
are rigid designators, it follows straightforwardly that identity statements connecting them 
will be true necessarily. If ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer, for example, they will 
co-refer in any world in which either refers at all, and so ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ must 
be necessary if true. This suggests another way for proponents of LMC to deny that 
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83 Ibid, p.57 . 
84 Ibid, pp.48-49, pp.127-144. 
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sentences like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ‘Water is H2O’ are true necessarily; they 
could deny that names and kind terms designate rigidly. However, to do so would be ill-
advised. It seems wrong to suggest ‘Aristotle’ picks out Aristotle in some circumstances, 
but someone else in other circumstances – whoever happens to be the teacher of 
Alexander, for example. Rather, when we consider how ‘Aristotle’ might apply in 
counterfactual scenarios, we are considering what might be true of Aristotle himself.
 85
 
Intuitive evidence for the rigid designation of kind terms like ‘water’ can be found in 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, discussed in section 1.6 
Carnap’s view of the semantics of names is not a version of descriptivism.86 Nonetheless, 
it is similar in that it takes names to have two kinds of meaning: an intension and an 
extension. What’s more, Carnap’s account of name intensions results in the conclusion 
that sentences such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ will be contingent, rather than necessary. 
Recall that for Carnap, both analyticity and necessity are analysed as L-truth, and a 
sentence is L-true when its truth is guaranteed by the stipulated rules of the language. For 
Carnap, this is when it is true in every state description. Carnap uses this notion of L-truth 
in his account of when two linguistic expressions are synonymous, or in his terminology 
‘L-equivalent’.87 For Carnap, two expressions are L-equivalent when they express the 
same intension. In the case of names, the relevant intensions are what Carnap calls 
‘individual concepts’.88 So, two names will be L-equivalent when they express the same 
individual concept. Importantly, this condition is fulfilled for Carnap when and only 
when an identity sentence between the names is L-true. For example, if ‘A’ and ‘B’ are 
names, they will express the same intension, and therefore be L-equivalent, if and only if 
the sentence ‘A is B’ is L-true. This means that for Carnap, the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ will both be associated with an individual concept, and these individual 
concepts will be identical if and only if ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is L-true. However, 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ do not express the same individual concept, and ‘Hesperus 
is Phosphorus’ is not L-true. As argued above, it is implausible given its a posteriori 
status that the sentence is true due to stipulated definitions alone. 
For Carnap, the stipulated linguistic rules come first; the conventional matter of which 
sentences are L-true determines whether two names are synonymous. And, an identity 
statement using names in both positions is only necessary when the names are 
synonymous. Given that analyticity also guarantees apriority, this means that there will 
                                                     
85 Note that the relevant sense of ‘how “Aristotle” might apply in different situations’ is the sense in which 
the name ‘Aristotle’ as used by us applies. We are not considering how a different population might have 
used the same sequence of letters.  
86 See Carnap, Meaning and Necessity pp.39-42. 
87 Ibid, pp.13-16. 
88 Ibid, pp.39-42. 
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be no necessary a posteriori identity sentences connecting names. By contrast for Kripke, 
any true identity sentence with names in both positions will be true necessarily. Given 
that often we don’t know when two names co-refer, these particular necessary truths will 
often be a posteriori. If Kripke rather than Carnap is right about the semantics of names 
and the necessary truths that result, the consequence for the positivist theory of modality 
is momentous. Analyticity in the sense of Carnap or Ayer cannot in general be 
responsible for necessity, since mere co-reference of names will be sufficient for the 
necessity of identity sentences connecting those names, even though in many cases those 
sentences will fail to meet the conditions for analyticity set out by the positivists. What’s 
more, it is now widely accepted that Kripke was right that names and kind terms are rigid 
designators, and that as a result, some sentences are necessary and a posteriori. In order 
to do justice to Kripke’s philosophical breakthrough, room must be made for these 
phenomena within a modern version of LMC.  
 
1.6 Hilary Putnam 
Around the same time as Kripke’s ‘Naming and Necessity’ lectures, Hilary Putnam was 
also putting forward semantic arguments that threatened LMC. Putnam’s central 
contribution was to argue against semantic internalism: the view that the mental states of 
an individual fully determine the meanings of her terms. While LMC is not explicitly 
committed to internalism, parallel arguments can be constructed that suggest meaning is 
not determined by convention in the way required for analyticity to explain necessity. 
What’s more, the arguments made by Putnam also provide an alternative route to rigid 
designation and the necessary a posteriori, which as we’ve seen, threatens LMC in itself.  
Putnam’s case against internalism is made using his famous Twin Earth thought 
experiment, as presented in his paper ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’. According to the 
story, there exists in another part of the universe a ‘Twin Earth’.89 This planet is just like 
Earth in almost every respect; it is an almost exact duplicate of Earth. In particular, it 
contains copies of all the people on Earth, precise even in their brain states and behaviour. 
The only difference between the two planets is the chemical composition of the stuff 
referred to as ‘water’ by inhabitants. While on Earth, ‘water’ refers to a substance 
composed of H2O molecules, on Twin Earth it refers to a substance with a complicated 
chemical formula abbreviated by ‘XYZ’. Importantly, the two substances are functional 
duplicates; they are both used for drinking, fall from the skies as rain, fill the lakes and 
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oceans, and so on. Despite this, Putnam argues that ‘water’ has a different meaning on 
each planet. Specifically, its referent is different: on Earth it picks out H2O, and on Twin 
Earth it picks out XYZ. Nonetheless, by hypothesis my duplicate on Twin Earth has the 
same mental states as me; when she says ‘This is water’, her mental states are the same as 
mine when I say ‘This is water’.  Given that our mental states are the same but the 
referents of our terms are different, Putnam concludes that mental states don’t fully 
determine meaning. A similar argument can be constructed when it comes to the role 
conventions play in determining meaning at each planet. In Putnam’s story, the only 
difference between the two planets is the chemical composition of the substance referred 
to as ‘water’. That means that any linguistic conventions adopted by each community 
must be the same. As such, any conventional aspect of the meaning of ‘water’ must be the 
same for both communities.
90
  
An important feature of Putnam’s story is that we judge that ‘water’ has a different 
meaning on Twin Earth. We do not judge that ‘water’ as used by us means the same thing 
as ‘water’ as used by the Twin Earthians, and that both H2O and XYZ are varieties of 
water. Putnam argues that the Twin Earth case suggests that our term ‘water’ only refers 
to H2O; nothing with a different chemical composition, despite its functional similarity, 
counts as water.
91
 Putnam’s conclusion is that in cases like this, the external world plays a 
part in determining the reference of our terms in various actual and counterfactual 
scenarios. In particular, sameness relations holding between entities in the world help to 
determine the conditions under which a term correctly applies or fails to apply. For 
example, say I introduce the term ‘water’ by pointing to a glass of liquid and saying ‘This 
liquid is water’. According to Putnam, it is a matter of language-independent fact which 
liquids constitute the same liquid as the one I ostended. In this case, it will be all and only 
those liquids composed of H2O molecules. The Twin Earth thought experiment suggests 
that ‘water’ applies only to stuff that’s the same as the stuff we actually use the term to 
pick out; ‘water’ designates rigidly. And, it’s a fact independent of language or 
convention that substances are the same as water if and only if they are composed of H2O 
molecules. This fact about what constitutes the same liquid therefore combines with the 
fact that ‘water’ is a rigid designator to determine what counts as a correct application of 
‘water’ for me, and the conditions under which my sentence ‘This is water’ is true.  
                                                     
90 This parallel only holds if we are internalists about the content of the conventions themselves. This 
assumption is plausible, however, given the role of conventions. Plausibly, the role of convention is to govern 
human behaviour. If so, communities that behave identically cannot be said to have different conventions in 
place. But by stipulation, the communities on Earth and Twin Earth do behave identically.  
91 Putnam, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’ pp.146-152. 
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If Putnam’s example, as he suggests, shows that ‘water’ is a rigid designator, we have a 
new route to the necessary a posteriori. If the English term ‘water’ refers to H2O in every 
possible circumstance, then ‘Water is H2O’ will be true necessarily. We already know 
that the necessary a posteriori causes trouble for LMC. Putnam’s Twin Earth story helps 
explain why. First of all, note that while ‘Water is H2O’ is true necessarily in English as 
spoken by Earthians, ‘Water is H2O’ will be false in the language spoken by Twin 
Earthians. After all for them, ‘water’ doesn’t refer to H2O at all; it refers to XYZ. 
Furthermore, according to Putnam’s argument, ‘water’ will refer to XYZ in all possible 
circumstances in the Twin Earthian language. ‘Water is XYZ’ will be true necessarily for 
Twin Earthians. As noted above, however, the conventional linguistic rules that 
determine (according to Ayer and Carnap) which sentences are analytic will be held fixed 
across Earth and Twin Earth. By hypothesis, the only difference between the two planets 
is the chemical composition of the stuff filling the lakes and oceans. Languages governed 
by exactly the same linguistic rules must have the same analyticities, given that 
analyticity is a conventional feature of language use. So, if languages governed by the 
same conventions can result in different necessities, necessity cannot be fully explained 
by analyticity. We’ve already seen that it’s implausible that ‘Water is H2O’ is analytic in 
English. Even if it were, however, it would have to be analytic in Twin English too; but 
‘Water is H2O’ isn’t even true in Twin English, let alone necessary. 
The message from both Kripke and Putnam when it comes to the meaning of our terms is 
that the external world matters. Both argue for the existence of extra-linguistic facts about 
what constitutes the same natural kind or individual in different circumstances. Both add 
that our natural kind terms and names refer rigidly in that a natural kind term picks out 
the same kind in all circumstances and a name picks out the same individual in all 
possible circumstances. The Twin Earth case helps provide intuitive evidence for this; the 
fact that we do not judge the watery substance on Twin Earth to be water suggests that 
‘water’ in English only refers to stuff of the same kind as water here. This is enough for 
sentences like ‘Water is H2O’ to be true necessarily. But what explains the necessity of 
this sentence is not analyticity, according to the view endorsed by Kripke and Putnam. 
Instead, the natural position for them to take is that it’s the features of the kind referred to 
by ‘water’ that are responsible for the necessity of ‘Water is H2O’. Kripke explicitly 
endorses this position in his acceptance of cross-world identity relations and essences. He 
argues that it’s a language-independent feature of the world that nothing counts as the 
same kind as water unless it’s composed of H2O molecules. In other words, water is 
essentially H2O. The semantic views of Kripke and Putnam therefore go hand in hand 
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with a view about modality that cannot be accepted by someone who thinks that modal 
truth fully depends on language.  
The semantic and metaphysical work of Kripke and Putnam has been extraordinarily 
influential; the approach to the meaning of names and kind terms they endorse is now 
more popular than the Fregean alternative it was intended to replace.
92
 With it, 
approaches to modality according to which the external world, rather than language, is the 
source of modal truth have also risen to prominence. The arguments made by Kripke and 
Putnam represent what many have considered a devastating challenge to LMC as it was 
articulated by the logical positivists. Modern proponents of LMC have made it a primary 
objective to respond to these arguments and accommodate the existence of the necessary 
a posteriori into linguistic approaches to modality. Attempts to do this will be discussed 
in the next chapter, and taken up again in chapter 7 when truth conditions are provided for 
various modal sentences, including necessary a posteriori ones.  
 
1.7 Conclusion: desiderata revisited 
Logical positivism represented a radical shift in thinking among philosophers, most 
importantly in their epistemology and in the role they took philosophy to have in 
knowledge acquisition. The positivists rejected the ‘pure intuition’ that Kant had taken to 
be the basis of synthetic a priori knowledge, and claimed that knowledge could be gained 
by two methods only: empirically, or through the logical analysis of language. The former 
was treated as the task of empirical scientists, and the latter as the task of philosophers. 
The positivists took all a priori knowledge to fall into the second category. If a sentence 
was meaningful and knowable independently of experience, it must be analytic. That is to 
say, it must be true due to conventions of language. As outlined in section 1.1, this 
approach to apriority led naturally to a similar approach to modality. Given that modal 
sentences are non-empirical, the positivists took them to have their basis in analyticity. In 
particular, any sentence that was analytic was also treated as necessary within a language.  
The aims and motivations of the positivists were therefore closely related to the 
epistemological desiderata set out for LMC in the introduction. Those desiderata were 
that the metaphysics of modality provided must be compatible with a plausible, 
naturalistic and empiricist account of how modal knowledge is acquired. The positivists 
                                                     
92 Evidence that this is the case can be found in the results of a survey of professional philosophers conducted 
by PhilPapers in 2014. See David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ‘What Do Philosophers Believe?’ 
Philosophical Studies Vol. 170 (2014) pp.465-500. The authors found that 28.7% of target faculty 
respondents thought names were Fregean, while 34.5% thought they were Millian, and 36.8% endorsed some 
other view.  
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were aiming to provide exactly such a story. They thought that if conventions of language 
are what determine the modal truths, then our knowledge of them can be explained by 
knowledge of those conventions had by competent speakers of the language. Indeed, 
finding an empiricist explanation of a priori truth, including modal truth, was perhaps the 
primary goal of logical positivism. 
It is less clear whether positivists such as Ayer or Carnap would have embraced the 
metaphysical desiderata of reductionism, parsimony and metaphysical naturalism. Of 
course, both philosophers were highly suspicious of traditional metaphysics, which they 
associated with untestable, unempirical claims. If claims about theoretical virtues of 
theories, or about whether they instantiate those virtues are ‘metaphysical’ in the 
problematic sense, they would have been rejected by the positivists as meaningless. 
Carnap, however, may have been satisfied with the standing of theoretical virtues such as 
parsimony or reductionism if they were treated as pragmatic reasons for theory choice, 
rather than as claims about which theory is more likely to be true.
93
 Perhaps a simpler 
theory is more useful for some purposes, for example. 
Whether or not the metaphysical desiderata would have been embraced by the positivists, 
we can see that they go a long way towards meeting them. If, as the positivists suggest, 
modal truth can be accounted for purely in terms of linguistic conventions, we have a 
promising route to avoiding the need for primitive metaphysical modality in our theory. 
While the positivist linguistic theories seem promising when it comes to epistemological 
desiderata, and perhaps even metaphysical desiderata, they fall short when it comes to the 
final desideratum mentioned in the introduction: being able to survive Quinean and 
Kripkean critiques. The positivist linguistic theories of modality cannot be considered 
adequate as they stand due to their inability to account for the existence of necessary a 
posteriori truths. What’s more, the use of the notion of analyticity must also be defended 
in light of Quine’s arguments against it. The task of making room for the necessary a 
posteriori within a linguistic theory of modality has been taken up by modern theorists 
such as Alan Sidelle and Amie Thomasson. These theories will be discussed in depth in 
the next chapter, as will their viability in light of Quinean arguments.  
For the most part, positivist versions of LMC will not be discussed again in detail for the 
remainder of this thesis. Instead, the focus will be on articulating a version of LMC that is 
viable in a post-Kripkean philosophical world. By showing that the view can stand up to 
Kripkean and Quinean challenges, I hope to demonstrate that it remains a theory of 
                                                     
93 See Carnap, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ pp.22-24 for discussion of the considerations that may 
be taken into account when choosing whether to adopt some framework or theory.  
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modality that is to be taken seriously. However, as we’ll see in chapters 3 to 5, LMC 
faces challenges on other fronts. In particular, it is in danger of commitment to a 
widespread conventionalism about ontology and truth that will not be attractive to 
modern day empiricists. The majority of the thesis will be devoted to articulating this 
challenge, and providing a response on behalf of LMC. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Modern Linguistic Modal Conventionalism and the Necessary A Posteriori 
In recent decades, attempts have been made to revive linguistic approaches to modality. 
For the most part, these modern versions of LMC have been concerned with providing 
ways to respond to the objections raised in the previous chapter. On the one hand, this 
means defending the view from Quinean criticisms of analyticity. On the other hand, it 
means constructing a version of LMC that can account for the existence of necessary a 
posteriori truths. This chapter will describe two recent linguistic modal theories in detail: 
Alan Sidelle’s modal conventionalism and Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism.94  
Particular attention will be paid to the account of the necessary a posteriori provided by 
each theorist.  I will argue that while Sidelle and Thomasson’s approach is promising, 
both theories rely on a notion of actuality that remains to be explained within the context 
of LMC. The project of doing so will be delayed until chapter 7, where an account of 
actual-world dependence is provided using the framework of two-dimensional semantics. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of this chapter describe Sidelle and Thomasson’s theories and 
identify some of their shortcomings. Section 2.3 briefly addresses Quinean objections to 
analyticity, including the responses given by various authors. Finally, section 2.4 sets the 
parameters for LMC that will be used for the rest of the thesis, by stipulating what 
commitments a theory must embrace in order to constitute a version of LMC.    
 
2.1 Sidelle’s modal conventionalism 
Sidelle’s modal conventionalism is set out in his 1989 book ‘Necessity, Essence and 
Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism’. In line with the positivist theories 
discussed in chapter 1, his central thesis is that ‘necessity is nothing beyond analyticity’.95 
Specifically, Sidelle holds that all analytic sentences are necessary, and that they owe 
their necessity to their analyticity. Sidelle’s theory has a number of important features. 
Firstly, he holds that the claim that modality depends on analyticity is sufficient for 
modality to count as conventional, where ‘convention’ is a ‘catchall for mind-based 
contribution.’96 He sees realists as the opponents of conventionalists, characterising the 
central theses of realism as that ‘modality is a real, mind-independent feature of reality,’ 
                                                     
94 See Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation, Thomasson, Ordinary Objects and Thomasson, ‘Modal 
Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’. Note that Thomasson at times uses ‘modal conceptualism’ to 
refer to her theory. I will use ‘modal normativism’ throughout.  
95 Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation p.2. 
96 Ibid, p.2. Sidelle explicitly acknowledges that he has little to say about the nature of conventions in his 
footnote 23. However, he references David Lewis, Convention: A philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1669) as ‘the best going account of convention’. 
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and that ‘the truths that are necessary are so because the states of affairs they depict are, 
as a matter of the way the world is, quite independently of the ways we talk and think 
about them, necessary.’97 For Sidelle then, modality’s dependence on analyticity 
guarantees that it is both conventional and mind-dependent.  
Unfortunately, Sidelle does not explicitly articulate a theory of analyticity. Nonetheless, 
his writing makes clear that he holds that there are conventional rules of use governing 
the terms in a language, and that he takes these to be what make some sentences analytic 
and therefore necessary. For example, he says, ‘Consider: I introduce the term ‘squg’ as 
short for ‘round and red’. It will then be a necessary truth that whatever is squg is red.’98 
Sidelle’s thought is that if it is a rule of use that ‘squg’ only picks out red things, this rule 
guarantees that whatever is squg is red. As a result, ‘Whatever is squg is red’ is analytic. 
Since for Sidelle all analytic sentences are necessary, this sentence will also be necessary. 
What’s more, the rule of use governing ‘squg’ is conventional; we could have adopted 
another rule for the term, or we might not have introduced the term at all. Sidelle’s view 
is that conventional rules of use governing terms, like the rule for ‘squg,’ are responsible 
for making sentences necessary. 
The majority of Sidelle’s book is devoted to showing how a conventionalist theory of 
modality can account for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths.
99
 For Sidelle, this 
means showing how the existence of the necessary a posteriori is compatible with the 
view that all necessity depends on analyticity. Sidelle takes for granted that it is 
unproblematic for a priori necessary truths to be analytic; providing ‘Bachelors are 
unmarried’ and ‘Two plus two equals four’ as paradigmatic examples.100 His story about 
those truths will be similar to the one provided in the case of ‘squg’. He will posit 
conventional features of use or meaning for the terms ‘bachelor’, ‘unmarried’, ‘two’, 
‘four’ ‘plus’ and so on, that make these sentences analytic. And, their analyticity is 
sufficient for their necessity. However, Sidelle accepts that a posteriori necessary 
sentences such as ‘Water is H2O’ are not themselves analytic, and that a different account 
of them must be provided. The challenge presented by the necessary a posteriori is 
therefore to identify how analyticity can explain the necessity of these sentences given 
that they are not themselves analytic.
101
  
                                                     
97 Ibid, p.5. 
98 Ibid, p.9. 
99 Ibid, especially chapters 2 and 3. 
100 Ibid p.2. At least, the analyticity of these sentences is unproblematic barring Quinean worries to do with 
the analytic synthetic distinction. Sidelle deals with these worries later in the book (pp.136-150). 
101 See sections 1.5 and 1.6 of this thesis for a detailed account of how the necessary a posteriori threatens 
LMC.  
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Sidelle’s strategy for solving this problem is to argue that the necessity of a posteriori 
truths such as ‘Water is H2O’ is owed to the analyticity of a second sentence, which is in 
turn determined by rules of use. He argues that in typical Kripkean cases an analytic truth 
is combined with a synthetic, empirical truth to yield a synthetic, a posteriori, yet 
necessary truth. In these cases, Sidelle treats the necessity of the latter truth as owed 
entirely to the analyticity of the former truth from which it was partially derived. In order 
to make clear how this view works, it is helpful to begin with an example. Sidelle notes 
that the central feature of the necessary a posteriori is that empirical discovery is required 
before we can know the truth of the sentences in question.
102
 In the water case, we needed 
scientists to discover the chemical composition of water before we could know that 
‘Water is H2O’ is true, let alone necessary. Importantly, the fact that empirical 
investigation is required to discover that water is H2O means that it is knowable only a 
posteriori. That means we can imagine that the empirical investigation might have turned 
up different results. For all we knew prior to doing the requisite science, the chemical 
composition of the stuff filling our lakes and rivers might have turned out to be XYZ, or 
something different altogether. 
Putnam’s twin earth thought experiment (as discussed in chapter 1) suggests that once we 
discover that water is composed of H2O, we judge that a substance must be composed of 
H2O in order to qualify as water. In other words, water is composed of H2O necessarily. 
However, we would have made the same kind of judgment about water no matter what its 
chemical composition had turned out to be. If the chemical composition scientists 
discovered had turned out to be XYZ, Sidelle notes, we would have concluded that 
‘Water is H2O’ was false, and that ‘Water is XYZ’ was not just true, but necessary. This 
suggests we would have judged water to have its chemical composition necessarily, 
whatever that composition turned out to be. What’s more, we can know this a priori; our 
judgments about water under various hypotheses about how the world might turn out to 
be can be done prior to any scientific investigation.
103
  
This suggests that while a sentence such as ‘Water is composed of H2O molecules’ is 
only knowable a posteriori, there is a second, a priori truth in the vicinity. And, Sidelle 
argues, it’s this a priori truth in the vicinity that guides us in our judgment that whatever 
the chemical composition of the substance in our lakes and water turns out to be, water 
has that chemical composition necessarily. The relevant a priori truth is something like:  
                                                     
102 Ibid, pp.30-33. 
103 Sidelle acknowledges that it may be implausible that it’s a priori that water has its actual chemical 
composition. He suggests ‘chemical composition’ could be substituted with ‘deep explanatory feature.’ (Ibid, 
p.32, footnote 17) The key point is that it’s not superficial properties such as being clear or drinkable that are 
essential to water, but rather the underlying physical properties that explain them; and, we know this a priori.  
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(1) ‘For some substance to count as water, it must share the deep explanatory features 
of the substance that fills our lakes and rivers, whatever those features turn out to 
be.’  
Sidelle refers to principles like (1) as ‘principles of individuation’, and argues that they 
are a priori and analytic. These sentences demonstrate how something is ‘individuated’ in 
that they reveal what counts as identical to the thing in question in various hypothetical 
situations. For Sidelle, (1) is analytic because it reflects a conventional rule of use for 
‘water’. Such conventional rules of use are ultimately responsible for the necessity of an a 
posteriori sentence like ‘Water is composed of H2O molecules.’ His final formulation of 
how necessary a posteriori sentences are generated is that conventional rules of use for 
names and kind terms combine with empirical information to determine the necessary, a 
posteriori truths. Broadly, the rules stipulate that a term introduced for a particular kind 
of entity (a ‘K-kind term’) should be applied only where a property of a certain sort (a ‘p-
property’) is instantiated. Empirical investigation is required to establish which property 
is the relevant p-property. An example is as follows: 
(2) If ‘x’ is a K-kind term, then if F is the p-property of the thing denoted by ‘x’, ‘x’ 
applies to something in any possible situation only if it has F in that situation. 
(3) ‘Water’ is a K-kind term. 
(4) Being composed of H2O molecules is the p-property of the thing denoted by 
‘water’. Therefore, 
(5) ‘Water’ applies to something in any possible situation only if it is composed of 
H2O molecules.
104
 
Descending to the object language, the rule expressed in (2) results in the analytic 
‘principle of individuation’: 
(6) If something is of kind K, then if it has property F of type p, it has property F in 
any possible situation in which it exists. 
This combines with: 
(7) Water is of kind K, and 
(8) Being composed of H2O molecules is the p-property had by water, 
To result in: 
(9) It is necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules. 
                                                     
104 Ibid, pp.42-49. The wording in this argument is mostly Sidelle’s, but is pieced together from throughout 
this page range. 
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Here, Sidelle’s position is that what makes something a K-kind term ‘should depend 
fundamentally on the sorts of intentions with which we use the term, that is, on the rules 
that govern this use.’105 In this instance, for something to be a K-kind term is for us to use 
it to track certain sorts of properties. The rules of use say that whichever of the ‘p-
properties’ something turns out to have, if we introduce a K-kind term for that thing, the 
term must only be applied where the relevant p-property is instantiated. For example, a 
K-kind term may be a chemical kind term. Then, whichever chemical structure something 
turns out to have, if we introduce a chemical kind term for that thing, the term must only 
be applied where that chemical structure is instantiated. Of course, these rules of use for 
K-kind terms are entirely conventional and it’s up to us whether some term is introduced 
as a K-kind term. As such, (2) and (3) are intended by Sidelle to be expressions of 
linguistic conventions. The result of descending to the object language yields analytic 
sentences in (6) and (7). On the other hand, (4) and (8) are empirical. Sidelle argues that 
the necessity expressed in (9) is due entirely to the analyticity of (6) and (7), which is in 
turn due to the conventional rules (3) and (4). However, the aposteriority of (9) is due to 
the aposteriority of (4) and (8); empirical investigation is required in order to work out 
which of the p-properties water instantiates.  
Sidelle acknowledges that the view as it stands remains open to objections. First and 
foremost, he recognises that the schema exemplified in (2) – (9) may be able to generate 
necessary truths where there are none.
106
 In (2), the phrase ‘p-property’ is intended to pick 
out some class of properties that may be had by K-kinds. However, there is no restriction 
on what terms can be used to designate p-properties. For that reason, certain contingent 
sentences will be treated as necessary by the theory. It is (probably) a truth, for example, 
that the phrase ‘having the chemical composition most commonly mentioned in 
philosophy papers’ picks out the p-property had by water (being composed of H2O 
molecules). Therefore, the sentence ‘Having the chemical composition most commonly 
mentioned in philosophy papers is the p-property of the thing denoted by “water”’ is true, 
and generates ‘Necessarily, water has the chemical composition most commonly 
mentioned in philosophy papers’ via steps (7) and (8). Of course, this last sentence is 
false; a different chemical composition could easily have been the one most commonly 
mentioned in philosophy papers.  
Sidelle’s solution is to require that the term picking out the p-property in (2), (4), (6) and 
(8) must be a rigid designator, in the sense described in chapter 1: it must be a term that 
                                                     
105 Ibid, p.49. 
106 Ibid, pp.62-69. 
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refers to the same property in every world in which it designates anything at all.
107
 Given 
that ‘the chemical composition most commonly mentioned in philosophy papers’ does not 
designate rigidly, it cannot be used to generate illicit necessary truths.
108
 Of course, 
relying on rigid designation is problematic for a modal conventionalist, given that rigid 
designation is normally spelled out in a way that requires ‘real’, non-conventional 
relations of cross-world identity between actual objects and merely possible ones. Sidelle 
argues, however, that an account of rigid designation can be provided that does not 
presuppose modality in any problematic way. His suggestion is that cross-world identity 
itself should be considered conventional in nature. On his proposal, we as users of a 
language determine what counts as ‘the same thing’ in different possible worlds. With 
conventional cross-world identity relations in place, we can introduce a term as a rigid 
designator by restricting its use such that it picks out the same thing in every possible 
world.  
Sidelle’s account of conventional cross-world identity relations is not articulated in any 
detail. What’s more, Sidelle’s theory alludes to the existence of possible worlds in a 
number of places but does not provide an account of how they might be constructed in the 
context of his modal conventionalism. Note that the rule expressed in (2) governs the use 
of ‘x’ in any possible situation. Given that Sidelle also relies on rigid designation, he 
needs an account of what qualifies as a possible situation in conventionalist terms, and an 
account of what counts as the same individual or kind in different possible situations. 
What’s more, Sidelle’s theory as it stands still does not succeed in demonstrating that 
necessary a posteriori truth can be determined by analytic principles in combination with 
contingent empirical truths. Recall that the rule governing K-kind terms expressed in (2) 
generated the analytic truth (6): ‘If something is of kind K, then if it has property F of 
type p, it has property F in any possible situation in which it exists.’ This was to combine 
with the stipulated (7) ‘Water is of kind K,’ and the empirical (8) ‘Being composed of 
H2O molecules is the p-property had by water’ to result in the truth of ‘It is necessary that 
water is composed of H2O molecules.’ In its present form, therefore, Sidelle’s account 
makes the necessity of ‘Water is composed of H2O molecules’ partly dependent on the 
supposed contingent, empirical discovery that being composed of H2O molecules is a 
property had by water. However, that means the contingent feature of the world that helps 
explain the aposteriority of ‘Water is composed of H2O molecules’ is itself made 
                                                     
107 Ibid, pp 64-69. 
108 It might be thought that ‘having the chemical composition most commonly mentioned in philosophy 
papers’ rigidly designates the property having the chemical composition most commonly mentioned in 
philosophy papers. The important point here is that the phrase does not rigidly designate a p-property. 
Therefore, Sidelle’s solution may need to be modified to require that the term picking out the p-property 
rigidly designates the p-property, rather than simply that it rigidly designates some property or other.  
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necessary by linguistic conventions. Sidelle cannot claim that the rules are sensitive to 
which contingent empirical truth about water happens to hold if they also determine that 
water has the discovered feature necessarily. Go to a world w in which the scientists 
discover that the substance filling the lakes and rivers is composed of XYZ. Is it true or 
false at w that water is composed of H2O molecules? On the one hand, it seems that 
Sidelle is committed to saying that it is false that water is composed of H2O molecules at 
w. Otherwise, he cannot maintain that the rules governing ‘water’ are sensitive to 
contingent, empirical discoveries. On the other hand, Sidelle is committed to saying that 
‘Water is composed of H2O molecules’ is true at w. After all, he accepts that the sentence 
is a necessary truth.  
One way to fix this problem is to require that ‘water’ only be applied to substances 
sharing the actual chemical composition of the substance denoted by ‘water’. Then (2) 
becomes: 
(10) If ‘x’ is a K-kind term, then if F is the actual p-property of the thing denoted by 
‘x’, ‘x’ applies to something in any counterfactual situation only if it has F. 
And (6) becomes: 
(11) If something is of kind K, then if it actually has property F of type p, it has 
property F in any counterfactual situation in which it exists. 
And an instance of this schema is: 
(12) If water is a chemical kind, then if it is actually composed of H2O molecules, it 
is composed of H2O molecules in every counterfactual situation in which it 
exists. 
Then the chemical composition of the substance at w is not relevant for determining 
whether the ‘nested’ antecedent (...if it is actually composed of H2O molecules...) in (12) 
is satisfied, even at w. Whether or not water is composed of H2O molecules at w will 
depend on its chemical composition at the actual world, rather than at any world 
considered merely as counterfactual. This makes sense of Sidelle’s thought that empirical 
discoveries here speak for the nature of water at all worlds. What’s more, there is still a 
sense in which water could have turned out to have a different chemical composition, and 
that can be captured by our judgments about water at other worlds considered as actual. 
However while this approach helps to capture Sidelle’s thought that different empirical 
discoveries could lead to different necessary truths, the empirical premise remains 
necessary rather than contingent, insofar as all truths of the form ‘Actually, S’ are 
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necessary. This problem, as well as discussion of how LMC can use the notion of a world 
considered as actual to account for necessary a posteriori truths, will be pursued further 
in chapter 7.  
Another point of clarification for Sidelle’s theory is to do with what is meant when he 
claims that necessary a posteriori truths are ‘derived from’ or ‘generated by’ rules of use 
in combination with empirical truths. One option for Sidelle is to claim that the rules of 
use in combination with some empirical claim are sufficient for the necessity of the 
relevant a posteriori truth. As Yablo points out in his 1992 review of Sidelle’s book, 
however, the fact that this relation of sufficiency holds is not enough to demonstrate that 
the rule of use is what makes the necessary a posteriori truth necessary.
109
 Rather, it 
could be the necessity of the object language expression of the rule (Sidelle’s analytic 
‘principles of individuation’) that is responsible for the necessity of the a posteriori truth. 
On one way of looking at the case discussed above, the analyticity of a principle like (6) 
merely coincidentally corresponds to its necessity. Perhaps it is, independently of 
language, a feature of K-kinds that they have their p-properties essentially. If so, it is 
because chemical kinds have their chemical compositions essentially that the empirical 
information that water is composed of H2O molecules can be combined with (6) to 
explain the necessity of ‘Water is H2O’. Yablo’s objection is that a sufficiency relation 
between rules governing terms and modal truths expressed in those terms is not enough to 
rule out the existence of ‘real’ (non-conventional) modal properties or essences.  
While Yablo is right that the existence of a rule like (2) is compatible with a modal realist 
position, Sidelle’s account does not need to rule out the viability of all other positions in 
order to itself be viable.
110
 If the existence of some rule of use (or the analyticity of some 
principle of individuation) in combination with an empirical truth is sufficient for the 
necessity of an a posteriori truth, enough has been done to show that analyticity can be 
what’s responsible for necessity in these cases. The main challenge presented by the 
necessary a posteriori for LMC was that it drew necessity apart from analyticity in such a 
way that conventional linguistic rules appeared to have no bearing on which sentences 
count as necessary. Sidelle reintroduces the possibility of a linguistic treatment of 
necessity by showing that for every necessary a posteriori truth there is an analytic 
sentence in the background that is at least capable of explaining the necessity of the a 
posteriori truth in question. 
                                                     
109 Stephen Yablo, Review of Necessity, Essence and Individuation: A Defense of Modal Conventionalism, by 
Alan Sidelle, The Philosophical Review Vol. 101, No. 4 (1992): pp.878-881. 
110 Sidelle does however make a case for modal conventionalism over its rivals in chapter 4 of Necessity, 
Essence and Individuation.   
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Still, Yablo is right to point out that much more detail is required on the relation of 
dependence that Sidelle takes to hold between linguistic conventions and modal truths. As 
you would expect, sufficiency is not a strong enough relation to do the required work. 
After all, there is a sense in which any truth is sufficient for every necessary truth, given 
that necessary truths hold no matter what. More likely, the relation between the rules and 
the modal truths should be a metaphysical dependence relation like grounding or truth-
making. However, making use of such dependence relations will only help if they 
themselves are not spelled out modally, on pain of risking circularity. I discuss this worry 
in more detail in section 8.2 of this thesis.  
In summary, while Sidelle’s modal conventionalism offers helpful insight into how to 
incorporate the necessary a posteriori into LMC, it is missing important details. Firstly, it 
relies on a theory of analyticity that Sidelle has not explicitly stated. Secondly, Sidelle 
requires an account of possible worlds in conventionalist terms, including an account of 
cross-world identity relations, rigid designation and actual-world dependence. Finally, 
more detail is needed on the dependence relation that is posited between the linguistic 
rules and the modal truths they are taken to generate. 
 
2.2 Thomasson’s modal normativism 
Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism fills in many of the gaps left by Sidelle’s 
conventionalism. Most importantly, Thomasson provides a detailed account of the nature 
of linguistic rules and how they generate analyticities, including an argument for why we 
should believe in such rules in the first place.
111
 Thomasson bypasses the problem of 
explaining the dependency relation between rules and modal truths by explicitly denying 
that there is one. As we’ll see, Thomasson treats modal sentences as expressions of 
linguistic rules, rather than as being made true by linguistic rules. Thomasson’s account 
of the necessary a posteriori is brief, and is similar to Sidelle’s in its basic structure. As 
such, it faces similar pitfalls; like Sidelle, Thomasson relies on a notion of actual-world 
dependence that is not elucidated in her theory. 
2.2.1 Linguistic rules and why we should believe in them 
The central thesis of Thomasson’s modal normativism is that metaphysical modality is 
explained by semantic rules governing the use of terms. More specifically, she argues that 
                                                     
111 Thomasson’s account of linguistic rules and analyticity can be found primarily in chapters 2 and 3 of 
Ordinary Objects. See also her ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ pp.138-145 as well as 
Amie L. Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) chapter 2. 
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referring terms such as names are associated with sortals, and that sortals come with 
‘application conditions’ and ‘coapplication conditions.’112 The term ‘sortal’ is used by 
Thomasson to refer to a particular kind of general term; it is a category term that tells you 
about the existence and identity conditions for objects that fall under the sortal, via its 
application and coapplication conditions.
113
 The application conditions of a sortal 
determine what properties something must have if it is to count as belonging to the sortal. 
Its coapplication conditions specify when a referring term associated with the sortal 
counts as being applied again to one and the same entity, rather than to another entity of 
the same type. For example, the application conditions for ‘person’ might require that a 
name associated with ‘person’ can only pick out humans. And, the coapplication 
conditions for ‘person’ might require that if ‘Madeleine’ is associated with ‘person’, and 
has been successfully applied once, ‘Madeleine’ can only be reapplied to persons 
spatially continuous with the original referent. Thomasson notes that sortals can be 
distinguished from adjectives and other non-categorical general terms because the latter 
come only with application conditions, while sortals also have coapplication conditions; 
for example, ‘same wet’ is nonsensical because ‘wet’ lacks coapplication conditions.114  
Application conditions and coapplication conditions are expressed using semantic rules. 
For example, an application condition for ‘dog’ might say, ‘Apply “dog” only where 
“canine” applies,’ or ‘“Dog” may be applied where “excited” applies, but not where 
“feline” applies.’ In general then, application conditions governing sortals connect the use 
of one sortal term to the use of other terms, stipulating that the first may only be applied if 
the second is applied, or alternatively, that it is permissible to apply the first if the second 
is applied. In some cases, the fulfilment of application conditions for one sortal will be 
guaranteed so long as the application conditions of some second sortal are fulfilled. In 
these cases, the successful application of the second sortal is sufficient for the successful 
application of the first. For example, if the application conditions for ‘dog’ are met in 
some situation, the application conditions for ‘animal’ will also be met. Given that this is 
the case, Thomasson argues we can establish hierarchies of sortals.
115
 In the case under 
discussion, ‘animal’ is a ‘genus’ sortal with respect to ‘dog’, which is a ‘species’ sortal. 
‘Parrot’ and ‘insect’ are two more species sortals with respect to ‘animal’. The 
application conditions of a genus sortal are guaranteed to be met in some situation 
                                                     
112 Thomasson, Ordinary Objects pp.39-42. 
113 The term ‘sortal’ came into regular use in modern times following Strawson’s use in P.F. Strawson, 
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1959), pp.167-173. 
According to Strawson, a sortal ‘supplies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars 
which it collects’ (p.168). As with Thomasson then, he takes the central function of sortals as being to 
provide conditions under which the objects that belong to the sortal exist and are identical / non-identical to 
one another.  
114 Thomasson, Ordinary Objects p.40. 
115 Ibid pp.41-42. 
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provided the application conditions of any of its species sortals are met. This has an 
important implication when it comes to coapplication conditions. If the coapplication 
conditions for a species sortal (say ‘dog’) allow that two applications qualify as picking 
out the same entity, the coapplication conditions for the genus sortal must also be met. 
So, ‘same dog’ implies ‘same animal’, for example, as does ‘same parrot’ or ‘same 
insect.’ 
Given that coapplication conditions determine whether a second use of a sortal is for the 
same object, Thomasson argues that they fix the identity conditions for the objects to 
which they refer. When a name is associated with a sortal, she says,  
‘...the coapplication conditions for terms of the category associated with the name also 
fix the truth‐conditions for any identity claims made using the relevant names, and so fix 
(frame‐level) identity conditions governing the objects (if any) referred to by those 
names. Indeed, what I above have been calling “coapplication conditions” are typically 
simply called “identity conditions” in the previous literature.’ 116 
Thomasson is quick to maintain, however, that her view does not entail that the identity 
conditions of objects themselves are in any way linguistic; she argues that coapplication 
conditions simply determine truth conditions for identity sentences using the language the 
relevant linguistic rules govern. In chapters 3 and 4, I return to issues raised by the link 
between linguistic rules and the identity conditions of objects in the context of discussing 
the threat of object conventionalism faced by LMC.  
Thomasson acknowledges that according to at least one popular theory of reference, the 
causal theory, there is no need for application conditions associated with names. 
According to that view, the reference of names is secured by the causal relationships in 
which they stand to objects in the world. However, the causal theory faces some well-
known problems, and Thomasson argues that the solution to those problems is to accept 
that there are rules of use associated with referring terms.
117
 Firstly, causal theories face 
the ‘qua’ problem, according to which there are simply too many objects causally related 
to our use of a term for reference to be fixed to any single one. When I introduce the 
name ‘Josephine’ for example, I am causally related to both a person and a group of 
conjoined body parts. I’m also causally related to each of those body parts individually, to 
a collection of atoms, to a temporal part of a person, and to many other things. 
Thomasson argues that causal relations alone are not enough to secure my reference to 
the person rather than to any of the other candidate referents. The problem dissolves, 
                                                     
116 Ibid, p.56. 
117 Ibid, pp.38-44. 
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however, if the name is associated with a sortal directly (in this case ‘person’), and if that 
sortal comes with a set of application and coapplication conditions. If ‘Josephine’ is 
introduced as a name for a person, for example, the other objects to which my use of the 
name is causally related are ruled out as the name’s referent. The application conditions 
and coapplication conditions for ‘person’ are what guarantee that ‘Josephine’ picks out 
the entity with the conditions of existence, persistence and identity we intend. 
The second well-known problem facing the causal theory of reference is that it lacks a 
straightforward account of how nonexistence claims can be true.
118
 According to most 
causal theorists, the meaning of a name is its referent. If a referent is lacking then, the 
name ought not be meaningful. Given that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ doesn’t refer, for example, 
the name ought to lack meaning according to the causal theory. In that case, the sentence 
‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ won’t be meaningful either, and we are left without an 
explanation for its apparent truth. On the other hand, if the name is meaningful, it must 
refer to some object, in which case the sentence will come out false even though it should 
be true. Thomasson acknowledges that one solution to this problem, suggested by Keith 
Donnellan, is to adopt an approach according to which the nonexistence claim is true if 
and only if the history of use of the relevant name ends in a ‘block’.119 This will occur 
when there is no object that stands in an appropriate causal connection to our usage of the 
name. This ‘metalinguistic’ account apparently avoids the problem because the conditions 
given for when a nonexistence claim is true only mention the non-referring name, rather 
than using it. However, here the qua problem re-arises. Thomasson argues that in most 
cases of true nonexistence claims, there are objects that are causally related to uses of the 
term. Uses of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ will be causally related to a work of fiction, for 
example, and plausibly also a fictional character. In order to rule out these entities as the 
referent of the name, the name must be associated with application conditions and 
coapplication conditions that determine what it picks out.
120
  
Thomasson sees the ‘qua’ problem and the problem of nonexistence claims as sufficient 
motivation for her commitment to application conditions and coapplication conditions. 
However, she does not advocate returning to a descriptive theory of reference according 
to which the reference of terms is determined purely by their associated rules. Instead, she 
suggests adopting a ‘hybrid’ theory of reference similar to one outlined by Devitt and 
                                                     
118 Ibid, pp.45-48. 
119 Ibid, p.46. Thomasson’s reference is to Keith S. Donnellan, ‘Speaking of Nothing’ The Philosophical 
Review Vol. 83, No. 1 (1974): pp.3-31. 
120 Of course, causal theorists have made replies to the problems Thomasson discusses. See for example 
Nathan Salmon, ‘Nonexistence,’ Noûs Vol 32, No. 3 (1998): pp 277–319, and Richard B. Miller, ‘A Purely 
Causal Solution to One of the Qua Problems,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 4 (1992): 
pp.425-434. See Manuel García-Carpintero and Martí Genoveva eds., Empty Representations, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) for discussion.   
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Sterelny, according to which both semantic rules and causal factors play a role in 
determining reference.
121
 
2.2.2 Using linguistic rules to construct a theory of modality 
Having argued for their existence, Thomasson is in a position to show how application 
conditions can form the basis of analyticity and metaphysical modality. As noted above, 
application and coapplication conditions are statable in the form of rules governing the 
use of terms. For example, given that ‘bachelor’ is a species term with respect to the 
genus term ‘person’, ‘Apply “bachelor” only where “person” is applied’ will be a 
semantic rule governing the use of ‘bachelor’. Similarly, ‘Apply “philosopher” only 
where “person” applies’ will be a rule governing ‘philosopher’. Thomasson argues that 
such rules are all we need in order to establish the existence of analyticities. Specifically, 
she claims that analyticities are simply indicative mood, object language expressions of 
linguistic rules. In order to make her case for this view, she appeals to an analogy with the 
way rules are expressed in the context of games.
122
 Thomasson notes that while the rules 
of games are sometimes stated in the imperative mood they are often also stated in the 
indicative mood. For example, a rule in the imperative mood might be ‘If you roll a six, 
take another turn.’ However, the indicative mood works just as well: ‘If a player rolls a 
six, he or she takes another turn.’ Stating a rule in the indicative mood often makes for 
ease of expression. ‘The youngest player starts,’ for example, is more natural than ‘If you 
are the youngest player, start’ or ‘Youngest player: start.’ Similarly, Thomasson suggests, 
the semantic rules discussed above can be stated in the indicative mood. The indicative 
formulation of ‘Only apply “bachelor” where “person” applies,’ for example, is 
‘“Bachelor” only applies where “person” applies.’  
Note that both the imperative and indicative mood formulations of the semantic rules for 
‘bachelor’ were stated in a metalanguage. Thomasson points out, however, that the use of 
a metalanguage is rare outside the formal study of language. She argues that instead, 
semantic rules are often stated in the object language in everyday contexts. According to 
Thomasson, indicative mood, object language expressions of rules are simply analytic 
sentences. The object language expression of ‘“Bachelor” only applies where “person” 
applies,’ for example, is the analytic sentence ‘All bachelors are people.’ She argues that 
this view of the role of analytic sentences is supported by linguistic evidence. For 
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example, she suggests that if a child asks ‘Is Aunt Dora a bachelor?’ the response ‘All 
bachelors are men’ is more natural than ‘The word “bachelor” only applies to men.’ 
Moreover, Thomasson notes that while analytic sentences are often used to correct 
linguistic mistakes like this one, they are hardly ever used to state worldly facts, or to 
describe regularities. For example, if someone was to say, ‘John is a bachelor, and he’s 
unmarried,’ she could rightly be accused of violating the Gricean maxim of relevance by 
being uninformative. After all, the information that John is unmarried was already 
contained in the assertion that John is a bachelor.
123
 
Granting that analytic sentences are object language, indicative mood statements of 
semantic rules, Thomasson argues that the addition of a modal adverb serves to make 
explicit that the sentence is functioning to express a rule, rather than to describe a merely 
contingent regularity. Again, an analogy with the case of games is useful. Suppose the 
rules of a game state, ‘At the end of each turn the player counts his or her score.’ In the 
context of a game’s rulebook, it will usually be clear that the indicative mood sentence 
expresses a rule, rather than a mere observation about the habits of players. However, 
adding the modal verb ‘must’ can function to make explicit that what’s expressed is a rule 
in less clear contexts: ‘At the end of each turn the player must count his or her score.’ 
Thomasson notes that while in rules expressing requirements the modal is often optional, 
it is usually essential in rules expressing permissions because in such cases, there is no 
English indicative mood expression of a rule without the modal verb. ‘A player skips his 
or her turn,’ for example, cannot be used to provide the same information as ‘A player 
may skip his or her turn.’124  
Thomasson’s argument is that metaphysical modal adverbs play an analogous role when 
it comes to semantic rules governing terms. In the metalanguage, modal verbs like ‘must’ 
and ‘may’ help to make explicit that indicative mood descriptions of how terms are 
applied are rules. For example, we can say ‘“Bachelor” must only be applied where 
“unmarried” is applied.’ When descending to the object language, we can add modal 
adverbs to analytic sentences to achieve the same goal. The modal equivalent of ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried,’ for example is ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried.’ As 
with the case of games, adding a modal is usually indispensable for expressing 
permissions. ‘Bachelors can be tidy,’ or ‘A bachelor might be tidy’ can be used to express 
the rule ‘“Bachelor” may be applied where “tidy” is applied,’ but there is no non-modal, 
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124 There are some indicative mood sentences that can be used to convey rules but lack modals. Eg, ‘A player 
is permitted to skip his or her turn (by the rules).’ Plausibly, however, such sentences are descriptions of 
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object language expression of the same rule; ‘Bachelors are tidy,’ for example, will not 
do the job.  
As expressions of semantic rules, Thomasson stresses that analytic sentences and their 
modal counterparts do not need truth-makers in that their truth ‘does not depend on any 
empirical fact’s obtaining.’125 After all, their function is prescriptive, rather than 
descriptive. In their role as expressions of rules, analytic truths are not even truth apt, and 
therefore are not the sort of sentences that can be made true or false by worldly entities or 
states of affairs. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that analytic sentences can be used to 
express truths. As Theodore Sider says, analytic truths are just as much ‘about the world’ 
as any other sentences.
126
 ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ states a truth about bachelors, for 
example. Thomasson accounts for this fact by arguing that a single sentence can be used 
to perform more than one kind of speech act.
127
 While the primary function of analytic 
sentences is prescriptive, they can sometimes be used descriptively, and in those cases 
they express truths. When used descriptively, she argues, the truth of analytic sentences is 
guaranteed by the linguistic rules they serve to express. The linguistic rule ‘Apply 
“bachelor” only where “unmarried” applies,’ for example, sets application conditions for 
‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’ such that successful application of the former term requires 
successful application of the latter. As a result, every time ‘bachelor’ applies to an 
individual, ‘unmarried’ will also apply, which in turn guarantees that ‘All bachelors are 
unmarried’ will be true. Therefore, the semantic rule alone is sufficient to guarantee the 
truth of the analytic sentence. Similarly, modal sentences may be taken to be true or false 
in what Thomasson calls a ‘deflationary’ sense depending on whether or not they 
accurately reflect the linguistic rules.
128
 False modal sentences are inaccurate attempts at 
expressions of linguistic rules, while true ones are accurate.   
So far, the cases discussed have been cases of a priori necessities, but Thomasson argues 
that modal normativism can be extended to also account for necessary a posteriori 
truths.
129
 Her strategy for dealing with these cases is similar to Sidelle’s. She argues that 
some rules are ‘schematic’ in nature, and require empirical details to be filled out in order 
to obtain more specific conditions of application governing a term. Once again, the case 
can be made by analogy with the rules of a game. Often, a rulebook will provide 
information about who should have the first turn; for example, they might say ‘The 
                                                     
125 Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’, pp.147-149, and Ordinary Objects 
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youngest player starts.’ Alone, however, this is not enough information to work out which 
course of action to take in order to follow the rule. First, some empirical investigation 
must be done in order to work out who is the youngest player. Suppose that the 
investigation reveals that Elliot is the youngest player. Then, ‘The youngest player starts’ 
can be combined with ‘Elliot is the youngest player’ to generate ‘Elliot starts.’ Despite 
the fact that the rules do not specify that Elliot is to start directly, it is still mandated by 
the rules that in this game, Elliot is to start. Thomasson argues that semantic rules 
generate a posteriori necessities in an analogous way. In some cases, the semantic rules 
governing a term must be combined with empirical information to create rules that are 
only knowable a posteriori. For example, she suggests that the term ‘water’ may be 
governed by the rule ‘Whatever the actual chemical composition of this stuff turns out to 
be, apply “water” only where there is stuff of that chemical composition.’130 An 
expression of the rule in the object language is the analytic sentence ‘Whatever the actual 
chemical composition of this stuff turns out to be, water has that chemical composition.’ 
Finally, the modal version is ‘Necessarily, whatever the actual chemical composition of 
this stuff turns out to be, water has that chemical composition.’ However, empirical 
information is required before we can work out which chemical composition is the right 
one. When it is discovered that the relevant chemical composition is H2O, that 
information can be combined with the rule to generate: ‘Apply “water” only where “H2O” 
applies.’ The object level, indicative form of the rule is then ‘Water has the chemical 
composition of H2O,’ and the modal form is ‘Necessarily, water has the chemical 
composition of H2O.’  
Thomasson’s account of the necessary a posteriori is brief, and she intends it to be a mere 
sketch rather than a detailed theory. However, it is clear that she recognises that actual-
world dependence will be required in order to make sense of how empirical discoveries 
can combine with linguistic rules to generate a posteriori necessities. After all, her 
suggested rule for ‘water’ restricts its application to the actual chemical composition of 
‘this stuff.’ As with Sidelle’s theory then, Thomasson’s approach requires some account 
to be given for how modal truths can depend on the nature of the actual world. 
Thomasson’s sketch also falls prey to the problem identified by Sidelle when it comes to 
non-rigid descriptions being used to pick out properties.
131
 Say, for example that ‘The 
actual chemical composition of this stuff is the chemical composition most commonly 
mentioned in philosophy papers’ expresses a truth. Given what Thomasson has said, it 
appears that her view entails that ‘water’ is to be applied only where ‘the chemical 
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131 See section 2.1 above for discussion of problems facing Sidelle’s theory.  
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composition most commonly mentioned in philosophy papers’ is applied. Fixing this 
problem may require Thomasson, with Sidelle, to appeal to a notion of rigid designation.  
The second issue Sidelle’s theory faced was that an account was required for how 
analyticity ‘generates’ necessity. As noted above, Thomasson’s theory avoids this 
problem altogether. Given that modal sentences are simply object language expressions 
of linguistic rules, they do not require truth-makers according to Thomasson. She argues 
that modal sentences usually do not perform a descriptive function; instead they are 
disguised instructions or commands. As such, no explanation is required for how 
necessity is ‘generated’ from rules. Nonetheless, Thomasson can still maintain that modal 
sentences express truths: they are true when they accurately reflect the existence of a 
genuine linguistic rule, and false otherwise. 
 
2.3 Defending analyticity 
The second major objection to LMC raised in the previous chapter was Quine’s rejection 
of the analytic / synthetic distinction.
132
 Prodigious work has been done by others to 
defend the notion of analyticity, and I will take for granted that these attempts have been 
sufficiently successful to render the commitment to analyticity incurred by LMC 
harmless. Here, I will briefly outline some of the key lines of defence raised in the 
literature. 
One influential response to Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ comes from Grice and 
Strawson, who argue that the circularity in definitions of concepts like ‘analyticity’ and 
‘synonymy’ is not vicious.133 Graham Priest makes a similar point, arguing that many 
important concepts are definable only using circular terms.
134
 While it may be impossible 
to elucidate concepts such as ‘meaning’, ‘synonymy’, ‘analyticity’ and so forth in purely 
non-semantic terms, they argue, that does not mean we ought to reject the concepts as 
nonsensical. Plausibly, for example, logical concepts such as ‘consequence’ and ‘validity’ 
are also definable only relative to each other. Grice and Strawson also argue that it is 
possible to accept Quine’s view that any belief can be revised in light of empirical 
information while maintaining the analytic / synthetic distinction. They argue that while 
every belief can be revised, some such revisions constitute changes of definition, and 
                                                     
132 Here, my focus is on responses to Quine’s arguments in ‘Two Dogmas.’ The arguments in ‘Truth By 
Convention’ are discussed in chapter 5.  
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pp.289-301. 
56 
 
some consist in merely ‘admitting falsity.’135 The former kind of change is what occurs 
when we revise analytic principles. This response is reminiscent of the positions espoused 
by the early positivists discussed in chapter 1. Recall that Reichenbach also held that our 
system of beliefs faces experience ‘as a whole,’ and that principles only count as a priori 
relative to a theory. As a result, he argued that any principle could be rejected in light of 
new evidence. However, a distinction was still maintained between definitional principles 
and experiential ones since some revisions constituted changes of definition, as in the 
case of the shift to new geometrical principles in light of the theory of relativity.  
Priest offers a second sort of response to Quine’s argument from holism. He argues that if 
we are to update our beliefs in light of new evidence, our system of beliefs as a whole 
must be governed by rules of inference. These rules determine, for example, when there is 
a conflict in the system and when there isn’t. And, Priest says, the rules that govern the 
system can be stated as conditionals which are members of the belief set itself. Analytic 
sentences are those members of our system of beliefs that ‘reflect its structure,’ or are 
statements of the rules governing the system as a whole.
136
 In many ways, this approach 
from Priest is similar to Thomasson’s position that analytic sentences are expressions of 
semantic rules stated in the object language.  
Paul Boghossian argues that there is no way to construct a plausible interpretation of 
Quine’s rejection of the analytic / synthetic distinction. His argument is that the concept 
of ‘Frege-analyticity’, according to which a sentence is analytic if it is transformable into 
a logical truth by swapping synonyms with synonyms, cannot be rejected without 
rejecting meaning itself. Boghossian suggests two ways to interpret Quine’s claim that 
this notion meaningless. The first is a thesis he calls ‘non-factualism’ about analyticity: 
the thesis that there is no coherent property expressed by ‘is analytic’, and as a result, that 
‘S is analytic’ is also incoherent. The second is a thesis he calls an ‘error theory’ about 
analyticity: the thesis that analyticity is a coherent property, but one that is necessarily 
uninstantiated.
137
 Boghossian dismisses non-factualism by arguing that for Frege-
analyticity to be incoherent, either the notion of logical truth must be incoherent or the 
notion of synonymy must be incoherent. Given that logical truth is not in question, the 
only option left is for synonymy to be incoherent. Boghossian argues, however, that it is 
implausible to deny that the notion of synonymy makes sense without embracing 
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scepticism about meaning itself.
138
 Once we allow that expressions can be meaningful, it 
is difficult to deny that two expressions can have the same meaning. To do so would 
mean accepting that we are unable to stipulate that one expression is to mean the same 
thing as another. What’s more, given that there are at least some synonymies (such as 
stipulated ones), even the weaker ‘error theory’ interpretation of Quine’s position can be 
rejected.  
Nonetheless, Boghossian does not endorse analyticity in all its forms. He accepts that 
analytic claims should not be thought to be literally made true by meaning. (In the Frege-
analyticity case, the logical truths with which analytic sentences are synonymous are not 
‘made true’ by meaning.) He suggests, however, that analyticity can be used to explain 
the a priori.
139
 He contrasts a metaphysical understanding of analyticity (the notion that 
an analytic sentence owes its truth to its meaning) from an epistemological understanding 
of analyticity (as the notion that merely grasping the meaning of a sentence justifies one’s 
holding it true).
140
 
Theorists in recent times have also constructed accounts of analyticity intended to 
withstand Quinean attacks. Examples include Thomasson’s theory described above, 
Boghossian’s epistemological analyticity, and Gillian Russell’s theory.141 Russell argues 
for what Boghossian would call a ‘metaphysical’ conception of analyticity, according to 
which the meaning of a sentence fully determines its truth. Her theory differs from earlier 
positions by taking the reference determiner of an analytic sentence to be what makes it 
true, rather than its content. Russell argues for a ‘two-factor’ account according to which 
the truth of a sentence is determined partly by a state of the world, and partly by its 
meaning.
142
 She argues that the meaning that forms the second of these factors is 
‘reference determiner’, where a reference determiner is defined as a condition that 
something must meet to count as the extension of the expression in question.
143
 
According to Russell, the state of the world that forms the first factor can be the context 
of utterance, the context of introduction, or the context of evaluation for a term. 
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Following Kaplan, she suggests that the context of utterance for a term determines its 
context of evaluation.
144
 Then, analyticity, or truth in virtue of meaning, is a property had 
by a sentence when its truth is guaranteed by its reference determiner alone. Russell 
argues for a neo-Kantian position according to which this is the case for subject / 
predicate sentences when a) the sentence can be true even if nothing meets the conditions 
set by the subject expression’s reference determiner, and b) the reference determiner for 
the subject expression ‘contains’ the reference determiner for the predicate expression.145 
This second condition holds when everything that satisfies the subject expression with 
respect to some context of utterance and context of introduction also satisfies the 
predicate expression with respect to that context of utterance and context of 
introduction.
146
 
The notion of analyticity remains controversial, and there are numerous other critiques 
and defences in the literature.
147
 In the following chapters, however, I will set aside 
Quinean concerns to do with analyticity in order to focus on other issues for LMC. In 
particular, I will examine whether the theory is committed to broader ontological 
conventionalism. Further discussion of the notion of truth by convention, and the 
critiques levelled against it from Quine and others, can be found in chapter 5.  
 
2.4 Establishing parameters for LMC 
The defence of LMC from Kripkean and Quinean challenges mounted above has 
primarily been made within the context of Sidelle and Thomasson’s modal theories. Of 
course, these are only two of a number of conventionalist and deflationist theories of 
modality in the literature.
148
 Therefore, it is necessary to establish some precise 
parameters for LMC in order to differentiate it from similar views. In this section, I will 
provide a brief overview of some of prominent deflationist and conventionalist theories of 
modality. Then, I will set out some parameters to determine the commitments of LMC, 
and specify which theories do and do not count as a version of it. Note that while LMC as 
defined below will be my focus, at times objections raised will also apply to other 
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conventionalist or deflationary theories. When this is the case, I will draw attention to the 
broader application.  
2.4.1 Theodore Sider 
One important recent modal theory is Theodore Sider’s ‘Humean’ account of modal 
truth.
149
 Sider explicitly rejects versions of conventionalism that treat necessity as 
equivalent to analyticity.
150
 His theory starts from the assumption that ‘necessity’ does 
not pick out any natural property. Instead, he says, it is up to us which classes of truths we 
treat as necessary, and which we treat as merely contingent. As such, Sider’s view makes 
the meaning of terms like ‘necessary’ conventional, but does not take the necessity of any 
sentence to be equivalent to its analyticity, or its truth to be guaranteed by linguistic rules 
alone. Some of the classes of sentences Sider considers necessary are mathematical 
truths, logical truths and the laws of metaphysics. Even analytic truths count as necessary 
according to Sider, but their analyticity alone is not the source of their necessity; instead 
they are necessary because they fall into a class of sentences that by convention, we have 
chosen to treat as necessary.  
2.4.2 Ross Cameron 
Ross Cameron argues for a deflationist theory of modality.
151
 With Sider, Cameron 
argues that necessity is not a natural property; it does not ‘carve reality at the joints’.152 
Again with Sider, he suggests that which features of reality we treat as necessary and 
which we treat as merely contingent is in a sense conventional, but he denies that we 
make modal sentences true. According to deflationism, we choose where to draw the 
boundaries between necessity and contingency, but the properties we end up picking out 
are just as real as any other properties; they simply aren’t natural. Cameron suggests that 
we can distinguish three different positions when it comes to modality: the realist 
position, the conventionalist position and the deflationist position. According to the 
realist, reality carves a natural joint between the necessary and the contingent. According 
to the conventionalist, there is no such joint in reality; instead, we impose or project 
modal features onto the world. Finally, according to the deflationist, reality carves a non-
natural joint. Cameron helps articulate these positions with the help of an analogy. We 
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might call someone ‘tall’, he says, in some circumstances but not in others.153 Perhaps in 
the context of your family you are tall, but you are short when compared to most 
basketball players. There are three things we could say about the property of tallness. 
Firstly, we could say that tallness is a natural property such that either you are tall or not; 
if so, we must have got it wrong in one context or the other. This is the realist position. 
Secondly, we could say that tallness is merely conventional; the world contains no 
tallness properties, but perhaps we ‘project’ tallness onto you in some circumstances but 
not others. This is the conventionalist position. Thirdly, we could say that tallness is a 
non-natural property, but a real one nonetheless. You are part of the set of people taller 
than most of your family members, and also part of the set of people shorter than most 
basketball players. Neither of these represents a natural property, but each is still a real 
feature of the world.  This final position is the deflationist position, which Cameron 
supports. He suggests that modal properties are analogous; they are not conventional, but 
they also fail to carve reality at the joints.  
2.4.3 Iris Einheuser 
A limited modal conventionalism is defended by Iris Einheuser, who argues that our 
concepts ground the modal properties of objects.
154
 She frames her modal 
‘conceptualism’ as a solution to the grounding problem for coincident objects. Einheuser 
argues that the modal differences between objects with complete spatiotemporal overlap 
(such as a statue and a piece of alloy) are grounded in the concepts we apply to them. Her 
basic ontology is composed of ‘ontologically inarticulate stuff’; this stuff does not come 
built-in with objects instantiating modal properties.
155
 Instead, Einheuser says, we 
configure objects in the world through application of our concepts, which carve out 
entities complete with modal properties and conditions of persistence. This helps provide 
a solution to the grounding problem because it accounts for what the statue and the alloy 
have in common (they share the same portion of inarticulate stuff) and how they differ 
(they instantiate different conceptual modal properties). Nonetheless, Einheuser’s view is 
not intended as a full-blown modal conceptualism. The non-conceptual ‘stuff’ of her 
ontology is composed of fundamental physical particles, which themselves have modal 
properties. As a result, it is only the non-fundamental entities that depend on our concepts 
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according to Einheuser.
156
 She suggests that a set of non-conceptually dependent possible 
worlds could be constructed that represent different ways the ‘stuff’ itself could be.157 
2.4.4 Dana Goswick 
Dana Goswick argues for a ‘response-dependence’ theory of objects and their modal 
properties.
158
 Like Einheuser, she suggests that the right way to explain the modal 
properties of objects is to take a non-modal part of the world to combine with human 
practices to result in an object complete with modal properties. According to Goswick, 
the mind-independent world contains ‘non-modal objects’. These are entities that occupy 
space and time, and instantiate non-modal properties, but lack modal properties. For 
Goswick, what’s required for a modal object to arise is that we have a particular kind of 
psychological response to a non-modal object, which she calls a ‘sort-response’. For 
example, for there to be an object with the modal persistence and identity conditions of a 
rock, some subject must respond to an appropriate non-modal object as a rock. As a 
result, Goswick accepts that both objects and their modal properties are dependent on 
human psychological responses.  
2.4.5 Simon Blackburn  
Simon Blackburn defends a ‘quasi-realist’ theory of modality.159 He argues that we ought 
to reject the approach to theorising about modality that takes providing a modal theory to 
require providing truth conditions for modal sentences. Instead, he contends, the project 
of providing a modal theory is one of giving an account of what it means to make modal 
claims, and why it is correct for us to do so.
160
 According to Blackburn, making modal 
assertions means making certain commitments, or expressing certain mental states. 
Constructing a theory of modality, he says, must begin with an account of the function of 
modal claims in our discourse; we must first say what mental states are reflected in our 
modal claims. Using this information, we can then give an account of propositions 
expressed by them. By linking modal propositions directly to the mental states they 
reflect, the truth or falsehood of the propositions can be given in terms of the correctness 
of the mental states.  
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2.4.6 Conditions for LMC 
As is clear in light of the list above, a wide variety of views fall into the category of 
deflationism or conventionalism about modality. Given the broad range of loosely related 
theories available, it is helpful at this point to set the parameters for LMC that I will be 
using throughout the rest of the thesis. Broadly (although not exhaustively) the views 
above can be grouped along two different dimensions. On the one hand, some views are 
anti-realist while others are deflationist. The deflationist views, such as Sider’s and 
Cameron’s, take ‘necessary’ to pick out a real, mind-independent feature of reality, but 
deny that the feature in question is a natural property. On the other hand, the anti-realist 
views, such as Einheuser’s and Goswick’s, take necessity to be a property that depends 
on our human behaviour in some way. A second way to group the theories above is by 
whether they take modal truths to depend on language or on some other feature of us. On 
the one hand, Sider’s view is that modal truth is partly conventional because it depends 
on what ‘necessary’ means. On the other hand, Einheuser’s view is that the modal 
properties of objects depend on our concepts, Goswick’s view is that they depend on our 
psychological responses, and Blackburn’s view is that they serve to express certain 
mental states.  
LMC falls into the anti-realist side of the first divide, and the linguistic side of the second 
divide. According to LMC, the rules governing terms in a sentence determine the modal 
status of the sentence. And, necessity does not pick out a property, natural or non-natural, 
that is independent of those linguistic rules. Importantly, this means that the role played 
by linguistic conventions in determining modal truth must be more than simply to fix the 
meaning of ‘necessary’ to an independently existing property. What it means for the role 
of convention to qualify as more significant than this is a topic that will be given 
significant discussion in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
For the remainder of the thesis, I will use ‘linguistic modal conventionalism’ to pick out 
any theory that accepts the following two theses: 
a) The truth values of all metaphysical modal sentences are determined in a non-
trivial way by conventional linguistic rules governing the use of terms. 
b) All modal features of the world are dependent on these conventional linguistic 
rules. 
Note that none of the five views listed above qualify as LMC given these two conditions. 
Sider’s and Cameron’s theories both fail to meet both conditions. They fail condition a) 
because the role played by linguistic rules is simply to help fix reference to independently 
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existing properties; this does not meet the ‘non-trivial’ test. (Once again, what qualifies as 
non-trivial is a topic that will be elucidated further in chapters 4 and 5.) They fail 
condition b) because they take modal properties to be non-conventional (although non-
natural) features of the world. Einheuser’s, Goswick’s and Blackburn’s theories all fail 
condition a). None of these three theories take linguistic roles to play any role in 
determining modal truth. Finally, note that Sidelle’s theory counts as a clear case of LMC 
by explicitly endorsing both a) and b). The extent to which Thomasson would endorse 
these conditions is discussed in chapter 4. As we will see in the following chapters, 
reconciling a) and b) with non-conventionalism about ontology more broadly is a difficult 
task. 
2.4.7 Two notes: sentences and conventions 
There are two features of condition a) that require explanation before moving on to 
construct the objection for LMC that is to be the focus of the next three chapters. Firstly, 
a) requires that modal sentences depend for their truth on conventional linguistic rules. In 
what follows, sentences should be thought of as sentence types rather than tokens, and 
should be taken to be expressed in a natural language. (For my purposes, that language is 
English.) A further question is how English sentences are to be typed. Here, I’ll assume 
that they are typed orthographically or phonetically, rather than semantically.
161
 I take this 
approach because it will be an important feature of the discussion in future chapters that 
one and the same word or sentence can have different meanings. 
The second feature of a) that requires discussion is the nature of the conventions that 
establish linguistic rules. While I do not intend to commit on behalf of LMC to one theory 
of convention or other, I will briefly outline two available theories. The first is David 
Lewis’s famous account.162 According to Lewis, conventions arise in human societies as a 
way of solving problems of coordination. Such problems arise for a group when each 
member has a number of actions he or she could take, such that the outcomes each person 
wishes to bring about or prevent depend on the actions of others in the group.
163
 As a 
result, each person’s chosen action should depend on her expectations about the actions 
of the others. Sometimes, the actions group members take will constitute what Lewis calls 
an ‘equilibrium’. This is the case when each person would not choose to alter her action 
given what the others in the group have chosen. Lewis describes the following as a case 
                                                     
161 David Kaplan’s ‘Words,’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume Vol. 64, No. 1 (1990): pp.93-119 
provides argument against this view. A response can be found in John Hawthorne and Ernest Lepore, ‘On 
Words,’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 108, No. 9 (2011): pp.447-485. 
162 Lewis, Convention. 
163 Ibid, p.8. 
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of a coordination equilibrium.
164
 If a phone call is cut off, and the participants want to 
reconnect, there are two actions each person could take: each could either call back, or 
wait for the other to call back. The situation in which one or the other calls back, but not 
both, is a coordination equilibrium because neither participant would benefit from 
changing her action. On the other hand, the situations in which neither calls back, or both 
call back at the same time, are not coordination equilibria, because each would benefit 
from changing her action given what the other person did.  
According to Lewis, conventions are established to allow people to coordinate their 
actions to achieve equilibria. A convention is then a regularity in the actions of the 
members of some population such that in a given situation, everyone conforms to the 
regularity, everyone expects everyone else to conform to the regularity, and conforming 
with the regularity represents a coordination equilibrium. In other words, conforming to 
the regularity means that no individual would be better off not conforming, given that 
everyone else does conform.
165
 On Lewis’s view, conventions require that there is 
common knowledge of expected behaviour. 
Margaret Gilbert has offered extensive criticism of Lewis’s account.166 For example, she 
suggests that Lewis’s account is wrong in requiring that a convention can only arise if 
each party expects others to conform to it; sometimes, she says, we fully expect others to 
flout conventions.
167
 Gilbert also argues that there is an essentially normative aspect to 
convention, which is lacking from Lewis’s view.168 She offers her own theory of social 
convention, according to which a convention constitutes a kind of joint acceptance of a 
principle of action.
169
 Importantly, she agrees with Lewis that this joint acceptance must 
be common knowledge among members of the relevant society, even if an explicit 
agreement is lacking. Her account is normative in that each member of the society must 
take herself to have a duty to conform to convention if she is party to it, even if other 
reasons for action can trump her reasons to conform. 
In order for linguistic rules to be conventional, it must be that convention in a sense such 
as those of Lewis or Gilbert has arisen among members of a linguistic community to 
follow the linguistic rules. If it is a rule to only apply ‘bachelor’ where ‘male’ applies, for 
example, some convention must be in place to refrain from applying ‘bachelor’ where 
                                                     
164 Ibid, p.5. 
165 Ibid, p.42. 
166 See Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.319-367.  
167 Ibid, pp.346-349. 
168 Ibid, pp.352-355. 
169 Ibid, pp.373-407. 
65 
 
‘male’ does not apply.170 Note that both Lewis’s and Gilbert’s account have in common 
that conventions are often implicit, rather than stipulated or laid down explicitly. In what 
follows, I’ll assume that our linguistic conventions are implicit in this way.   
2.5 Taking stock 
With parameters in place, we can now take stock of LMC’s prospects. In chapter 1, I 
argued that the primary charges that have been laid against LMC are a) that analyticity, 
upon which the view relies, should be rejected, and b) that it cannot account for necessary 
a posteriori truths. The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that neither of these 
challenges is insurmountable. I take it that the substantial body of work done in recent 
times to defend the notion of analyticity has met with enough success to warrant the use 
of analyticity in LMC. 
On the other hand, the work required to make LMC compatible with the existence of 
necessary a posteriori truths is not yet complete. The approach taken by Sidelle and 
Thomasson is promising, but must be supplemented by an account of how modal truths 
depend on the actual world. I return to this topic in chapter 7, where I argue that the 
approach to the necessary a posteriori provided by two-dimensional semantics can be 
adapted by LMC. For now, I will set aside Quinean and Kripkean worries to argue for a 
new challenge to LMC: the threat of object conventionalism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
170 Lewis’s account of the conventions of language can be found in chapter 5 of Convention.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Lost in a Conventional World 
Despite its ability to respond to Quinean and Kripkean challenges, linguistic modal 
conventionalism is not immune from objections. Here and in the following two chapters, I 
argue that LMC becomes committed to conventionalism about objects and 
conventionalism about truth if it maintains an ontology that admits modal properties had 
by objects and modal truth conditions had by propositions. This chapter is devoted to 
articulating the first part of the challenge: the threat of object conventionalism. While 
Sidelle explicitly endorses object conventionalism, I argue that the position ought to be 
rejected by proponents of LMC, given the motivations for the view set out in the 
introduction. One natural way for LMC to account for the modal properties had by 
objects is to take them to depend on the rules governing referring terms. However, as 
argued below, the modal properties had by an object are closely related to its conditions 
of existence, identity and persistence in such a way that treating those properties as 
dependent on convention amounts to treating the object itself as dependent on convention. 
What’s more, combining conventionalism about the modal properties of objects with non-
conventionalism about the objects themselves can lead to contradictions and to Leibniz’s 
Law violations. Below, section 3.1 introduces the notion of modal properties and the de 
re modal sentences that appear to attribute those properties to objects. Sections 3.2 and 
3.3 present two ways to generate object conventionalism from LMC. In section 3.4, I 
evaluate whether a commitment to object conventionalism is a bullet worth biting for 
LMC, and conclude that it isn’t. Finally, in section 3.5 I examine whether the use of 
‘Abelardian’ predicates can represent a way for LMC to avoid the unwanted commitment.  
 
3.1 Modal properties and de re modal truth 
As noted in chapter 2, modern versions of LMC such as Sidelle’s and Thomasson’s take 
linguistic rules governing terms to make some sentences analytic, and treat analyticity as 
the determinant of the modal status of sentences. As such, sentences of the form 
‘Necessarily, S’ are taken to be true because ‘S’ is analytic, or because rules governing 
the use of the terms in ‘S’ guarantee that S is true. Similarly, ‘Possibly, S’ is taken to be 
true because ‘Not S’ is not analytic, or because rules governing the use of terms in ‘S’ 
don’t guarantee that ‘S’ is false. These are cases of de dicto modality; adding 
‘necessarily’ or ‘possibly’ to ‘S’ says that the entire sentence is necessarily true or 
possibly true. By contrast, de re modal sentences appear to say of an object that it has 
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some property necessarily or possibly. For LMC, modal sentences of this type require a 
different approach. Consider, for example, the claim that the number of planets is 
necessarily greater than seven. This claim can be read in two ways. On the de dicto 
reading, the claim is that the sentence, ‘The number of planets is greater than seven’ is 
true necessarily. This is false, since there could have been seven or fewer planets. On the 
de re reading, the claim is that the referent of ‘the number of planets’, namely the number 
eight, is necessarily greater than seven. This is true, since no matter how things turned out 
to be, the number eight would be greater than the number seven.  
More generally, a modal sentence is de re when its logical form is such that it contains a 
variable within the scope of a modal operator that is bound by a quantifier outside the 
scope of the modal operator. In the example just discussed, the claim can be 
disambiguated with a de re reading as:  
(1) (the x: Px)(□Gx)  
In (1), ‘P’ is ‘the number of planets’ and ‘G’ is ‘is greater than seven’. Since the last 
instance of ‘x’ both falls within the scope of the modal operator and is bound by the 
quantifier ‘the x: Px’, (1) is de re. On the other hand (2) is de dicto, since the modal 
operator attaches to a complete sentence, rather than to a free variable: 
(2)  □((the x:Px)Gx) 
Because the modal operator attaches directly to a predicate in de re sentences, rather than 
operating on the sentence as a whole, we can refer to de re modal sentences as sentences 
involving ‘modal predication’.171 In (1), ‘□Gx’ is a modal predicate that is naturally 
interpreted as attributing to the referent of the subject term (the x: Px) a modal property: 
the property of being necessarily greater than seven.  
Given the basic approach of LMC discussed in chapters 1 and 2, we can see that its 
treatment of (2) is relatively straightforward.  ‘Necessarily, the number of planets is 
greater than seven’ will be true if the linguistic rules governing ‘the number of planets’ 
and ‘greater than seven’ make ‘The number of planets is greater than seven’ analytic. 
Since ‘Apply “the number of planets” only where “greater than seven” applies’ is not 
plausibly a linguistic rule, ‘The number of planets is greater than seven’ is not analytic, 
and the modal claim is false. However, dealing with (1) is more difficult. A natural way 
to treat claims like (1) is to hold that modal predicates pick out modal properties, and a 
sentence like (1) is true just when the referent of the subject term has the modal property 
                                                     
171 This is the terminology Sidelle uses in Necessity, Essence and Individuation pp.69-78.  
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picked out by the predicate. On this view, (1) is true because the referent of ‘the number 
of planets’ (the number eight) has the modal property picked out by the modal predicate: 
the property of being necessarily greater than seven.  
De re modal sentences, then, appear to make claims about modal properties had by 
objects; indeed, ‘de re’ can be translated as meaning ‘of the thing’. The task for LMC is 
to explain how these sentences can depend for their truth on linguistic rules. If the natural 
reading of de re modal sentences is accepted, that means providing an explanation of how 
linguistic rules can make it the case that objects have the modal properties they do. This is 
no small feat; on the face value reading, modal properties are features of objects like any 
other properties. Just as an object can be red, for example, it can also be possibly green. 
As a result, treating de re modality as conventional means treating features of objects as 
conventional on this view, rather than simply treating features of language as 
conventional. Sidelle’s strategy for dealing with de re modality is take on this challenge 
by accepting the natural reading; he takes the linguistic rules governing an expression to 
determine whether objects in its extension possess a given modal property.
172
  Sidelle 
argues that linguistic rules endow objects with their modal properties, and by doing so, 
they explain the truth of de re modal sentences.  
To see how this view might work, consider the following example. The sortal ‘person’ is 
associated with conditions of application and coapplication. According to the current 
proposal, it is these rules that determine the modal properties of any object that falls into 
the extension of ‘person’. Since ‘person’ is a sortal, rather than a merely descriptive 
predicate, it is a term with which we associate conditions of identity and persistence for 
objects. As a result, anything that counts as a person will have the property being 
necessarily a person. Similarly, if ‘person’ can only be applied where ‘worthy of moral 
concern’ is applied, all persons will have the property being necessarily worthy of moral 
concern. Given that people have these conventional modal properties, we have a simple 
way of providing truth conditions for de re modal sentences. Because the rules have 
endowed all people with the modal property being necessarily worthy of modal concern, 
the de re modal sentence, ‘All people are necessarily worthy of moral concern’ is true. 
Similarly, if the name ‘Angus’ is introduced as a name for a person, ‘Angus is necessarily 
worthy of moral concern’ will be true. This story has the advantage of being able to 
maintain the natural account of modal predication suggested above; modal predicates 
operate just like other predicates on this view. ‘A is necessarily F’ is true just so long as 
                                                     
172 Ibid, pp.50–58, pp.69–78.  
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the referent of A has the property of being necessarily F, for example. As we’ll see 
however, this kind of view threatens to make A itself dependent on convention. 
 
3.2 Modal properties and conditions of existence, identity and persistence 
On the strategy suggested in section 3.1, LMC treats the modal properties had by an 
object as dependent on conventional linguistic rules. However, a number of authors 
(some friendly to the proposal and others unfriendly) have argued that theories in this 
vein are committed to conventionalism about objects themselves.
 173
 The gap between 
conventionalism about modal properties and conventionalism about objects is bridged by 
the existence, identity and persistence conditions (EIP conditions) that determine the 
nature of an object and what it takes for the object to exist. The argument from modal 
conventionalism to object conventionalism proceeds in three steps. The first step is to 
establish a relation of dependence between the EIP conditions of an entity and its modal 
properties, and the second step is to establish that if that relation of dependence holds, 
conventionalism about modal properties entails conventionalism about EIP conditions. 
Finally, the third step is to show that conventionalism about something’s EIP conditions 
entails that whether or not the object exists depends on convention.  
Step 1: EIP conditions have modal import 
Each object comes with a set of existence conditions, identity conditions and persistence 
conditions.
174
 The existence conditions of an object determine what states of the world 
count as containing the object; they determine how things need to be in order for the 
object to exist. Relatedly, the identity conditions of an object determine what something 
needs to be like in order to qualify as identical to that object. Finally, its persistence 
conditions determine what changes it can undergo while continuing to exist and while 
retaining its identity. These EIP conditions have modal implications.
175
 When we talk 
about the conditions under which an object would exist, or the conditions in which it 
could survive, we are making modal claims. To say that a table could not continue to 
                                                     
173 A friendly version of the argument can be found in Iris Einheuser’s ‘Towards a Conceptualist Solution to 
the Grounding Problem’. Less friendly versions can be found in chapter 1 of Crawford L. Elder, Real Natures 
and Familiar Objects (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2004) and chapter 4 of Michael Rea, World Without 
Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
174 That objects have existence and identity conditions is not universally accepted. In particular, Kripke is 
famous for rejecting them in Naming and Necessity (eg. pp.46-47). See also Michael Jubien, ‘The Myth of 
Identity Conditions,’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol.10 (1996): pp.343-356. Ultimately, the version of LMC 
pursued in chapter 6 also denies that objects have identity conditions. However, the argument set out here 
only requires that if objects have modal properties then they have identity conditions, and vice versa. 
175 See Thomasson , Ordinary Objects pp.62-63 for an argument that existence and identity conditions are 
modal in nature. A similar argument can be found in Michael Rea, World Without Design pp.82-85. 
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exist if it were ground into sawdust, for example, is to say that the table has a modal 
property: the property not being possibly sawdust. In general, then, an object’s having 
some set of EIP conditions will guarantee that object’s having certain modal properties.  
Similarly, and most importantly for LMC, the modal properties had by an object 
guarantee that it has certain EIP conditions. If it is a feature of the table that it is not 
possible for it be a pile of sawdust, then we have an explanation for why it is not identical 
to the pile of sawdust that exists an hour from now, post grinding. If the table is not 
possibly sawdust, then a condition of identity for the table must be that it’s not identical 
to any pile of sawdust; a condition of persistence for it must be that it cannot survive the 
grinding process. Similarly, if it’s a modal property of the table that it’s necessarily solid, 
then it’s a condition of existence for the table that it can only exist in scenarios where 
there’s something solid.  
The modal nature of EIP conditions is what distinguishes them from mere existence, 
identity and persistence facts. To state an identity fact is to say that some object is 
identical to another, and to state an existence fact is to say that something exists. To state 
a persistence fact is to say that something exists both at t1 and at t2, and all times in 
between. By contrast, to state an identity condition is to describe the sorts of things to 
which an object could be identical, and to state an existence condition is to state the 
circumstances in which something could exist. This suggests that having certain modal 
properties is sufficient for an object to have certain EIP conditions. We saw this in the 
case of the table: being not possibly sawdust guarantees that the table’s identity 
conditions rule out its being identical to sawdust, and vice versa.  
Step 2: From conventionalism about modal properties to conventionalism about EIP 
conditions 
This step in the argument is relatively straightforward. The relation of dependence 
between something’s EIP conditions and its modal properties means that if its modal 
properties depend on conventional linguistic rules, its EIP conditions do too. According 
to the version of LMC suggested in section 3.1, the rules governing referring terms 
determine what modal properties are had by an object. But, having some modal property 
guarantees that an object has certain EIP conditions. So, by making it the case that an 
object has a certain modal property, linguistic conventions also have the power to make it 
the case that the object has a certain EIP conditions. For example, if the rules governing 
‘table’ and ‘sawdust’ make it the case that the table isn’t possibly sawdust, they also 
make it the case that a condition of existence for the table is that it isn’t a pile of sawdust.  
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Step 3: From conventionalism about EIP conditions to conventionalism about objects 
The final step in the argument is to show that if an object’s EIP conditions are 
conventional, then the object itself is also conventional. The case for this claim is put by 
Crawford Elder as follows. According to conventionalism about identity and existence 
conditions, he says: 
That some switches of properties amount to ceasings-to-exist, that others amount to 
comings-into-existence, whereas yet others amount to mere alterations, is the case only 
relative to us and our conventions. In other words, that the existences of the world’s 
objects begin where they do, and end where they do, will not be independent of us and 
our conventions.
176
 
Michael Rea makes a similar case: 
What a thing can and cannot survive depends on what kind of thing it is; and what kind 
of thing it is depends on what it can and cannot survive. Thus, if the facts about what a 
thing can and cannot survive depend upon its relations to other contingent things, then so 
also do the facts about what kind of thing it is. So, if accepting this... commits 
naturalists to modal antirealism, then it also commits them to the denial of RMO 
[Realism about Material Objects].
177
 
The thought that Elder and Rea are expressing is that if EIP conditions depend on 
convention, the matter of which objects in fact exist will depend partly on convention. 
Mere switches of properties alone won’t determine that something begins or ceases to 
exist; they must combine with conventional facts about which of those switches constitute 
comings-into-existence or ceasings-to-exist. For example, the conventional fact that the 
table can’t survive being ground into sawdust combines with switches of qualitative 
properties to make it the case that a ceasing-to-exist occurred. If the table had been 
possibly ground into sawdust, then post grinding nothing would have gone out of 
existence, and the object pre-grinding would have been identical to the object post 
grinding.  
The fact that the table exists at all depends on its existence conditions being fulfilled. In 
general, some distribution of qualitative properties across space and time is not enough to 
determine what exists. Rather, the distribution of qualitative properties must combine 
with conditions of existence and identity to determine which groups of those properties 
                                                     
176 Elder, Real Natures and Familiar Objects p.9. 
177 Rea, World Without Design pp.95-96. 
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are instantiated by a single object, and which are not.
178
 So, whether some object exists is 
determined in part by its conditions of existence, and if those conditions are determined 
by conventional linguistic rules, whether the object exists will in part be determined by 
conventional linguistic rules. Similarly, whether object A and B are identical will be 
determined by their conditions of identity. And, given that those conditions of identity are 
determined by conventional linguistic rules, whether or not A and B are in fact identical 
will depend on conventional linguistic rules.  
On the ‘natural reading’ suggested in section 3.1, modal properties are genuine features of 
objects, just like non-modal properties.
179
 However, the argument outlined above 
demonstrates that if such modal properties are treated as dependent on the linguistic rules 
governing terms, the question of what exists and what is identical to what is also 
dependent on conventional linguistic rules. With Rea, I take this position to constitute a 
kind of anti-realism or conventionalism about objects themselves. At a minimum, realism 
or non-conventionalism about objects should require that the answers to questions like 
‘How many objects are in the room?’ and ‘How old is that tree?’ should be answerable 
independently of convention; as it stands LMC is committed to denying that claim. 
 
3.3 Conventional modal properties and Leibniz’s Law 
Sidelle provides an alternative route from modal conventionalism to object 
conventionalism that does not appeal to EIP conditions.
180
 Sidelle’s strategy is to argue 
that combining realism about objects with conventionalism about modal properties entails 
that a single object can have incompatible modal properties.
181
 The argument makes use 
of the conventionalist picture of modal properties outlined in section 3.1 according to 
which the modal properties of objects are determined by the rules governing linguistic 
expressions.  
                                                     
178 Plausibly, it may be that EIP conditions don’t themselves constitute determiners of what exists. Instead, 
they might be thought of as the things that make it the case that some qualitative distribution determines the 
distribution of objects that it does, rather than a distinct one. In that case, EIP conditions are still difference 
makers when it comes to what exists, in that different EIP conditions mean different distributions of objects, 
holding fixed some distribution of qualitative properties. 
179 Note that in chapter 7, I will provide truth conditions for de re modal sentences that do not rely on such 
modal properties; however, the view does allow for the construction of a deflationary kind of ‘modal 
property’ that is simply a construction out of sets of predicates. In section 7.7, I argue that this second sort of 
modal property does not fall prey to the argument described here.  
180 This argument can be found in Alan Sidelle, ‘Modality and Objects,’ The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 60, 
No. 238 (2010): pp.109-125.  A similar argument can also be found in Gillian Russell, ‘Meaning and 
Necessity,’ in Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara eds., The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of 
Language, (New York: Routledge, 2012) pp.782-794. 
181 Here, ‘object realism’ can be taken as a catch-all term for any theory according to which at least some 
objects exist, and facts about which objects exist that do not depend on conventional human practices.  
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The modal conventionalist who maintains object realism should hold that the following 
scenario is possible.
182
 I could introduce the name ‘Goliath’, fixing its reference to some 
convention-independent object, associating the name with the sortal ‘statue’.183 The 
linguistic rules governing ‘statue’ will determine which modal predicates can correctly be 
applied to ‘Goliath’. In particular, ‘Goliath is not possibly squashed’ will be true, since 
the rules associated with ‘statue’ prohibit its application where ‘squashed’ applies.184 At 
the same time, however, I could introduce the name ‘Lumpl’, fixing its reference to one 
and the same object.
185
 ‘Lumpl’ is associated with the sortal ‘lump’, and thus is governed 
by different linguistic rules to those governing ‘Goliath’. The meaning of ‘lump’ terms is 
such that the sentence ‘Lumpl is possibly squashed’ is true, since the relevant linguistic 
rules do not rule out applying the term ‘lump’ where ‘squashed’ applies. However, the 
linguistic rules governing the two names both ought to succeed in endowing the object 
with modal properties, according to a version of LMC in the style discussed in 3.1. By 
introducing the names ‘Goliath’ and ‘Lumpl’ for one and the same entity as described 
here, I make it the case that the entity in question has the property of being possibly 
squashed and the property of being not possibly squashed. Therefore, the following 
sentences are all true in the scenario described: 
(3) Goliath is identical to Lumpl. 
(4) Goliath is not possibly squashed. 
(5) Lumpl is possibly squashed. 
(3) is true by supposition; we are supposing that ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ are introduced for 
one and the same non-conventional object. (4) and (5) are made true by linguistic rules 
governing our terms, as must be the case according to LMC. However, holding all of (3), 
(4) and (5) to be true commits the object realist modal conventionalist to a contradiction. 
If (3) is true, then (4) and (5) together amount to the claim that one and the same entity is 
both possibly squashed and not possibly squashed. 
It should be clear how cases like the statue / lump case will be easy to construct if you 
accept object realism and modal conventionalism. Briefly, here is one more case. Take 
any man who remains unmarried throughout his lifetime. This entity will constitute both a 
                                                     
182 The example used here is a variant of the case famously introduced in Allan Gibbard, ‘Contingent 
Identity,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 4, No.2 (1975): pp.187-221. 
183 Of course, I can’t fix the reference of ‘Goliath’ to just any object. It must be one that meets the application 
conditions for ‘statue’. 
184 Here and throughout, ‘is possibly squashed’ should be interpreted as ‘possibly exists as a squashed entity’ 
or ‘possibly survives squashing’ rather than as ‘is possibly such that someone would be able to squash it.’ 
Presumably, Goliath is possibly squashed in the latter unintended sense. 
185 In the example used by Sidelle in ‘Modality and Objects’, a second term is only counterfactually 
introduced for the object, rather than actually. However, by using a case in which two names are actually 
introduced for a single object, we can bypass attempts to avoid the problem by denying that  entails . 
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person and a bachelor. Therefore, we can introduce two different names for this object, 
one (‘Bob’) associated with the sortal ‘person’ and the other (‘Bill’) associated with the 
sortal ‘bachelor’. Given that the rules governing ‘bachelor’ determine that it can only be 
applied where ‘unmarried man’ applies, any name introduced as a ‘bachelor’ name will 
inherit that rule. By contrast, no such rule applies to ‘person’ names. Therefore, given 
object realism and modal conventionalism, we will be committed to: 
(6) Bob is identical with Bill. 
(7) Bob is not necessarily unmarried. 
(8) Bill is necessarily unmarried.186 
Sidelle’s solution to this problem is to reject (3) and (6). He argues that it cannot be the 
case that Goliath is identical to Lumpl, since the modal properties had by one differ from 
those had by the other. Insofar as names governed by incompatible rules determine 
incompatible modal properties for their referents, he says, they can never co-refer. This 
makes use of what is referred to as the ‘dualist’ or ‘pluralist’ strategy for dealing with the 
statue / lump case: take at face value the datum that Lumpl and Goliath possess different 
properties, and infer by Leibniz’s Law that they must be distinct entities.187 
However in the case of LMC, the dualist strategy leads to object conventionalism; giving 
up (3) and (6) also means giving up object realism. To see why this is the case, recall that 
by hypothesis we were assuming that some non-conventional facts have determined what 
objects exist and which objects are identical to which, and then selected one of those 
objects to be the referent of the two names. Now, though, by adopting a conventionalist 
account of how the object gets to have its modal properties, we are forced to accept that 
there are two objects where our non-conventionalist theory of objects said that there was 
only one. As a result, the outcome is not merely that the statue and the lump must be 
distinct, as many theorists already accept; the outcome is that what makes them distinct is 
linguistic conventions. Assume any realist view you like about objects, according to 
which there exists some object O. According to LMC, we should be able to fix the 
reference of two distinct names governed by distinct rules to O. In doing so, we will be 
able to confer incompatible modal properties upon the object in question, generating a 
contradiction. By Sidelle’s reasoning, we must then infer by Leibniz’s Law that there are 
two objects where we thought there was one. We will thereby be forced to accept that 
                                                     
186 As a matter of fact, we do not tend to treat ‘bachelor’ as a sortal, as we don’t tend to treat bachelors as 
entities with their own conditions of persistence independent of those had by people. The point here is simply 
that we could treat ‘bachelor’ as a sortal insofar as the linguistic rules are conventional.  
187 For examples of this strategy, see Kit Fine, ‘The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter,’ Mind 
Vol. 112, No. 446 (2003): pp.195-234, Louis deRosset, ‘What is the Grounding Problem?’ Philosophical 
Studies Vol. 156 (2011): pp.173-197 and Alan Sidelle, ‘Coincidence: The Grounding Problem, Object-
Specifying Principles, and Some Consequences,’ Philosophical Papers Vol. 45, No.3 (2016): pp.497-528. 
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which objects exist is a matter determined by conventional linguistic rules, not by our 
preferred realist theory of objects.  
One strategy for salvaging object realism immediately suggests itself. In setting up his 
problem, Sidelle assumes that our referencing-fixing practices can succeed in making two 
terms, governed by incompatible rules, pick out a single object. However, an object 
realist tempted by LMC might deny this. One way to do so would be to appeal to a theory 
of objects that begins with coincident objects. Then, if there are enough objects in the 
vicinity when we attempt our ‘naming ceremony’ for Lumpl and Goliath, our attempt to 
fix the reference of the two names to one and the same object will fail. A natural way to 
argue for this would be to claim that for every set of linguistic rules that can govern a 
referring term, there is a distinct, language-independent object that’s already part of some 
realist ontology. On this line of thought, it was a mistake to assume from the beginning 
that Lumpl and Goliath were the same object. Instead, the objection runs, the correct 
realist theory of objects is fine-grained enough to make Lumpl and Goliath distinct, and 
to render it impossible to fix the reference of two names governed by incompatible rules 
to a single object.
188
 
While this strategy might seem attractive, it is unable to solve the present problem. 
However fine-grained your realist carving of the space of objects might be, it cannot be 
so fine as to distinguish merely modal differences if it is to be compatible with LMC. If a 
theory of objects does not distinguish between merely modal differences, however, it will 
always be the case that we can introduce names governed by incompatible linguistic rules 
for one and the same object, and thereby determine contradictory modal properties for it. 
This will be possible because the linguistic rules governing two sortals can be such that 
both sortals apply to a single object, but endow different modal properties on that object. 
In Thomasson’s terminology, this will be the case when the sortals share overlapping 
application conditions, but have different coapplication conditions. If sortals F and G 
have overlapping application conditions, some F will also be a G. However, different 
coapplication conditions for the two terms will mean that ‘same F’ does not imply ‘same 
G’. 
LMC will not be able to accept any theory of objects according to which there is a distinct 
object in the world for every set of alternative linguistic rules that might govern some 
sortal. Such a theory would require that objects already come built in with modal 
                                                     
188 Some authors have argued that Lumpl and Goliath can be distinguished non-modally. Kit Fine, for 
example, argues that statues and lumps of clay (or statues and pieces of alloy) have different non-modal 
properties; a statue can be Romanesque, for example or well or badly made. A lump of clay or a piece of 
alloy, he argues, cannot. (See Fine, ‘The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter,’ p.206.) 
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features.
189
 And if there are modal properties that are independent of linguistic 
conventions, the resulting theory does not qualify as a version of LMC; it fails condition 
b) set out in the previous chapter.
190
 On the other hand, if we accept a theory of objects 
that does not recognise modal differences, we will be able to introduce names associated 
with overlapping application conditions and different coapplication conditions for a 
single object, thus generating contradictions. 
 
3.4 Is object conventionalism so bad? 
As noted above, Sidelle argues that the right way to resolve this conflict is to give up on 
object realism; he suggests modal conventionalists ought to accept that objects are 
individuated by their modal properties, and embrace object conventionalism. He says: 
 If what it is to be an individual of a certain sort is to have certain features not only 
actually, but essentially, then the conventionalist has all the same reasons to think that 
if there are any such individuals, they must also not be ‘fully independent’, but should 
arise out of our individuative practice, which is our way of articulating the world.
191
 
However, most of those who argue that LMC leads to object conventionalism see the 
commitment as a negative consequence of the view, rather than a positive one. Elder for 
example, says, ‘Conventionalism, I contend, ultimately founders on its refusal to allow 
that any objects in the world possess mind-independent existences.’192 Stephen Yablo 
notes that this commitment to object anti-realism makes Sidelle’s LMC ‘a far more 
radical doctrine than it initially appeared.’193  
Further examination of Sidelle’s view will reveal just how radical it is. According to 
Sidelle, anything with modal properties counts as a conventional entity, and in virtue of 
this fact a vast range of entities are taken to depend for their existence on linguistic rules. 
                                                     
189 The resulting picture would be a kind of ‘plenitude’ view like those set out by Stephen Yablo, John 
Hawthorne and Sarah-Jane Leslie. According to one version of the plenitude view, every ‘modal profile’ that 
could be had by some object is instantiated in the world. As such, in the space occupied by Goliath / Lumpl 
there is something that can survive squashing, something that can’t, something that is necessarily beautiful, 
something that is necessarily exactly the height of the statue, and so on. This view allows for a minimal 
conventionalism in that it is up to us which of these objects we choose to talk about, but it countenances non-
conventional modal properties, and as such is not a version of LMC. See Stephen Yablo, ‘Identity, Essence 
and Indiscernibility,’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 84, No. 6 (1987): pp.293-314, John Hawthorne, 
‘Plenitude, Convention and Ontology,’ in Metaphysical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp.54-70 and Sarah-Jane Leslie, ‘Essence, Plenitude and Paradox,’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 25 
(2011): pp.277-296. 
190 Recall that the second condition for a theory to qualify as a variety of LMC provided in section 2.4 was 
that all modal properties are dependent on conventional linguistic rules.  
191 Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation p.57. 
192 Elder, Real Natures and Familiar Objects p.20. 
193 Yablo, ‘Review of Necessity, Essence and Individuation’ p.5. 
77 
 
Sidelle focuses the majority of his attention on ordinary, medium-sized objects; however, 
his account will extend to a far wider range of entities. For example, fundamental 
physical entities have modal properties so long as the terms referring to them are rule-
governed, and on Sidelle’s account, they must be conventional in virtue of having those 
properties. Similarly, if properties are taken to themselves have modal properties, they too 
will depend for their existence on conventional linguistic rules. Sidelle is committed to 
holding that a vast range of entities that are normally considered to be language-
independent in fact depend on us for their existence. His object conventionalism therefore 
has the consequence that much of our talk fails to adequately latch onto the convention-
independent state of the world. Our talk of people, dogs, trees, quarks and genes does not 
refer to language-independent entities on Sidelle’s view, but instead refers to entities that 
depend in part for their existence on the talk itself.  
Sidelle is quick to note that despite his object conventionalism, there remain entities in his 
ontology that lack modal properties and therefore do not depend on language. He notes 
that he is not committed to a view whereby everything is language-dependent. In 
particular, he claims that the world is at bottom composed of ‘inobjectual stuff’ that has 
qualitative properties distributed across space and time, but contains no objects.
194
 
However, insofar as there are meaning-independent entities in Sidelle’s ontology, it is 
difficult for him to claim that we succeed in referring to them. Ordinary objects are 
conventional, on Sidelle’s view, due to linguistic rules associated with the terms that pick 
them out. In standard cases, a referring term is associated with linguistic rules that 
determine modal properties for its referent. The referent itself is taken to be a 
conventional entity in virtue of having modal properties endowed upon it in this way. In 
order to claim that some referring terms pick out non-conventional entities, Sidelle would 
have to argue that in some cases, one or more steps in this process are blocked. In 
particular, he would have to argue either a) some referring terms are not governed by 
linguistic rules, or b) the linguistic rules governing some referring terms fail to determine 
modal properties for their referents. It is not out of the question that Sidelle could hold 
that in some cases one step of the above process fails. However, he would then need to 
provide a non-arbitrary account of how these ‘special cases’ of referring terms differ from 
the norm. That is, he would need to say why it is the case that some terms are governed 
by linguistic rules and some terms are not, or why it is the case that some linguistic rules 
bestow modal properties while others do not.  
                                                     
194 Sidelle, Necessity, Essence and Individuation pp.50-58. 
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Assuming that such a principled account can be given, cases of terms referring to entities 
with no modal properties will nonetheless be problematic. According to Sidelle’s theory, 
sentences of the form ‘A is necessarily / possibly F’ are true when the referent of ‘A’ has 
the modal property of being necessarily F or possibly F. But if A has no modal properties, 
all sentences of the form ‘A is necessarily / possibly F’ will be false. This suggests that 
accepting the existence of objects like A commits Sidelle to the truth of apparently 
contradictory pairs of sentences. For example, ‘A is necessarily F’ will be false, as will 
‘A is possibly not F’, and therefore the negation of both sentences will be true. However, 
‘not necessarily F’ is normally taken to be equivalent to ‘possibly not F’. It appears that 
Sidelle is faced with a dilemma: he must either give up on the idea that we can refer to 
language-independent entities, or he must give up on the interdefinability of modal 
operators. Either would be a cost to his theory.  
These issues seem particularly severe when applied to Sidelle’s own ontological theory. 
As noted above, Sidelle refers to the language-independent part of his ontology as 
‘inobjectual stuff’. For this reason, ‘inobjectual stuff’ ought to be the paradigm case of a 
term that refers to an entity that has no modal properties and is therefore language-
independent. Via the argument above, Sidelle must therefore hold that either a) 
‘inobjectual stuff’ is not governed by linguistic rules, or b) the linguistic rules governing 
‘inobjectual stuff’ fail to confer it with modal properties. However, Sidelle must provide 
some principled reasons for accepting either of these claims. When setting out his theory, 
Sidelle appears to accept linguistic rules governing ‘inobjectual stuff’. For example, it’s 
plausible that term ‘inobjectual stuff’ should not be applied where ‘contains objects’ is 
applied. Assuming that Sidelle does succeed in using ‘inobjectual stuff’ to pick out a 
convention-independent entity, the problems noted above still apply. Specifically, there 
will be pairs of true sentences on Sidelle’s view that are apparently contradictory. For 
example, ‘It’s not the case that inobjectual stuff is necessarily extended in space’ will be 
true, as will ‘It’s not the case that inobjectual stuff is possibly not extended in space.’ If 
Sidelle wants to maintain that these sentences do not contradict one another, he will have 
to give up on the attractive principle that ‘necessary’ and ‘possible’ are interdefinable. 
Sidelle might wish to deny that we can refer to entities that lack modal properties, but 
nonetheless maintain that we can quantify over them. Nonetheless, problems would still 
apply. In particular, he would be committed to: x(Fx & □Fx). He would also be 
committed to x(Fx & Fx). It’s also worth noting also that names confer modal 
properties on objects via being associated with sortals. For example, the referent of 
‘Josephine’ is necessarily worth of moral concern because ‘Josephine’ is associated with 
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‘person’. That suggests that merely falling into the extension of a sortal ought to be 
enough for something to gain modal properties, even if the thing in question isn’t named; 
after all, nameless people are still worthy of moral concern.
195
 If so, entities would need 
to fail to fall under any sortals in order to qualify as lacking modal properties.  
Sidelle’s theory is committed to the existence of inobjectual stuff that lacks modal 
properties. However, by Sidelle’s own lights, merely talking about that stuff may be 
enough to endow it with modal properties. If so, the theory is inconsistent. What’s more, 
it’s worth noting that these problems will apply to any version of LMC that adopts the 
strategy described in section 3.1, not just Sidelle’s. Any such theory runs the risk of being 
committed to the claim that any entity about we can successfully talk depends for its 
existence on our talk itself.
196
 
Ultimately, the two arguments set out in 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that LMC may be committed 
to a widespread conventionalism about ontology. However, one might argue that the 
empiricist motivations outlined for LMC in the introduction count in favour of 
ontological anti-realism, rather than against it. And, if the same factors that motivate 
LMC also motivate the rejection of object realism, the ‘radical’ consequences described 
above may not seem so radical to proponents of the view.
197
 Perhaps the most famous 
supporter of both LMC and ontological anti-realism is Carnap.
198
 A quick description of 
Carnap’s view will make clear how the two positions are related and why they may be 
motivated by the same empiricist factors. According to Carnap, all questions must be 
posed with the context of a framework.
199
 Here, a framework can be thought of simply as 
a language. On Carnap’s view, for questions like ‘Do numbers exist?’ or ‘Are the statue 
and the lump identical?’ to be posed within a framework is for them to be posed in a rule-
governed language. As such, their answers will be at least partly determined by the rules 
that govern the language, and the meanings of its terms. Carnap posits two kinds of 
‘framework internal’ questions. The first kind is those questions whose answers are 
                                                     
195 See chapter 7 for detail on how quantified modal sentences should be assigned truth conditions by LMC. 
196 Chapter 4 discusses in detail how this problem applies to Thomasson’s view. Note that Einheuser’s theory 
(see section 2.4.3) and Goswick’s theory (2.4.4) are both object conventionalist, but do not fall prey to many 
of the issues facing Sidelle’s theory that are mentioned here. Sidelle’s view faces particular trouble because 
the modal properties of objects are taken to depend on how we talk about them. Because neither Einheuser’s 
nor Goswick’s theories use linguistic rules as the basis of modal truth, they can maintain that we succeed in 
referring to the non-conventional parts of their ontology. Note that Einheuser also explicitly endorses some 
non-conventional modal properties: those had by fundamental physical entities.  
197 Thank you to the audience at the Australian National University for making this point during my 2017 
presentation based on this chapter.  
198 See Carnap, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. Also see David J. Chalmers, ‘Ontological Anti-
Realism’ and Matti Eklund ‘Carnap and Ontological Pluralism,’ in David J. Chalmers, David Manley and 
Ryan Wasserman eds., Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2009) for discussion of Carnap’s ontological anti-realism.  
199 At least, almost all meaningful questions are framework internal; Carnap only countenances framework 
external questions if they are about the pragmatics of adopting a given framework. 
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determined partly by the framework itself and partly by the external world. These are 
empirical questions. The second sort of framework internal question is one whose answer 
is determined fully by the framework itself. According to Carnap, ‘metaphysical’ 
questions like ‘Do numbers exist?’ and ‘Are the statue and the lump identical?’ are 
answered completely by the rules governing the framework itself. In other words, their 
answers are analytic. Carnap’s thought is that thorough-going empiricists must treat any 
questions that are not empirical as dependent on linguistic rules. And, ontological 
questions fall into that category.  
If Carnap is right, the empiricist motivation for LMC is also a motivation for ontological 
anti-realism, and Sidelle’s ‘radical’ conclusion ought to be embraced. Ultimately, some 
proponents of LMC will endorse the positivist view that all metaphysical claims are either 
meaningless or analytic. That group may well be untroubled by a commitment to the 
position that questions about what exists are answered analytically. However, a number 
of different positions fall under the broad category of ‘empiricism’ or ‘naturalism’, not all 
of which are sympathetic to the wider positivist project. Many modern-day naturalists are 
ontological realists. What’s more, some of the motivations for LMC cited in the 
introduction are exactly the kinds of metaphysical considerations that positivists such as 
Carnap would have regarded with suspicion. Examples include the claim that a 
parsimonious theory is to be preferred, and the claim that primitivism about modality is to 
be avoided if possible. These kinds of motivations do not count in favour of ontological 
anti-realism. At bottom, empiricism is the view that empirical investigation and the 
methods of science are privileged ways of gaining knowledge. One respectable way of 
construing empiricism is as taking for granted a basic realist position about the external 
world, and about the accuracy of the information the senses provide about that world. 
Realism about trees, tables and quarks fits neatly into such a view.  
Finally, even if a commitment to object conventionalism is not sufficient reason to reject 
LMC outright, it seems clear that such a commitment will detract from its plausibility 
according to at least some of its potential proponents. In general, it is a virtue of a theory 
about the nature of some domain that it remains compatible with a variety of 
independently plausible theories concerning the nature of other domains. It is a virtue of 
an ethical theory, for example, if it remains compatible with a variety of views when it 
comes to personal identity. Similarly, it is a virtue of a theory of modality if it remains 
compatible with a variety of different theories about the nature of trees, tables, quarks and 
so on. As such, LMC should seek to remain compatible with object realism if it can.  
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3.5 Abelardian predicates 
Treating modal predicates as ‘Abelardian’ may represent a way out of Sidelle’s argument 
that LMC leads to object conventionalism. Recall that Sidelle’s argument aimed to show 
that the combination of LMC and object realism led to contradictions. For example, 
introducing the names ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ for a single clay statue commits us to the 
claim that the object is both possibly squashed and not possibly squashed insofar as 
‘Lumpl’ is associated with the ‘lump’ sortal and ‘Goliath’ is associated with the ‘statue’ 
sortal. Sidelle’s strategy was to deny that Lumpl and Goliath are the same object, and 
hold that both are a conventional. However, there is another option available. Rather than 
holding that ‘Lumpl’ and ‘Goliath’ pick out different objects, LMC could take modal 
properties themselves to be sortal-relative. If the meaning of ‘is possibly squashed’ differs 
depending on the sortal term with which it is associated, ‘Lumpl is possibly squashed’ 
can be made compatible with ‘Goliath is not possibly squashed’ without denying that 
Lumpl and Goliath are identical. 
Taken from Quine, the following example has often been cited as an uncontroversial case 
in which the meaning of a predicate depends on the subject term it predicates.
200
 Due to 
his size, the Italian painter Giorgio Barbarelli was named ‘Giorgione’, meaning ‘Big 
George’. Quine argues that the following three sentences are all true: 
(9)    Giorgione is Barbarelli. 
(10)  Giorgione is so called because of his size. 
(11)  Barbarelli is not so called because of his size. 
While their syntactic form appears to make (10) contradict (11) when (9) is true, 
intuitively this is not the case. One explanation for this is that the meaning of the 
predicate ‘is so called because of his size’ differs depending on the subject term. 
Following Noonan, such predicates have been called ‘Abelardian’.201 In the above case, 
their shared referent is not the only way the two subject terms contribute to the truth 
conditions of sentences (9) – (11). Instead, the names themselves can affect the meaning 
of the predicate that follows. Plausibly, ‘is so called because of his size’ picks out the 
property of being called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size when the subject term is 
‘Giorgione’, but picks out the property of being called ‘Barbarelli’ because of his size 
when the subject term is ‘Barbarelli’, despite the fact that the names co-refer. The result is 
that sentences (10) and (11) are both true and do not contradict each other. 
                                                     
200 See W. V. Quine, ‘Reference and Modality,’ in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical 
Essays, Rev. 2nd ed. (1961; Repr. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980).  
201 Harold W. Noonan, ‘Indeterminate Identity, Contingent Identity and Abelardian Predicates,’ The 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 41, No. 163 (1991): pp.183-193.  
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Some philosophers have argued that modal predicates are Abelardian.
202
 In parallel to ‘is 
so called because of his size’ the idea is that modal predicates like ‘is possibly squashed’ 
have different meanings in the context of different sentences depending on the subject 
term. As with ‘is so called because of his size,’ the referent of the subject term is not the 
only way on this view for the term to contribute to the truth conditions of sentences 
involving modal predication. LMC can adopt this strategy by arguing that the linguistic 
rules associated with a name also affect the truth conditions of such sentences, and that 
they do so by altering the meaning of the predicate. For example, since ‘Lumpl’ is a 
‘lump’ term, the predicate ‘is possibly squashed’ could be taken to mean ‘is possibly 
squashed qua lump’ when applied to ‘Lumpl’. Similarly, since ‘Goliath’ is a ‘statue’ 
term, the predicate ‘is possibly squashed’ could pick out the property ‘is possibly 
squashed qua statue’ when applied to ‘Goliath’. The result is that the following three 
sentences are not contradictory: 
(3) Lumpl is Goliath 
(4) Lumpl is possibly squashed 
(5) Goliath is not possibly squashed 
Since the properties of being possibly squashed qua lump and not possibly squashed qua 
statue are not incompatible, there is no problem with a single object possessing both.  
David Lewis endorses a counterpart-theoretic version of this strategy.
203
 He argues that 
different subject terms can invoke different counterpart relations that are relevant for 
assessing a de re modal sentence. For example, he argues that ‘My body is possibly 
distinct from my body’ is false, but ‘I am possibly distinct from my body’ is true, even 
though I am identical to my body at any given time. This is because the first sentence 
invokes the bodily counterpart relation, while the second sentence invokes the personal 
counterpart relation. Once again, if counterpart relations are sortal-relative, it is not 
contradictory for a single object to have a counterpart relative to one sortal that it lacks 
relative to a different sortal. Lumpl / Goliath can have a lump-counterpart that is squashed 
while lacking any statue-counterpart that is squashed.  
If this strategy is viable, Sidelle’s motivation for adopting object conventionalism is 
undercut. LMC can accept that Lumpl / Goliath is a single, convention-independent 
object and hold that we endow it with sortal-relative modal properties via our linguistic 
rules. When we fix the reference of ‘Lumpl’ to the object, we endow it with the property 
                                                     
202 See for example Noonan (Ibid).  
203 David Lewis, ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,’ The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 65, No. 8 
(1971): pp.203-211. 
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of being possibly squashed qua lump. When we fix the reference of ‘Goliath’ on the other 
hand, we make it the case that it has the property of being not possibly squashed qua 
statue. Both these properties, however, can be picked out by the predicate ‘is possibly 
squashed’. The predicate is context sensitive; its meaning is influenced by the subject 
term of the sentence. 
Some philosophers have been suspicious of the claim that modal predicates are 
Abelardian.
204
 One reason is that it seems difficult to provide any convincing motivation 
for thinking that modal predicates are context sensitive apart from a desire to solve the 
problem of cases like Lumpl and Goliath without commitment to dualism or to coincident 
objects. That worry doesen’t apply to LMC, however, because it can provide independent 
reasons for why we would think that modal predicates are context sensitive. Since it is 
linguistic rules governing referring terms that determine the modal properties had by 
objects, it is to be expected that modal properties are relativised to referring terms. For 
example, since it is in virtue of the rules governing ‘Lumpl’ that its referent has any 
modal properties at all, it is unsurprising that its referent’s modal properties are relative to 
which name is used. 
However, the Abelardian predicates view is not entirely devoid of problems. Sidelle 
himself rejects this strategy, because he thinks we should be able to ask of an object itself 
what changes it could survive.
205
 If an object’s modal properties are relative to a sortal, 
there is no way to ask of the object simpliciter what its modal properties are. Instead, we 
can only ask about its modal properties qua lump, or its modal properties qua statue. 
Sidelle argues that such an outcome is unsatisfactory. His concerns bear similarity to the 
problems that arose via the first route from LMC to object conventionalism, as outlined in 
section 3.2. There, I argued that the conditions of existence, identity and persistence had 
by an object are related to its modal properties such that if the latter are conventional, the 
former are conventional too. As such, sortal-relative modal properties still mean sortal-
relative existence and identity. There is no way to ask whether some object would exist in 
certain circumstances without relativising your question to a mode of referring to the 
object.  
This suggests a second reason for why the Abelardian predicates strategy is unsatisfactory 
as it stands. Even if sortal-relative EIP conditions are acceptable, the Abelardian 
predicates strategy fails to block the route to object conventionalism discussed in 3.2. 
After all, the sortal-relative EIP conditions endowed on objects according to the 
                                                     
204 See for example Fine, ‘The Non-Identity of a Thing and Its Material Matter’.  
205 Sidelle, ‘Modality and Objects’ pp.119-124. 
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Abelardian view still play a role in determining what changes in the world constitute 
ceasings-to-exist, what changes constitute comings-into-existence, and so on. Perhaps the 
Abelardian predicates strategy even makes things worse rather than better in light of the 
argument in 3.2. If our linguistic rules endow objects with sortal-relative modal properties 
and therefore sortal-relative EIP conditions, the question of what objects there are will be 
both conventional and sortal-relative, making for a very strange ontology indeed.  
 
3.6 Heading deeper into the conventional maze 
In this chapter, I’ve argued that one natural way for LMC to explain de re modal truth is 
to take the linguistic rules governing referring terms to endow objects with modal 
properties. However, opting for this strategy leaves LMC open to the threat of object 
conventionalism via two routes. On the one hand, the intimate relationship between 
modal properties and existence, identity and persistence conditions means that 
conventionalism about modal properties leads to conventionalism about what exists. On 
the other hand, conventionalism about modal properties in combination with realism 
about objects can lead to contradictions. While the use of Abelardian predicates helps to 
block the second route to object conventionalism, it cannot block the first. In the next 
chapter, I’ll discuss whether Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ and Stephen Schiffer’s 
‘pleonastic’ properties can be used to help LMC solve this problem. I will conclude that it 
can’t; we must go deeper into the maze before we can get out. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Thomasson, Schiffer and a Dilemma for Linguistic Modal Conventionalism 
Chapter 3 left linguistic modal conventionalism saddled with conventionalism about 
objects. However, Amie Thomasson’s theory potentially represents a route to 
reconciliation for LMC and object realism. Thomasson argues for ‘simple realism’ about 
objects, which she takes to be compatible with her linguistic rule based theory of modal 
truth described in chapter 2. Here, I argue that the approach Thomasson favours may be 
able to avoid object conventionalism, but only by giving up on the central theses of LMC. 
By avoiding commitment to the view that objects depend on conventional rules governing 
linguistic expressions, Thomasson must also reject the claim that modal truth depends on 
those rules. As a result, Thomasson’s theory is unable to resolve the threat of object 
conventionalism faced by LMC. In section 4.1 below, I explain how the threat of object 
conventionalism raised in chapter 3 arises for Thomasson’s modal normativism 
specifically. In 4.2, I provide Thomasson’s case for how her view can avoid object 
conventionalism, and in sections 4.3 and 4.4 I assess that case. I argue that the 
Thomassonian strategy faces a dilemma: it can avoid object conventionalism, but only by 
rejecting LMC. 
 
4.1 Thomasson: the threat of object conventionalism 
In order to see how object conventionalism threatens Thomasson’s view, it is helpful to 
begin (as she does) with an account of how her particular theory takes linguistic rules to 
be related to the existence and identity conditions of objects, and therefore to their modal 
properties.
206
 Recall that according to Thomasson, rules expressing the conditions under 
which a term can be correctly applied and reapplied play an important role in 
disambiguating reference. She makes her case for the existence of these linguistic rules 
by noting that without them, we are unable to explain how our terms achieve determinate 
reference.
207
 Given that we are causally related to a number of objects that are candidate 
referents for our terms, she argues that causal relations aren’t enough to determine a 
referent.  
                                                     
206 Thomasson’s view on existence and identity conditions and how they relate to linguistic rules can be 
found in Thomasson, Ordinary Objects pp.55-63. 
207 Section 2.2 of this thesis explains this aspect of Thomasson’s theory in detail. See chapter 2 of 
Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects for further discussion of the role played by rules in fixing reference in her 
theory.  
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Rather, we need to associate terms with clear conditions of application and coapplication 
in order to single out one of those candidates as the referent of a term, excluding the rest. 
Application and coapplication conditions associated with a term help secure reference by 
singling out one set of existence and identity conditions had by its intended referent. In 
order for a term to pick out a single object, it’s not enough even for a single region of 
space-time to be specified, because objects with distinct identity conditions might occupy 
that region. A table, for example, plausibly has different identity conditions to the 
collection of atoms from which it is constituted. Therefore, in order to secure determinate 
reference, we need to ensure that it’s either the table or the collection of atoms that is the 
intended referent of the term.  
Thomasson holds that the conditions of application for a term are intimately related to the 
conditions of existence for its referent, in that the referent of the term exists if and only if 
the application conditions of the term are fulfilled.
208
 Similarly, she argues that 
coapplication conditions associated with a term are intimately related to the identity 
conditions of its referent. Coapplication conditions allow a given singular term to be 
applied twice if and only if the entities to which it is applied are identical. Because they 
determine what existence and identity conditions an object must have in order to qualify 
as the referent of a term, these application and coapplication conditions can single out one 
object as the term’s referent, thus solving the problem for achieving determinate reference 
noted above.  
For Thomasson, then, ‘A exists’ is true just so long as the application conditions for ‘A’ 
are met. And ‘A is identical to B’ is true just so long as the coapplication conditions for 
‘A’ and ‘B’ allow ‘A’ to be applied where ‘B’ is applied and vice versa. This means that 
application conditions governing a name ‘fix’ the existence conditions for its referent, and 
the coapplication conditions for a name ‘fix’ its referent’s identity conditions, in the sense 
that a name’s conditions of application and coapplication are guaranteed to correspond to 
its referent’s conditions of existence and identity.209 Thomasson’s view is that statements 
expressing conditions of existence and identity are analytic, and as such they are simply 
object language expressions of rules. Specifically, they are object language expressions of 
rules stating the application and coapplication conditions governing the terms in question. 
Returning to an example from chapter 3, a rule of application associated with ‘table’ 
might be, ‘Do not apply “table” where “pile of sawdust” applies.’ Then, a rule of 
coapplication for ‘table’ is, ‘If a name associated with the sortal “table” has been 
successfully applied once, do not reapply it if “pile of sawdust” applies.’ The sentence, 
                                                     
208 Ibid, p.55. 
209 Ibid, pp.55-60. 
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‘No table is a pile of sawdust’ is then an analytic, object language expression of that rule. 
Thomasson says that statements of existence and identity conditions are simply object 
language expressions of rules that ‘use rather than mention’ the relevant terms.210 
In chapter 3, I argued that conditions of existence, identity and persistence have modal 
import; having certain EIP conditions guarantees that an object has certain modal 
properties. Thomasson agrees, noting that talk about such conditions is talk about ‘what 
sorts of changes an individual could undergo (or what variations is could tolerate) while 
still existing as one and the same.’211 This is in keeping with Thomasson’s view that 
modal sentences are also object language expressions of rules; they are analytic sentences 
with a modal adverb added to make explicit that what’s expressed is a rule, rather than a 
descriptive statement. On Thomasson’s view, then, insofar as identity conditions are fixed 
by linguistic rules, and the identity conditions had by an object guarantee that the object 
has certain modal properties, linguistic rules fix the modal properties had by objects too.  
It can now be made clear how Thomasson’s view is susceptible to the threat of object 
conventionalism. As discussed, Thomasson holds that the application and coapplication 
conditions associated with terms determine the existence and identity conditions of their 
referents, and in doing so, fix their modal properties. One obvious way of interpreting this 
is as claiming that the rules governing terms make it the case that objects have the modal 
existence and identity conditions that they do, or in other words, as claiming that they 
endow objects with their modal properties. As argued in the previous chapter, however, 
the view that the modal properties had by objects are conventional is tantamount to the 
view that objects themselves are conventional. To briefly recap, this is because the modal 
existence conditions of objects play a part in determining what exists at a place and time, 
and the identity conditions of objects play a part in determining which things are identical 
to which at a place and time. Conventionalism about those conditions therefore entails 
conventionalism about what exists and what is identical to what. The argument for this 
link was that the conditions under which something exists or persists determine whether a 
change in qualitative properties in the world constitutes a single object undergoing a 
change, or one object going out of existence and another object coming into existence. 
Similarly, the identity conditions had by objects determine whether qualitative properties 
instantiated in different parts of space-time qualify as being had by a single object, or by 
multiple objects.
212
 
                                                     
210 Ibid, p.59. 
211 Ibid, p.62. 
212 See chapter 3, especially section 3.2, for more discussion.  
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Thomasson recognises that her view faces a threat from object conventionalism, but 
articulates that threat in a different way following an argument from Rea.
213
 One way of 
interpreting Thomasson’s claim that modal sentences are object language expressions of 
rules is as the view that linguistic rules make modal propositions true.
214
 Rea argues, 
however, that endorsing that claim would constitute a commitment to object 
conventionalism. According to Rea, if all modal propositions owe their truth to linguistic 
rules, the proposition that some modal property is had by an object will owe its truth to 
linguistic rules. If the proposition that some modal property is had by an object is true due 
to linguistic rules, however, it will also be the case that the object’s having the modal 
property it does is due to linguistic rules. In other words, we end up again with the result 
that the object’s modal properties are endowed on it by the linguistic rules, which 
amounts to object conventionalism. As Rea puts it, if conventions make modal 
propositions true, ‘then if follows that modal properties are exemplified in a region only if 
the matter in that region stands in particular contingent relations to human beings and 
their mental activity.’215 The view that the truth of modal propositions is conventional 
represents a second, less direct route to object conventionalism. If Thomasson is to avoid 
the claim that objects have the modal properties they do due to linguistic conventions, she 
cannot take all modal propositions to owe their truth to convention. 
 
4.2 Thomasson on avoiding object conventionalism 
Unlike Sidelle, Thomasson does not embrace object conventionalism. Rather, she defends 
a position she calls ‘simple realism,’ according to which objects are neither ‘ontologically 
shallow’ nor ‘thin and inconsequential’.216 As such, it is important that her modal theory 
does not commit her to the view that objects are conventional in nature. In order to avoid 
this commitment, Thomasson needs to be able to deny that the linguistic rules she takes to 
govern terms: 
i) endow objects with modal properties, and secondarily, that they  
ii) make all modal propositions true. 
                                                     
213See Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects pp.64-68 for Thomasson’s discussion of Rea’s argument. The original 
argument can be found in Rea’s World Without Design pp.85-96.  
214 In chapter 5, I will argue that an articulation of LMC according to which the truth of modal propositions is 
conventional is also committed to other problematic consequences, such as conventionalism about non-modal 
truth.  
215 Rea, World Without Design p.86. 
216 See Thomasson Ontology Made Easy pp.145-158 for an explanation of simple realism.  
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As argued in the previous chapter, object conventionalism follows from i) and as per 
Rea’s argument outlined at the end of the last section, ii) is sufficient for i). 
Thomasson’s strategy for avoiding commitment to ii) is to argue that that the contribution 
linguistic rules make to the truth of modal propositions is no different to the contribution 
they make to the truth of non-modal propositions.
217
 In both cases, they simply fix the 
meaning of a sentence in such a way that it expresses the proposition that it does; but, she 
argues, the truth of that proposition is independent of the rules governing the sentence 
expressing it. Of course, there is a sense in which the truth of any sentence can be said to 
depend on linguistic rules, even non-modal ones. As Thomasson says,   
‘...minds obviously play a role in determining whether sentences are true or false by 
establishing the meanings of the sentences that contribute to their truth-conditions. And, 
of course, if a series of marks or noises had different meaning, it might have a different 
truth-value.’218  
However, this isn’t enough for the mind-dependence of truth in any serious sense. That 
‘Many trees have green leaves’ would be false if ‘tree’ meant what ‘cat’ means isn’t 
sufficient for the mind-dependence of truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence. 
All that’s mind-dependent is that the sentence in question expresses the true proposition 
that it does, rather than a different proposition altogether. What Thomasson claims is that 
the contribution linguistic conventions make to modal truth is just the same as the 
contribution made to truth more generally; they simply serve to fix which proposition is 
expressed by which sentence. She says: 
‘The contribution minds and linguistic conventions make to determining the truth of 
modal statements on this view is no different from the contribution they make to other 
statements: in all cases, they establish the meaning and thereby establish the truth-
conditions of the statements, but don’t establish whether or not these are fulfilled; in fact, 
normally minds and conventions aren’t required for these truth-conditions to be 
fulfilled.’219 
Thomasson uses the sentence ‘Rocky can’t survive liquification’ to illustrate her 
argument.
220
 In this case, the name ‘Rocky’ is associated with the sortal ‘rock’, and that 
sortal is governed by application conditions according to which ‘rock’ terms cannot be 
applied where ‘liquid’ applies. Therefore, it is a coapplication condition for ‘rock’ names 
that they can only be reapplied to one and the same entity so long as neither application is 
                                                     
217 See Thomasson Ordinary Objects p.66. 
218 Ibid, p.65. 
219 Ibid, p.66. 
220 Ibid pp.65-67. 
90 
 
an appropriate application of ‘liquid’. Given that ‘Rocky’ is a ‘rock’ name, ‘Don’t apply 
“Rocky” where “liquid” applies’ will be an application condition governing ‘Rocky’. On 
Thomasson’s view, ‘Rocky can’t survive liquification’ is simply an object language 
expression of that rule. However, she argues, the proposition expressed by that sentence 
is not dependent for its truth on the linguistic rule mentioned. The rule in question helps 
to fix the reference of ‘Rocky’ to Rocky, and therefore helps make the sentence ‘Rocky 
cannot survive liquification’ express the modal proposition <Rocky cannot survive 
liquification>, but it does not make that modal proposition true. Of course, if ‘Rocky’ had 
been introduced as a name for a collection of atoms, rather than a rock, then it’s referent 
would have been different, and the proposition expressed by ‘Rocky cannot survive 
liquification’ might not have been true. But that doesn’t make the proposition expressed 
depend on convention for its truth; all that’s dependent on convention is the meaning of 
the name, and therefore which proposition is expressed. 
Thomasson concludes that the view that modal sentences are expressions of linguistic 
rules is not committed to claim ii) that the truth of modal propositions depends on 
linguistic rules. She suggests that the mistake people have made in thinking that her view 
is committed to ii) stems from the fact that she treats modal sentences as, like analytic 
sentences, requiring nothing of the world in order to be true. And traditionally, the view 
that such sentences require nothing of the world in order to be true is associated with the 
position that their truth is mind-dependent. According to Thomasson, the rules governing 
analytic sentences are such that whatever proposition an analytic sentence expresses, it 
will have to be a true one. In the case of ‘All bachelors are unmarried,’ for example, this 
was because the application conditions for ‘bachelor’ include the application conditions 
for ‘unmarried’. Given that this is the case, any successful application of ‘bachelor’ will 
be sufficient for the successful application of ‘unmarried’, and the object language ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried’ is guaranteed to be true. This position does not entail however, 
the position that the rules make that sentence true, or make the proposition it expresses 
true. She says it is a mistake to ‘...confuse the fact that minds are needed to establish the 
meaning of a sentence with the claim that the truth-conditions for the sentence include the 
existence of minds.’221 
Thomasson holds that given their normative function, modal sentences ultimately 
shouldn’t be treated as ‘reports about anything, and thus not as expressions apt for truth 
or falsehood.’222 In their primary function, analytic and modal claims are imperatives in 
disguise, rather than descriptive statements. If modal claims do not require truth-makers 
                                                     
221 Ibid, p.67. 
222 Ibid, p.69. 
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at all, then they should not be thought of as ‘made true’ in any sense by linguistic rules.223 
As such, Thomasson argues, her position is not committed to ii). Nonetheless, as noted in 
chapter 2, Thomasson acknowledges that both analytic claims and modal claims might be 
used to express truth apt propositions. After all, she notes, a single sentence may be used 
to perform different speech acts at different times. Thomasson argues that in these cases, 
analytic and modal sentences still don’t require truth-makers since they do not ‘depend on 
any empirical fact’s obtaining’.224 Once again, this is because the linguistic rules 
governing the terms in an analytic sentence guarantee that it will be true, regardless of 
what facts obtain in the world. Thomasson makes sure to note that, ‘...the adoption of 
these rules is not a truth-maker for the claim (it only establishes the meaning of the terms 
involved and the truth-conditions for each part).’225 In other words, given that the 
linguistic rules serve only to fix meaning, they aren’t what make it the case that what’s 
expressed by a sentence is true. When it comes to modal sentences, Thomasson claims 
that they also don’t require truth-makers, but can be taken to be true or false depending on 
whether they are accurate expressions of the linguistic rules. So, ‘Necessarily, all 
bachelors are unmarried’ is true since it accurately reflects the rules governing ‘bachelor’, 
but ‘Possibly, some bachelor is married’ is false since it misrepresents the rules governing 
‘bachelor’.226  
So far, the effort toward avoiding object conventionalism has been devoted to avoiding 
claim ii), that linguistic rules make all modal propositions true. Thomasson can make a 
similar move when it comes to denying claim i) directly. As noted above, Thomasson 
argues that application and coapplication conditions associated with singular terms 
guarantee determinate reference by singling out a set of EIP conditions had by the 
referent. However, just as she need not accept that the rules governing sentences make 
modal propositions true, Thomasson need not accept that these rules play the role of 
endowing objects with their EIP conditions. Rather she can argue that EIP conditions are 
had by objects independently of language, and that the linguistic rules simply function to 
select one of those objects, over the others, as the referent of a term. Just as on 
Thomasson’s view the linguistic rules governing the use of ‘Rocky’ make it the case that 
the sentence ‘Rocky cannot survive liquification’ expresses the independently true 
proposition that it does, those same rules can make it the case that ‘Rocky’ refers to the 
object that does, complete with language-independent modal properties. Once again, 
however, Thomasson need not accept that objects with their modal properties are truth-
                                                     
223 The case for this claim is made in Ordinary Objects pp.147-149, as well as in ‘Modal Normativism and 
the Methods of Metaphysics’ pp.68-72. 
224 Thomasson, Ordinary Objects p.70. 
225 Ibid p.70. 
226 Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ p.148. 
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makers for de re modal sentences; after all, de re modal sentences remain expressions of 
linguistic rules and therefore don’t require truth-makers. 
This approach coheres well with Thomasson’s justification for her commitment to 
application and coapplication conditions. If we need linguistic rules governing terms in 
order to single out for reference an object complete with existence and identity 
conditions, that would suggest that those existence and identity conditions do not 
themselves depend on the introduction of linguistic rules. Thomasson’s treatment of the 
collocation problem similarly suggests that this may be her favoured approach when it 
comes to objects and reference.
227
 The collocation problem is the problem of explaining 
how objects that share all their parts at all times can come to have different modal 
properties. Gibbard’s example of the statue and the lump, as discussed in chapter 3, is an 
example of this problem. The statue Goliath and the lump of clay Lumpl from which it is 
constituted share all their parts at all times at which they exist, and yet Lumpl can survive 
squashing while Goliath can’t. Given that their parts and non-modal properties are the 
same, some other explanation is required for how they differ in their modal properties. 
Sidelle’s solution to this problem, recall, was to argue that Lumpl and Goliath are distinct 
conventional objects that have their modal properties endowed upon them via 
conventional linguistic rules. Thomasson also argues that the different modal properties 
had by the statue and the clay are explained by different rules governing ‘statue’ terms 
and ‘lump’ terms, but wishes to deny object conventionalism. She says: 
‘Instead, the differences in modal truths for statues versus lumps of clay (and so the 
differences in the modal properties each is said to have) reflect different analyticities for 
the terms ‘statue’ and ‘lump’ (or the names ‘Goliath’ and ‘Lumpl’) used in stating the 
question (eg that it is analytic that, if ‘Goliath’ refers at all, what it refers to could not 
survive squashing, though the same does not go for Lumpl’)’.228  
On Thomasson’s view, if ‘Goliath’ is to refer at all, it must refer to something that cannot 
survive squashing. And, if ‘Lumpl’ is to refer at all, it must refer to something that can 
survive squashing. This is guaranteed by the rules governing ‘lump’ terms and ‘statue’ 
terms. On this basis we can infer that Lumpl and Goliath, as the referents of ‘Lumpl’ and 
‘Goliath’, are distinct. However, this doesn’t commit Thomasson to claiming that we 
endow Lumpl and Goliath with their modal properties. Rather, she can argue that the two 
objects can have their distinct modal properties independently of us, and linguistic 
conventions can simply serve to select each object, pre-endowed with modal identity and 
                                                     
227 See Thomasson, Ordinary Objects chapter 4 for her discussion of collocation problems.  
228 Ibid pp.82-83. Note that Thomasson’s original text uses the name ‘David’ to refer to the statue. ‘David’ 
has been changed to ‘Goliath’ here for consistency with other uses of the case in this thesis. 
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existence conditions, for reference. As such, Thomasson can avoid the problem raised by 
Sidelle for positions that combine object realism with modal conventionalism, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Since according to Thomasson the modal properties 
had by objects are not conferred on them by linguistic conventions, the problem of how 
we can endow a single object with incompatible modal properties never arises. 
 
4.3 A dilemma: conventional objects or real modality 
As outlined above, Thomasson’s strategy for avoiding object conventionalism is to deny 
that modal propositions are made true by linguistic conventions, or that those conventions 
endow objects with their modal EIP conditions. Rather, she suggests, the contribution 
these rules make to the truth of modal propositions is no different to the contribution they 
make to truth more generally; they serve to fix the meaning of a sentence to some 
proposition rather than making that proposition true. Similarly, Thomasson can argue that 
linguistic rules fix the reference of a term to something with independent modal existence 
and identity conditions, rather than endowing it with those modal features. In this section, 
I argue that this response to the problem isn’t successful as a way to render LMC 
compatible with object realism, since the price of avoiding object conventionalism is 
giving up the central theses of LMC. The Thomassonian approach faces a dilemma: either 
it is committed to object conventionalism, or it fails to constitute a version of LMC by 
failing to meet the conditions for the theory set out in chapter 2. I’ll pose this dilemma 
both in its application to how linguistic rules contribute to proposition truth, and in its 
application to how those rules contribute to the modal properties of objects. This problem 
suggests that Thomasson’s view does not represent a safe haven for those who wish to 
endorse LMC alongside a non-conventionalist theory of objects.  
4.3.1 The status of modal propositions 
As the argument from Rea suggests, object conventionalism results if linguistic 
conventions make modal propositions true. In order to avoid this consequence, 
Thomasson’s preferred strategy is to argue that the contribution linguistic rules make to 
the truth of modal propositions is just the same as the contribution they make to the truth 
of non-modal propositions; they simply serve to fix the meaning of sentences to 
propositions that are true or false independently of those rules. However, I’ll argue that 
this response jeopardises the Thomasson view’s status as a version of LMC. In particular, 
if modal propositions are true independently of linguistic rules, the theory of modality 
that results does not qualify as one according to which modality depends on analyticity or 
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linguistic rules in any serious sense. As a result it will fail both conditions for LMC set 
out in chapter two. Those conditions were: 
a) The truth values of all metaphysical modal sentences are determined in a non-
trivial way by conventional linguistic rules governing the use of terms. 
b) All modal features of the world are dependent on these conventional linguistic 
rules. 
Failing to meet these conditions may not undermine Thomasson’s own epistemological 
and meta-ontological goals; however, it renders her theory unable to achieve our goal of 
reconciling LMC with a non-conventionalist theory of objects.  
In order to avoid object conventionalism, Thomasson argues neither modal sentences nor 
the propositions they express are made true by linguistic rules. This is because, she 
argues, modal sentences, like analytic sentences, are primarily expressions of linguistic 
rules, and as such are not truth apt. Nonetheless, she says that sentences can be used to 
perform different speech acts at different times; therefore, modal sentences can be used to 
express truths. As noted in section 4.2, Thomasson argues that in these cases the linguistic 
rules make the same contribution to the truth of modal propositions as the contribution 
they make to the truth of non-modal ones. In each case, linguistic rules serve to fix the 
truth-conditions of a sentence. By doing so, they make it the case that a sentence 
expresses one proposition rather than another, but they do not make the proposition 
expressed true. If a proposition’s truth is not owed to linguistic rules, however, it must be 
owed to factors external to the rules governing the sentence expressing it. So according to 
this view, just like ‘Many trees have green leaves’ conventionally expresses the 
proposition <Many trees have green leaves>, ‘Necessarily all bachelors are unmarried’ 
conventionally expresses the proposition <Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried>. In 
both cases, the truth of the proposition expressed is independent of the truth of the 
sentence expressing it. The difference between the two cases is that the sentence 
‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is guaranteed by the linguistic rules to express 
a truth, while the sentence ‘Many trees have green leaves’ is not.  
The problem for this strategy is that the resulting view does not meet the conditions 
required to constitute a version of LMC. If modal propositions are considered entities that 
exist independently of linguistic rules, and whose truth does not depend on linguistic 
rules, the theory fails to qualify as LMC by failing to meet condition a). This point is 
particularly clear given that Thomasson takes the contribution made by linguistic 
conventions to modal proposition truth to be exactly the same as the contribution they 
make to truth in general. The fact that we use the term ‘tree’ the way we do makes it the 
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case that the sentence ‘Many trees have green leaves’ expresses the proposition it does, 
but doesn’t make that proposition true. Similarly, the fact that we use ‘bachelor’ the way 
we do makes it the case that the sentence ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ 
expresses the proposition that it does, but doesn’t make that proposition true. If 
conventions play the same role in determining modal proposition truth as the role they 
play in determining non-modal proposition truth, then the resulting theory must be 
conventionalist about non-modal truth if it is conventionalist about modal truth, and non-
conventionalist about modal truth if it is non-conventionalist about non-modal truth.  
It seems clear that Thomasson’s preferred strategy falls on the non-conventionalist side of 
this equation; her theory is conventionalist about neither modal proposition truth nor non-
modal proposition truth. Recall that in chapter 2, I promised to say more about what 
constitutes a ‘non-trivial’ contribution made by linguistic conventions to modal truth. 
Anyone who accepts that which symbols have which meanings is a conventional matter 
will be willing to accept some minimal role played by linguistic conventions in 
determining sentence truth. As Thomasson herself notes, it’s uncontroversial to believe 
that words might have had different meanings. This kind of contribution made by 
convention to truth, had in common by non-modal sentences and modal sentences on 
Thomasson’s view, cannot qualify as ‘non-trivial’ in the required sense.  
One condition a theory must satisfy in order to meet the non-triviality requirement is that 
it should be incompatible with theories that are not normally considered conventionalist 
theories of modality. The contribution Thomasson suggests that convention plays to truth, 
however, is compatible with a range of theories of modality that are not normally 
considered conventionalist. Someone who believes modality is to be analysed in terms of 
concrete or ersatz worlds, or in terms of dispositions, or in terms of any other non-
linguistic entities or facts can accept that conventions play a role in determining which 
strings of symbols express which modal propositions, the truth of which is to be analysed 
in their preferred way. This suggests that the strategy taken by Thomasson results in a 
theory that also fails to meet condition b), since it allows the existence of non-
conventional modal features of the world.  
Thomasson may well note that her theory is set apart from realist alternatives because 
even though they do not act as truth-makers for modal sentences or propositions, 
linguistic rules still guarantee that modal sentences are true in some sense. After all, many 
theorists will deny that modal sentence truth has anything to do with analyticity, 
convention or linguistic rules. Still, this view remains compatible with various forms of 
modal realism. For example, Lewis holds his realist theory about modality alongside the 
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view that a sentence is analytic when by convention it expresses a necessary 
proposition.
229
 Thomasson can also argue that her theory can help to explain the 
epistemology of modal truth. If modal sentences are expressions of linguistic rules, our 
competence with those rules can help to explain our knowledge of the truth of modal 
sentences. This may even be characterised as Thomasson’s central project; her position in 
‘Ontology Made Easy’ is that ontological questions are ‘easy’ in that their answers often 
follow from our linguistic rules in a straightforward manner. Perhaps modal questions are 
epistemically ‘easy’ in a similar sense. However, so long as modal propositions are taken 
to be true independently of linguistic rules, the theory cannot count as a version of LMC. 
This means that while Thomasson’s theory has interesting epistemological and semantic 
implications, it does not provide a route for reconciling LMC with a non-conventionalist 
theory of objects.  
The available options when it comes to modal proposition truth leave us in a dilemma. On 
the one hand, we can hold that modal propositions are made true by linguistic 
conventions. Thomasson rejects this option because it leads to object conventionalism, 
and so should we. On the other hand, we can hold that modal propositions owe their truth 
to something other than linguistic conventions. This appears to be Thomasson’s preferred 
strategy. However, on this option, the role played by linguistic conventions is minimal; 
they serve simply to fix the meaning of sentences to independently true propositions. This 
minimal role played by conventions is insufficient for the view to qualify as a genuine 
linguistic theory of modality. The first horn of this dilemma assigns a strong role to 
linguistic rules in determining modality, at the cost of involving a commitment to object 
conventionalism. On the other hand, the second horn of the dilemma assigns such a 
minimal role to linguistic rules that they no longer determine modality in any serious 
sense. On neither horn can we claim to have reconciled LMC with a non-conventionalist 
theory of objects.  
4.3.2 The status of modal properties 
A parallel dilemma can be set up when it comes to the reference relation between singular 
terms and objects. If she is to avoid i) Thomasson cannot accept that linguistic rules 
endow objects with their modal EIP conditions. To do so would be to take on a 
commitment to object conventionalism. Nonetheless, Thomasson holds that linguistic 
rules in some sense determine the EIP conditions of their referents. In her example of a 
‘rock’ name, ‘Rocky’ must refer to something that can’t survive liquification given the 
application conditions associated with the name. Similarly, we can infer that ‘Lumpl’ and 
                                                     
229 Lewis, Convention pp.174-176, pp.204-208. 
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‘Goliath’ don’t co-refer because ‘Lumpl’, if it refers at all, refers to something that can 
survive squashing, while ‘Goliath’, if it refers at all, refers to something that can’t survive 
squashing. In parallel to the case of propositions, Thomasson can argue that the role 
played by linguistic rules is to fix the reference of terms to objects that come pre-
endowed with modal existence and identity conditions. Rocks, for example, can’t survive 
liquification independently of linguistic rules; those rules serve simply to make it the case 
that ‘rock’ terms refer to rocks, rather than to other kinds of entities.  
Unfortunately, however, this approach to objects and reference faces the same worry as 
the one facing Thomasson’s approach to modal propositions. If the role played by 
linguistic rules is simply to select an object for reference, the theory fails to qualify as 
genuine LMC by failing to meet both conditions a) and b). As with the case of 
proposition truth, the matter of which modal properties are had by an object is not treated 
as any more conventional on this view as the matter of which non-modal properties are 
had by an object. As such, the view remains compatible with a range of theories about 
modal properties. For example, they may be analysed in terms of essences or dispositions, 
or in terms of identity across worlds or other worldly counterparts. None of these views 
qualify as conventionalist yet all are compatible with the view that linguistic rules help 
fix the reference of terms to objects. Again, the view that de re modal sentences are 
expressions of rules has substantive semantic and epistemological consequences, but it 
doesn’t constitute a metaphysical theory of modality so long as it is silent on how modal 
properties are to be analysed. As such, Thomasson’s view cannot be of help when it 
comes to our project of developing a version of LMC that is compatible with object 
realism. 
Sidelle makes a similar point in his review of ‘Ordinary Objects’. He notes that when it 
comes to dealing with problems of collocation, such as the case of the statue and the 
lump, Thomasson appears to have two options: either accept, as he does, that the world is 
‘articulated’ into objects by the application of identity conditions, or accept that there is 
language-independent modality. He says:  
If, as Thomasson wants to insist, there is no more mind-dependence to modal truths 
than there is to ‘There is gold’, then her ontology does consist of a world of mind-
independently individuated objects with modal properties, and so the semantics of 
referring terms can do nothing to explain how there can be collocated objects: it just 
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uses these rules to pick out what is already there, and so the needed explanation must 
still be metaphysical.
230
 
Sidelle’s point is that if linguistic rules simply explain sentence truth, the metaphysics of 
collocation is still up for grabs. Explanations of how we use terms in a language don’t 
suffice as explanations of the entities to which those terms refer. While Thomasson may 
happily accept that the modal properties had by objects do not depend on linguistic rules, 
this option is not available to linguistic modal conventionalism.  
The dilemma posed above for propositions therefore reapplies when it comes to 
explaining objects and their modal properties. On the one hand, Thomasson could argue 
that modal properties are endowed on objects by linguistic conventions, but the 
consequence of that view is a commitment to object conventionalism. On the other hand, 
she could argue that objects have modal properties independently of linguistic rules. On 
this view, the role of linguistic conventions is simply to fix the reference of terms to 
objects that come pre-endowed with modal existence and identity conditions; but that is 
compatible with any number of metaphysical theories about those modal properties. 
Again, while this approach may be able to satisfy Thomasson’s epistemological goals, it 
can’t satisfy our metaphysical goal of explaining modality in terms of linguistic rules. On 
the first horn of the dilemma, linguistic rules play a strong role in determining the modal 
properties of objects, at the cost of a commitment to object conventionalism. On the 
second horn of the dilemma, linguistic rules play such a minimal role that the theory that 
results no longer qualifies as LMC. As things stand, we are unable to reconcile LMC with 
a non-conventionalist theory of objects on either horn. The project of finding a way out of 
the dilemma on behalf of LMC will be taken up in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
4.4 Easy ontology and pleonastic properties 
Both horns of the dilemma set out above treated objects as just as conventional as 
modality. On the one hand, if modal propositions and properties are conventional, objects 
are too. On the other hand, if objects aren’t conventional, modal propositions and 
properties aren’t either. In order to maintain a linguistic theory of modality alongside 
non-conventionalism about objects, a wedge must be driven between modal properties 
and modal propositions on the one hand, and objects on the other such that the former 
count as language-dependent while the latter do not.  
                                                     
230 Alan Sidelle, ‘Review of Ordinary Objects by Amie Thomasson,’ The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, 
No. 230 (2008), p.174. 
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One place to look for a way to drive that wedge is in Thomasson’s treatment of modal 
properties and propositions as ‘pleonastic’. Following Schiffer, Thomasson takes a 
‘pleonastic transformation’ to occur when the existence of some entity can be inferred 
trivially from some uncontroversial truth that did not appear to involve a commitment to 
that entity.
231
 The entities whose existence can be trivially inferred in this way are 
referred to as ‘pleonastic’. Schiffer holds that the existence of a number of entities, 
prominently including properties and propositions, can be inferred this way.  For 
example, from ‘Fido is a dog’ we can infer ‘Fido has the property of being a dog’.232 
While the former sentence referred only to Fido, the new sentence refers to a new entity: 
the property of being a dog. Schiffer calls pleonastic transformations ‘something from 
nothing’ transformations since reference to the new entities appears to come for free; a 
sentence that doesn’t refer to any properties can be transformed into one that does without 
any extra empirical or philosophical work being done to establish the existence of the 
new entities.
233
 Thomasson argues that these pleonastic transformations offer ‘easy’ 
answers to existence questions in philosophy. In particular, she argues that some 
existence claims are analytically entailed by uncontroversial truths. And, if the existence 
of an entity is analytically entailed by a truth, as in the case of Fido and the property of 
being a dog, we should accept its existence. 
Importantly, pleonastic entities for Schiffer are both created by human practices of 
language use and are nonetheless independent of language in a serious sense.
234
 They are 
independent of language in that they would exist even in hypothetical circumstances in 
which humans and language don’t exist. This holds for properties and propositions; we 
correctly judge that the property of being a dog would exist and be had by Fido even if 
there were no humans to talk about it. On the other hand, pleonastic entities are created 
by our linguistic practices in that the nature of properties and propositions on Schiffer’s 
view is fully determined by our linguistic practice of permitting the nominalisation of a 
predicate or a ‘that’ clause in our language. To be the property of being a dog, for 
example, is just to be the referent of ‘the property of being a dog’. Similarly, to be the 
proposition that Fido is a dog is nothing more than to be the referent of ‘that Fido is a 
                                                     
231 See Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy pp.132-158, Stephen Schiffer, ‘A Paradox of Meaning,’ Noûs Vol. 
28, No. 3 (1994): pp.279-324, Stephen Schiffer, ‘Language-Created, Language-Independent Entities,’ 
Philosophical Topics Vol. 24, No. 1 (1996): pp.149-167, and Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). 
232 Schiffer, ‘Language-Created, Language-Independent Entities’ pp.149-150. 
233 Schiffer discusses and rejects the idea that singular terms such as ‘the property of being a dog’ only 
purportedly refer. He argues that the accepting the truth of ‘Fido has the property of being a dog’ really does 
commit us to the existence of a property. (Ibid, pp.151-153.)  
234 Ibid, pp.159-164. 
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dog’. In Schiffer’s words, the ‘essence’ of properties and propositions is determined by 
our linguistic practices.
235
  
Thomasson and Schiffer part ways when it comes to the ontological status of pleonastic 
entities. According to Schiffer, such entities are ‘ontologically shallow’ or ‘thin and 
inconsequential’. He contrasts pleonastic entities with ordinary objects such as trees, 
arguing that trees have ‘the highest degree of independence from our linguistic and 
conceptual practices’, while pleonastic properties have a lower degree of independence.236 
Thomasson, however, argues that entities whose existence is analytically entailed by true 
claims are just as language-independent as other kinds of entity. Thomasson widens the 
class of objects whose existence we infer via pleonastic transformation to include 
ordinary objects. From the existence of some particles arranged tree-wise, for example, 
we can analytically infer the existence of a tree; yet the tree does not have a diminished 
ontological status.
237
 She notes that the distinction between entities whose existence can 
be inferred analytically and those that can’t is not a distinction pertaining to the type of 
entity, such as whether it is a physical object like a tree or an abstract one like a property. 
Rather, she suggests that whether or not an entity can be inferred pleonastically will 
depend on what uncontroversial truths we start with and what rules govern the language 
we’re speaking.238 If we start with the empirical truth that there are some particles 
arranged tree-wise, our linguistic rules will warrant the application of the term ‘tree’. 
And, we infer the existence of properties in exactly the same way; given the 
uncontroversial truth that Fido is a dog, our linguistic rules warrant the application of the 
term ‘the property of being a dog’. It’s not analytic that there are trees, but it’s analytic 
that there are trees if there are particles arranged tree-wise. Similarly, it’s not analytic that 
there are properties, but it’s analytic that there are properties if there are true sentences of 
the form ‘A is F’. Thomasson calls her ontological position ‘simple realism’ because 
questions about whether entities exist can be answered easily while the entities 
themselves remain real and mind-independent. Questions about ontology are 
epistemically easy, but the objects that exist are not in any sense language or mind-
dependent as a result.  
Thomasson at various points suggests that modal propositions and modal properties may 
be pleonastic.
239
 This treatment of modal properties and propositions may offer a way to 
                                                     
235 Ibid, p.161. 
236 Ibid, p.161. 
237 Given, of course, that our application conditions for ‘particles arranged tree-wise’ are related in the right 
way to those for ‘tree’. 
238 Thomasson Ontology Made Easy  pp.141-143. 
239 Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ pp.148-149, Ordinary Objects pp.71-
72.  
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combine LMC with a non-conventionalist theory of objects. After all, pleonastic modal 
properties and propositions would be both language-created and in some sense language-
independent. If modal propositions are pleonastic, their existence (and truth) is 
analytically entailed by modal sentences. For example, from ‘Necessarily, all bachelors 
are unmarried’ we can infer ‘The proposition that necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried 
is true.’ And, from ‘Josephine is necessarily human’ we can infer ‘Josephine has the 
property of being necessarily human.’ As per Schiffer, we can treat these modal 
propositions and properties as ‘language-created’ in the sense that their ‘essence’ is 
determined by our linguistic practices. However, we can also treat them as language-
independent in that we’d judge them to exist whether or not there was a language or 
people to speak it. Similarly, the objects that instantiate modal properties would exist if 
there was no language, and are also therefore language-independent.  
To see how this solution to the dilemma might work, it is helpful to see how a pleonastic 
treatment of modal properties and propositions works on Thomasson’s view. Firstly, 
Thomasson holds that an object of some kind exists just so long as the application 
conditions of the relevant kind term are met. For example, the way to find out whether 
there are any trees is to check whether there’s something with a wooden trunk and 
branches, that grows roots in soil, requires light and water to live, and so on. All that’s 
required for ‘tree’ to refer is for there to be particles in the world arranged as something 
that plays the right role. On Thomasson’s view, the existence of trees is in no way 
dependent on language; the world settles whether there are any trees by settling whether 
the application conditions for ‘tree’ are met. Note, however, that the rules of use 
governing ‘tree’ will also suffice for the truth of certain modal sentences. Given that 
‘tree’ cannot be correctly applied where ‘chopped firewood’ applies, ‘If x is a tree, x is 
not possibly identical to some chopped firewood’ will be an accurate expression of the 
linguistic rules for ‘tree’, and will therefore be true. If modal properties are pleonastic, 
their existence can be trivially inferred from the truth of de re modal sentences. Given 
that ‘This tree is not possibly identical to some chopped firewood’ is true, for example, 
we can pleonastically infer that the tree has the property of being not possibly identical to 
chopped firewood.  
On this view, the existence of objects complete with pleonastic modal properties can be 
inferred from non-modal states of the world in combination with linguistic rules via three 
steps: 
Step 1: Establish the existence of objects of a certain kind by checking that the application 
conditions of the relevant sortal are met. 
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Step 2: Infer the truth of de re modal sentences about those objects by consulting the rules 
of use governing the sortal. 
Step 3: Pleonastically infer that the objects have modal properties from the truth of the 
relevant de re modal sentences.  
Importantly, Thomasson emphasises that the trees themselves do not depend for their 
existence on linguistic rules; she takes her view to be a form of realism about ordinary 
objects. After all, the only thing that’s required for there to be trees on this view is for 
certain non-conventional conditions in the world to be met. And, there would be trees 
whether or not there were speakers of English or any other human language. However, 
once the existence of trees was established in step 1, all that was added in steps 2 and 3 to 
arrive at their modal properties was that certain linguistic rules govern the term ‘tree’. On 
this view then, the existence of trees depends on nothing more than certain non-linguistic 
states of affairs obtaining. And, the linguistic rules governing ‘tree’ are sufficient for trees 
to have certain modal properties, such as not being possibly identical to a pile of chopped 
firewood. The resulting picture is one in which objects are independent of language, but 
their modal properties are derivable from linguistic rules governing referring terms. This 
appears promising as a method for maintaining a linguistic theory of modal properties 
alongside a non-conventionalist theory of objects. 
The key to success for this approach was holding that whether or not some object exists is 
determined by language-independent states of the world (step 1), while its modal 
properties are in some sense language-created (steps 2 and 3). In order for this solution to 
the dilemma to be successful, it must be established that pleonastic modal properties can 
be genuinely language-created while the objects that instantiate them are not. Once again, 
the prospects for this approach become more dubious when we call attention to the 
relationship between modal properties and existence and identity conditions.
240
 One way 
of interpreting the claim that linguistic rules are sufficient for a tree’s having certain 
modal properties is as the claim that linguistic rules make it the case that the tree has the 
modal properties it does. Then, the tree’s being not possibly chopped firewood makes it 
the case that post chopping, a tree that existed previously no longer exists. So, if linguistic 
rules make it the case that the tree isn’t possibly chopped firewood, they can make it the 
case that an hour from now an object will go out of existence. That is, they can make it 
the case that a particular event in the world constitutes an object going out of existence, 
rather than merely an object undergoing a change in shape and location. 
                                                     
240 Section 3.2 sets out the argument that conventionalism about EIP conditions leads to conventionalism 
about objects. It is also reiterated briefly at the beginning of this chapter.  
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Therefore, it’s misleading to say that which objects exist is fully determined by non-
linguistic states of the world on this view, since the linguistic rules make a difference to 
which states of the world count as including which objects. The reason that we check 
whether there are any trees by checking the application conditions for ‘tree’ in step 1 is 
that the application conditions for ‘tree’ determine what it takes to be tree by determining 
the modal features of trees. We check the language-independent world for things with 
trunks and leaves because we know that ‘tree’ doesn’t apply to things without trunks, and 
therefore, that trees have trunks necessarily. Different linguistic rules would therefore 
produce different conclusions about which objects exist and how many objects there are. 
If different linguistic rules result in different ontologies, we find ourselves back in the 
first horn of our dilemma. Given that modal properties are closely related to EIP 
conditions, language-created pleonastic modal properties mean language-created objects. 
The other option, of course, is to deny that our linguistic rules make it the case that trees 
and other objects have the modal EIP conditions they do. Instead, it may be that we check 
whether the conditions of application for ‘tree’ are met in order to check whether there 
are trees because those conditions help determine that we mean to pick out trees with our 
language rather than some distinct kind of entity. This seems likely to be Thomasson’s 
preferred strategy; after all she argues that pleonastic entities do not have a diminished 
ontological status. Thomasson notes that pleonastic properties don’t do explanatory work 
in the sense that we can’t appeal to them to explain why sentences are true. For example, 
we can’t appeal to Socrates’ having the pleonastic property of being necessarily human to 
explain why ‘Socrates is necessarily human’ is true. This is because when something can 
be trivially inferred from a claim, it cannot offer any more explanatory power than the 
claim from which it was inferred.
241
 So, given that ‘Socrates has the property of being 
necessarily human’ can be trivially inferred from ‘Socrates is necessarily human,’ the 
former cannot be used to explain the latter. Nonetheless, if the modal property doesn’t 
depend on the language from it is trivially inferred, its existence calls out for explanation. 
Once again, if modal properties don’t depend on language, they may be explained in any 
number of other ways, in line with any number of non-linguistic metaphysical theories of 
modality. On this strategy then, the inference from linguistic rules to modal properties 
provides a way of explaining how we come to know about modal properties, but does not 
explain the existence of those properties in terms of our language use. Thomasson’s 
writing suggests that her primary claim is epistemological rather than metaphysical; 
ontological questions are easy to answer, but ontology itself does not depend on us. 
However, the resulting theory is no longer helpful for us in our mission to make LMC 
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compatible with object realism, since it treats objects as having language-independent 
modal properties. As such the view fails to qualify as genuine LMC by failing to meet the 
conditions established in chapter 2. 
The dilemma discussed in section three arises, therefore, even when modal properties and 
propositions are treated as pleonastic. Pleonastic modal properties must either depend on 
the linguistic rules from which we inferred them, in which case object conventionalism 
follows, or they must be independent of those rules, in which case the resulting theory 
doesn’t qualify as LMC. 
  
4.5 The cost of conventionalism 
The dilemma discussed above can be used to offer a general diagnosis of why LMC is 
threatened by object conventionalism. In order to provide a conventionalist theory of 
modality, some account must be given of how de re modal sentences get to be true. 
Assuming that de re modal sentences attribute modal features to objects, this means 
providing an account of those modal features. On the one hand, modal properties can be 
treated as conventional, but given the tight connection between EIP conditions and modal 
properties, objects will then be conventional too. On the other hand, modal properties can 
be treated as non-conventional, thus avoiding commitment to object conventionalism. 
However, any theory that treats modal properties as completely independent of linguistic 
rules cannot claim to be genuine linguistic modal conventionalism. The tight connection 
between modality and EIP conditions means that modal conventionalism and object 
conventionalism go hand in hand; accept one and you accept the other, or reject one and 
you reject the other. In the next chapter, I broaden the application of this dilemma by 
arguing that it arises for de dicto modal truth in a way that is structurally parallel to how it 
arises for de re modal truth and modal properties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
CHAPTER 5 
In a Conventional World, We Decide What’s True 
In chapters 3 and 4, my focus has been on the consequences conventionalism about modal 
properties has for the status of objects. The treatment of modal properties as conventional 
was a way for linguistic modal conventionalism to maintain that de re modal sentences 
are determined to be true or false by linguistic rules. The thought was that if linguistic 
rules determine which objects have which modal properties, we can explain the truth of 
sentences like x(□Fx) in terms of those properties. Specifically, x(□Fx) can be treated 
as true when something has the property of being necessarily F. Unfortunately, that 
approach led to object conventionalism. Usually, de dicto modal truth is thought to be the 
‘easy’ case for LMC, because the explanation of sentence necessity in terms of analyticity 
appears more natural than the explanation of object necessity in terms of analyticity. In 
this chapter, I will argue that de dicto modality is not so easy for LMC after all. I’ll make 
that case by constructing a dilemma for LMC’s treatment of de dicto modality that is 
isomorphic to the dilemma for de re modality discussed in chapter 4. The dilemma arises 
in relation to LMC’s treatment of the modal status of propositions (construed as the 
meanings of sentences) as dependent on linguistic rules. On the one hand, the linguistic 
rules might be though to simply fix the meaning of sentences such that they express 
propositions that come with modal statuses built in. This view doesn’t constitute a 
genuine version of LMC because it allows for the existence of non-conventional 
modality. On the other hand, a stronger account takes linguistic rules to endow 
propositions with their modal statuses. This constitutes a genuine version of LMC, but 
becomes committed to problematic consequences such as conventionalism about non-
modal truth.  
In section 5.1 below, I summarise LMC’s approach to de dicto modal truth, and explain 
the role played by analyticity in determining the modal statuses of sentences. In section 
5.2, I present the first horn of the dilemma. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 discuss two ways the 
modal statuses of propositions might be treated as conventional, both of which lead to 
conventionalism about truth. In section 5.5, I reject an ‘Abelardian’ approach as a way to 
avoid the dilemma. In section 5.6 I argue that conventionalism about truth ought not be 
embraced by LMC, and finally, in section 5.7 I discuss whether LMC ought to take on a 
commitment to conventional possible worlds. 
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5.1 Analyticity and de dicto modality for linguistic modal conventionalism 
Explaining de dicto modality in terms of conventional linguistic rules is at face value 
more straightforward than explaining de re modality in terms of those rules. After all, it 
seems more reasonable to suppose that a sentence could come to have modal features due 
to the rules that govern its terms than that an object could come to have modal features 
due to linguistic rules. As discussed in chapter 1, the positivists treated necessity and 
analyticity as the same property, arguing that the necessity of a sentence is a consequence 
of conventional decisions about language use. Due to complications that arise from cases 
of necessary synthetic truth, modern versions of LMC do not treat necessity and 
analyticity as the same property. However, as outlined in chapter 2, they still treat 
necessity as closely related to analyticity, and as determined by linguistic rules. 
A full articulation of LMC’s approach to de dicto modality therefore requires an account 
of the property of analyticity and the role played by convention in determining which 
sentences qualify as having it. As is suggested by the slogans ‘truth by convention’ and 
‘truth in virtue of meaning,’ whether a sentence counts as analytic is sometimes 
characterised as determined by convention, and other times characterised as determined 
by what it means. The role of meaning in analyticity is apparent in the Kantian and 
Fregean accounts of the concept. According to Kant’s famous ‘containment’ metaphor, a 
sentence is analytic when the meaning of the predicate term is a part of the meaning of 
the subject term. ‘All food is edible’ is analytic on this view since the meaning of ‘being 
edible’ is part of the meaning of ‘food’.242 According to the Fregean account, a sentence 
is analytic when it is transformable into a logical truth by substituting synonyms with 
synonyms within the sentence. For example, if ‘bachelor’ is synonymous with ‘unmarried 
man’, the sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ can be transformed into the logical 
truth ‘All unmarried men are unmarried men’ by substituting synonyms for synonyms.243 
On both these accounts, the meanings of a sentence’s constituent terms determine 
whether it qualifies as analytic. 
Both construals treat analytic sentences as having the feature that their meaning 
guarantees their truth in some sense. If a sentence is synonymous with a logical truth, it is 
guaranteed to be true itself insofar as logical truths are guaranteed to be true. And, if a 
sentence is such that the meaning of its subject term contains the meaning of its predicate 
term, anything that counts as falling into the extension of the subject term will also fall 
into the extension of the predicate term, thus guaranteeing the truth of the sentence. For 
                                                     
242 Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p.7 (A6-7). 
243 See Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic section 3.  
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example, anything that counts as falling under ‘food’ will also count as falling under 
‘edible’, guaranteeing that ‘All food is edible’ is true.  
This feature of analyticity is prominent in Thomasson’s theory, as well as Russell’s 
theory. As outlined in section 2.2, Thomasson takes a sentence to be analytic when it’s an 
expression of a conventional linguistic rule governing the use of its sub-sentential terms. 
Given that there is a linguistic rule according to which the term ‘bachelor’ should only be 
applied where ‘man’ is applied, ‘All bachelors are men’ qualifies as analytic by 
Thomasson’s standards. Analytic sentences are guaranteed to express truths on 
Thomasson’s view because the linguistic rules ensure that the successful application of 
one term implies the successful application of another. So again, anything that counts in 
the extension of the first term must also count in the extension of the second. Given that 
‘bachelor’ can only be correctly applied where ‘man’ is applied, for example, any correct 
application of the former term will be a correct application of the latter term. This 
guarantees that ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ must express a truth. As outlined in section 
2.3, Russell’s view construes ‘truth in virtue of meaning’ as truth in virtue of reference 
determiner, where a reference determiner provides a condition that must be met by an 
entity for it count as the referent of an expression. She follows Kant in appealing to the 
notion of containment to elucidate when truth is guaranteed by meaning in this sense.
244
 
According to Carnap, the analytic sentences are those that are true in every one of his 
‘state descriptions’, which are intended as representations of possible states of the world. 
A sentence is true in every state description, and therefore analytic, if it stipulated to be a 
‘meaning postulate’ in the language, or if it follows from the meaning postulates using 
stipulated rules.
245
 As such, analytic sentences in a language are all the language’s 
meaning postulates and consequences of the meaning postulates, and the logical truths 
that hold in every state description due to the rules governing state descriptions 
themselves.
246
 Carnap holds that whether or not a sentence is to be a meaning postulate is 
determined prior to fixing the ‘rules of designation’ for the language, or in other words, 
the rules determining what the sentence is to mean and what its terms pick out. Given that 
some sentence is a meaning postulate however, whatever meaning the sentence is 
ultimately assigned, it is guaranteed that it must express a truth.
247
  
                                                     
244 Russell, Truth in Virtue of Meaning pp.93-95, p.100. 
245 See Carnap’s ‘Meaning Postulates’, and Meaning and Necessity pp.7-13. Carnap’s theory of analyticity is 
also discussed in section 1.3 of this thesis. 
246 For example, ‘S or not S’ is true in every state description because the rules stipulate that for every 
sentence, either it or its negation is included in each state description.  
247 Carnap, ‘Meaning Postulates’ pp.67-68. 
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According to all five ways of characterising analyticity, an analytic sentence is one that is 
guaranteed to be true given the meanings of its terms. The reason many consider 
analyticity to be a matter of convention is that the aspect of meaning that guarantees truth 
is taken to be determined by conventional decisions on the part of a community of 
language speakers. The role of convention in determining which sentences are analytic is 
particularly clear in Carnap’s and Thomasson’s theories of analyticity. According to 
Thomasson, it is conventional rules governing terms that determine whether a sentence is 
analytic. We could have chosen not to adopt the rule that ‘bachelor’ is only to be applied 
where ‘unmarried’ is applied. If we had, ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ would not have 
been analytic. Similarly, according to Carnap’s theory, we could have chosen not to make 
‘All bachelors are unmarried’ a meaning postulate. Convention can also play a role in 
Kant’s, Frege’s and Russell’s accounts of analyticity so long as the meaning of our terms 
is conventional. Given that it’s a matter of convention what the term ‘bachelor’ means, 
it’s a matter of convention that ‘bachelor’ can be substituted for ‘unmarried man’ in a 
sentence to transform ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ into a logical truth. Given that 
its a matter of convention which reference determiner is had by which term, it’s also a 
matter of convention that the reference determiner of ‘bachelor’ contains the reference 
determiner of ‘unmarried’.  
The role played by convention in determining which sentences are analytic is what makes 
LMC a conventionalist theory of modality: if to be necessary is at bottom nothing more 
than to be analytic, and analyticity is conventional, then necessity is conventional too. In 
the remainder of this chapter, however, I’ll argue that it is more difficult than it seems to 
make de dicto necessity genuinely convention-dependent. As exemplified in the 
discussion above, the role of convention in analyticity and de dicto necessity is generally 
discussed in the context of sentences, rather than in the context of the contents of those 
sentences and what they say about the world. When we take into account sentence 
contents, it becomes problematic to maintain that analyticity and necessity are genuinely 
conventional. 
 
5.2 The first horn: unconventional analyticity 
If LMC qualifies as conventionalist in virtue of taking modality to depend on analyticity, 
it must be the case that conventional linguistic rules governing terms play a significant 
role in determining which sentences are analytic, and therefore which sentences are 
necessary. In this section, I argue that there is one widely accepted role convention plays 
in determining meaning that is not sufficient for analyticity to count as conventional in 
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any serious sense, and by the same token, is not sufficient for modality to count as 
conventional by virtue of its dependence on analyticity. As a result, the view discussed 
fails to constitute a version of LMC by failing to meet both conditions a) and b) set out in 
section 2.4.6. 
5.2.1 The limited power of conventional meaning 
One role that conventional linguistic rules might play in determining which sentences are 
analytic is to determine which of our words have which meanings. It’s a matter of 
convention, for example, that ‘bachelor’ means unmarried man. Of course, ‘bachelor’ 
could have simply meant unmarried person or it could have meant something different 
altogether. Perhaps ‘bachelor’ might never have been introduced as a term in English at 
all. If our conventions for using ‘bachelor’ were different in these ways, sentences which 
currently qualify as analytic would not be analytic. For example, if ‘bachelor’ meant 
unmarried person rather than unmarried man, ‘All bachelors are men’ would not be 
analytic. One view then, is that the conventional decision to make ‘bachelor’ mean 
unmarried man, in conjunction with similar conventional decisions about the other terms 
in the sentence, is what makes ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ analytic. Given that 
analyticity suffices for necessity, those conventional decisions would also make ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried’ necessary according to LMC. 
It’s relatively uncontroversial to accept that convention helps to determine which 
linguistic symbols are attached to which meanings in the way described above.
248
 This 
point can be made particularly clear by looking at the case of names; it is uncontentious 
that which name we use to pick out any particular individual is a matter of convention. 
Obama’s parents could have chosen to call him ‘Bill’ rather than ‘Barack’ for example. 
Given that they called him ‘Barack’, however, the rest of us agree to call him ‘Barack’ as 
a result of his parents’ decision. The same applies to linguistic expressions more 
generally, however. It is arbitrary, for example, that ‘dog’ means dog rather than cat, and 
in this sense, the meaning of ‘dog’ is a conventional matter.  
Assume that the linguistic expression ‘e’ means m. Different accounts of meaning will 
say different things about what kind of entity m is. A Millian will say that so long as ‘e’ is 
a name, m is an individual of some sort. A Fregean will say m is a sense. Nonetheless, it 
is a matter of convention that ‘e’ stands in the meaning relation to m; ‘e’ meaning m is a 
conventional matter. Call facts about the relations of meaning standing between linguistic 
                                                     
248 Nonetheless, this position is not universally accepted. For example, if words are typed semantically rather 
than by some other means, ‘dog’ would not have been the same word had it meant cat. (See Kaplan, 
‘Words’.) Note that in section 2.4.7, I stipulated that sentences were to be typed orthographically or 
phonetically, not semantically.  
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expressions and their meanings ‘meaning facts’. An example of a meaning fact is the fact 
that ‘bachelor’ means unmarried man. The account given above of the role of convention 
in determining which sentences are analytic appealed to these meaning facts as the basis 
of the conventional status of analyticity. And, given that modality inherits its 
conventional status from analyticity according to LMC, these facts will also form the 
basis of the conventional status of modality. In the case of Frege-analyticity, it was the 
conventional fact that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ both have the same meaning that 
made ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ analytic. According to the Kantian view, its 
analyticity was due to the conventional fact that the subject term and predicate term were 
assigned meanings such that the former contained the latter. The same could be said of 
Russell’s account; the conventional fact that a particular term has a particular reference 
determiner helps determine which sentences are analytic. On this way of cashing out the 
role of convention in analyticity then, conventional meaning facts make ‘All bachelors 
are unmarried’ analytic and thereby make it necessary. 
Unfortunately, however, dependence on conventional meanings facts cannot by itself 
suffice for conventionalism about modal truth, or even about analyticity. To see why, 
note that the view that the truth of modal sentences depends on meaning facts is 
ubiquitous, to the extent that it is accepted by just about everyone regardless of which 
theory of modality they happen to endorse. As argued above, it’s uncontroversial to 
accept that the meanings of our terms are up to us in this sense.
249
 You can easily turn a 
modal truth into a falsehood if you change the conventional meaning of one of its terms. 
This is the case regardless of which theory of modality you endorse. Consider, for 
example, someone who thinks that modality is primitive and irreducible. This kind of 
modal theorist will argue that the sentence ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is 
made true by a primitive modal fact. However, she will also accept that the truth of the 
sentence depends partly on the conventional rules governing our use of ‘bachelor’. If 
‘bachelor’ had meant what ‘biologist’ means the modal sentence would have been false. 
The reason it would have been false is that ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ 
would not have expressed the primitive modal fact that necessarily, all bachelors are 
unmarried. Instead, it would have said that necessarily, all biologists are unmarried, 
which of course is not a fact. The modal primitivist will argue that the truth of modal 
sentences in English depends on primitive modal facts plus conventional facts about 
which English terms mean what. She can happily accept that the primitive modal facts are 
                                                     
249 As discussed in section 5.3 below, Quine argues in ‘Truth by Convention’ that this minimal role is all 
conventions are capable of. He suggests that conventions can be used to find new ways to express old truths, 
but cannot be used to found new ones.  
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not enough to make modal sentences true; what those sentences mean matters too, and 
that is a conventional matter. 
This suggests that a view according to which modality depends on conventional meaning 
facts does not meet condition a) for LMC: that the truth values of all metaphysical modal 
sentences are determined in a non-trivial way by conventional linguistic rules governing 
the use of terms. Given the considerations noted above, the role of conventional meaning 
facts in determining modal truths clearly falls into the trivial side of this divide. What’s 
more, given that the view remains compatible with realist views such as modal 
primitivism, condition b) isn’t met either; the theory does not rule out the existence of 
modal features of the world that are not dependent on linguistic rules. The inadequacy of 
conventional meaning facts for making modality conventional is also revealed by the 
consideration that the truth of non-modal sentences depends partly on such facts; any 
English truth depends in part on what terms in English mean. The truth of the empirical 
sentence ‘There are fewer whales in the ocean now than there were several centuries ago’ 
is partly conventional. If ‘ocean’ had meant what ‘sky’ means, the sentence would have 
been false. Acceptance that truths in a domain depend partly on conventional meaning 
facts is not sufficient for being conventionalist about that domain. If it were, 
conventionalism would encompass too many theories for the distinction between 
conventionalist and non-conventionalist theories to be one worth making. The 
dependence of empirical truths about the number of whales in the ocean on conventional 
meaning facts does not suffice for conventionalism about empirical truth. The same 
applies when it comes to modality; dependence of modal truths on conventional meaning 
facts does not suffice for conventionalism about modality.  
Further consideration suggests that conventional meaning facts will not even suffice to 
make analyticity conventional. Just as the conventional fact that ‘ocean’ means ocean 
cannot make ‘There are fewer whales in the ocean now than there were several centuries 
ago’ analytic, the conventional fact that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are synonymous 
cannot by itself make ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ analytic. On the Fregean 
account of analyticity, the extra ingredient required over and above the conventional 
meaning facts is that ‘All unmarried men are unmarried men’ is a logical truth. 
Conventional meaning facts might determine that ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ is 
synonymous with that sentence, but synonymy with any sentence isn’t sufficient for 
analyticity; only synonymy with the logically true ones is sufficient. For Kant and for 
Russell the extra ingredient that’s required once the meaning facts are fixed is that the 
meanings of the subject and predicate terms are related in the right way. Specifically, one 
must be ‘contained in’ the other. Unfortunately, however, if the matter of logical truth, or 
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of containment in Kant or Russell’s sense, is non-conventional, then the role of 
convention in determining which sentences are analytic becomes very weak; all 
convention achieves is to determine whether our terms are attached to meanings in such a 
way that a sentence expresses a truth of the right kind. However, being a truth of the right 
kind is what does the serious work in distinguishing analytic sentences from non-analytic 
ones. In the Fregean terminology, it’s being a logical truth that does the work in 
determining which sentences are analytic and which ones aren’t. And in the Kantian / 
Russellian terminology, it’s the relation of containment among meanings that does the 
required work.  
In both cases, the relevant ingredient that is essential in determining whether a sentence 
has the special property of being analytic is what’s meant by the sentence. If what’s 
meant by the sentence is a logical truth, the sentence is Frege-analytic. If the reference 
determiner of the predicate term is contained in the reference determiner of the subject 
term, the sentence is analytic according to Russell. This suggests that in order for 
analyticity to be truly convention-dependent, and for modality to inherit this convention-
dependence, convention must play a role in making it the case that certain sentences with 
certain meanings are analytic. Therefore, a natural place to look for a more significant 
role for convention in analyticity and modality is in the meanings or contents of 
sentences. In what follows, I’ll use the term ‘proposition’ to pick out the meanings of 
sentences. Insofar as propositions are the meanings of sentences, a way to make modality 
genuinely convention-dependent would be to argue that linguistic rules governing terms 
make it the case that some propositions are true necessarily, or single out some 
propositions as the ones that are expressed by analytic sentences. If conventions can make 
propositions necessary rather than simply fixing the meaning of sentences to propositions 
that have their necessity independently, we have a way for modality to be genuinely 
convention-dependent. This proposal will be discussed further in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
5.2.2 Carnap-Thomasson analyticity to the rescue? 
Before examining how to make modal propositions convention-dependent, it’s worth 
considering whether the Carnap-Thomasson-style picture of analyticity achieves genuine 
convention-dependence without reference to sentence contents. Recall that on the Carnap-
Thomasson picture, whether or not a sentence is analytic is determined prior to what that 
sentence means. ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic on Thomasson’s view because 
the rules governing ‘bachelor’ stipulate that it should only be applied where ‘unmarried’ 
is applied. And, this rule can be established before we fix the extensions of the relevant 
terms to objects or classes of objects in the world. Similarly, on Carnap’s view, we can 
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stipulate that ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is be a meaning postulate before we fix ‘rules 
of designation’ for ‘bachelor’ or ‘unmarried’.  
These accounts therefore appear to provide a way for analyticity to be fully determined 
by conventional rules. Insofar as modality is determined by analyticity, modality can be 
fully determined by those rules too. For example, I can adopt the linguistic rule that 
‘quog’ is to be applied only where ‘spog’ is applied, and thereby make ‘All quogs are 
spogs’ analytic. Furthermore, I can do this before I assign a reference to ‘quog’ or ‘spog’. 
Given that analyticity is sufficient for necessity according to LMC, my introducing the 
relevant rules for ‘spog’ and ‘quog’ will also make ‘All quogs are spogs’ necessary. This 
process makes the necessity of the sentence depend purely on my conventional linguistic 
rule, rather than on the sentence’s content; after all, the rule is introduced without yet 
assigning meanings to ‘quog’ and ‘spog’.  LMC can argue that this account of modality is 
incompatible with theories such as modal primitivism because the modal status of the 
sentence is fully determined by the conventional rules; nothing else is required in order 
for it to be true, including primitive modal facts. By contrast, linguistic rules alone are not 
sufficient for the truth of ‘There are fewer whales in the ocean now than there were 
several centuries ago.’  
Unfortunately, this attempt to make analyticity strongly convention-dependent becomes 
problematic once analytic sentences are assigned some meaning or other. If ‘All quogs 
are spogs’ is to have the function of a meaningful sentence in that it communicates 
information and so on, it must say something about the world; in other words, it must 
express some proposition. On the Carnap-Thomasson-style view of analyticity, once it’s 
stipulated that ‘All quogs are spogs’ is analytic, we must then set up rules of designation 
determining meanings for each term in the sentence. Given that we’ve made ‘All quogs 
are spogs’ analytic, however, we had better not assign meanings in such a way that the 
sentence expresses a falsehood. If we stipulate that ‘All quogs are spogs’ is to be analytic, 
we can’t also decide that ‘quog’ is to pick out the class of trees are ‘spog’ is to pick out 
the class of foxes. If we could, it would be in our power to make it the case that all trees 
are foxes, which amounts to a radical conventionalism about the state of the external 
world. As such, we are restricted in our options such that the proposition expressed by 
‘All quogs are spogs’ must be a true proposition. It’s permissible to stipulate that ‘quog’ 
means bachelor and ‘spog’ means man but we cannot stipulate that ‘quog’ means tree 
and ‘spog’ means fox.  
Furthermore, given that according to LMC being analytic is sufficient for being 
necessary, these theories will require that whatever proposition is expressed by an 
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analytic sentence must be a necessary one. At this point, however, the necessity of the 
proposition expressed remains unexplained. The theory addresses the analyticity and 
necessity of sentences but has nothing to say about propositions. Here, we have a choice. 
On the one hand, we could argue that there is a class of necessary propositions, and these 
are the candidate meanings for ‘All quogs are spogs’ once we’ve decided that the 
sentence is to be analytic. However, this means countenancing non-linguistic modality, 
which is incompatible with LMC as per condition b). On the other hand, we could argue 
that the modal status of propositions is somehow dependent on conventional linguistic 
rules. In that case, the Carnap-Thomasson account of modality doesn’t offer us a way to 
make modality conventional without addressing the status of propositions and is in this 
regard then no better off than the explanation of modal truth in terms of conventional 
meaning facts. Ultimately, we have been led back to where we were at the end of section 
5.2.1; LMC must have something to say about the modal status of propositions. 
It should be clear that this problem for LMC’s treatment of de dicto modality parallels the 
problem for de re modality discussed in the previous chapter. There, I argued that for a 
theory to qualify as LMC, it must take conventions to play a more substantial role in 
determining de re modal truths than merely fixing the reference of terms to objects that 
come pre-endowed with modal properties. Similarly, in order for a theory to qualify as 
LMC, it must take conventions to do more than simply fix the meaning of sentences to 
propositions that come pre-endowed with modal statuses. 
 
5.3 The second horn part one: conventional truth 
In order for LMC to make de dicto modality genuinely conventional, it must be able to 
show how what’s meant by a sentence is necessary, contingent or otherwise. Just as 
serious conventionalism about de re modality required explaining how objects have their 
modal properties, serious conventionalism about de dicto modality requires explaining 
how propositions come to have their modal statuses. One way to achieve this would be to 
argue that the same linguistic rules that make a sentence analytic also make the 
proposition it expresses necessary. One way of cashing out this strategy is to treat 
analyticity as ‘truth by convention’. The thought is that by making a sentence like ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried men’ analytic, our conventional rules can also make the 
proposition it expresses true. Then, the necessary propositions would be those that are 
made true by convention.  
115 
 
Unfortunately, however, the notion of truth by convention has been the target of 
convincing criticism. Most prominently, arguments against it come from Quine, but they 
have also been taken up in recent times by Theodore Sider and Timothy Williamson. In 
his article ‘Truth by Convention,’ Quine claims that ‘definitions are available only for 
transforming truths not for founding them.’250 He argues that conventions governing the 
use of terms only have the power to give us new ways of expressing old truths; they can’t 
be responsible for generating new ones. In other words, Quine is suggesting that 
conventions can only play the ‘trivial’ role in truth that is insufficient for LMC, as 
discussed in section 5.2; they can make it the case that a string of words means the 
proposition that it does, but they can’t make that proposition true. 
Sider objects to the idea of conventional truth on a similar basis.  He says: 
‘What could it mean to say that we make logical truths true by convention? Imagine an 
attempt to legislate truth: “Let every sentence of the form ‘If P then P’ be true.” What 
would this accomplish? The legislator could be resolving to use the word ‘true’ in a new 
way; he could be listing the sentences to which this new term ‘true’ applies. But this 
isn’t making logic true by convention; it is legislating a new sense of ‘true’. On the other 
hand, the legislator could be singling out a meaning for ‘if...then’: ‘if...then’ is to stand 
for a relation, R, between propositions, such that for any proposition, p, the proposition 
that R(p, p) is true. But this does not amount to logical truth by convention either, for it 
appeals to an antecedent notion of propositional truth. The propositions R(p, p) are 
assumed to “already” be true; they are merely used to pick out the desired relation R.’251 
Sider’s point is that the thing that’s meant by a sentence, even if it’s a logical truth, does 
not depend on linguistic conventions, and is not the type of thing to which we can assign 
truth values by stipulation. The suggestions Sider considers for what it could mean to 
‘legislate’ a logical truth end up collapsing into redefinitions of terms like ‘true’ or ‘if... 
then’. Timothy Williamson also argues against analyticity construed as truth by 
convention, noting that logical truths like ‘Either it’s raining or it’s not raining’ and 
analytic truths such as ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ are just as much ‘about the world’ as 
non-analytic sentences like ‘Today is Tuesday.’252 And, insofar these sentences make 
assertions about the world, they ought to owe their truth to something worldly, rather than 
to convention. ‘Either it’s raining or it’s not raining,’ for example, is made true by the 
rain or lack thereof, and ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is made true by bachelors and their 
properties. Even recent defenders of analyticity object to the idea that conventions are 
capable of ‘founding’ truths. Paul Boghossian, for example says: 
                                                     
250 Quine, ‘Truth By Convention’ p.81. 
251 Sider, ‘Reductive Theories of Modality’ p.204. 
252 Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy. See Chapter 3 in particular.  
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‘Are we really to suppose that, prior to our stipulating a meaning for the sentence ‘Either 
snow is white or it isn't’ it wasn't the case that either snow was white or it wasn't? Isn't it 
overwhelmingly obvious that this claim was true before such an act of meaning, and that 
it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed 
by one of our sentences?’253 
Finally, the case discussed in the previous section speaks against the proposal that 
linguistic rules make propositions true. I can stipulate that ‘All quogs are spogs’ is to be 
analytic and therefore must express a truth, but that appears to limit what I can mean by 
‘quog’ and ‘spog’; I can’t consistently stipulate that the sentence is to be analytic while at 
the same time stipulating that ‘quog’ is to mean tree and ‘spog’ is to mean fox. In order 
for a proposition to be a candidate for the meaning of an analytic sentence, it must 
already be true. However, on the view that propositions are made true in virtue of being 
expressed by analytic sentences, I can make the proposition that all foxes are trees true. 
The view that the necessary propositions are those that are made true by convention 
meets the conditions for LMC; however, the notion of truth by convention lacks 
independent plausibility.  
 
5.4 The second horn part two: necessity by convention 
Luckily, LMC need not go so far as to embrace truth by convention; all it requires is 
necessity by convention. One option is for LMC to claim that conventional linguistic 
rules make a proposition like <Either it’s raining or it’s not raining> necessary without 
making it true. Plausibly, this still requires conventionalism about truths of a restricted 
class – the modal truths – since linguistic conventions will make <Necessarily, either it’s 
raining or it’s not raining> true. However, this view need not be committed to 
conventionalism about proposition truth more generally. Of course, given that necessity 
implies truth, it might be objected that conventionalism about necessary truth implies 
conventionalism about truth in general; if we can make <Either it’s raining or it’s not 
raining> necessary, we can also make it true. There’s an easy fix for this problem, 
though: restrict our powers of necessity-making to the true propositions. LMC can allow 
that there is a class of true non-modal propositions that is determined independently of 
linguistic conventions and hold that those are the propositions that are candidates to be 
made necessary by introduction of linguistic rules.  
                                                     
253 Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’ p.365. 
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There is a straightforward analogy here with the case of de re modality discussed in 
previous chapters. One version of LMC may hold that we endow objects with modal 
properties; but proponents of that view are unlikely to think we can endow objects with 
modal properties that are inconsistent with their non-modal properties. We can’t make an 
object necessarily red, for example, if as a matter of fact it is blue. Similarly, we can’t 
make false propositions necessarily true. Just as LMC ought not embrace 
conventionalism about an object’s non-modal properties, it should not embrace 
conventionalism about non-modal proposition truth. 
To see how this proposal would work, we can start with a Thomasson-style theory of 
analyticity according to which stipulated linguistic rules make some sentence analytic. 
Then, however the meanings of the terms in that sentence are assigned, they must be 
assigned in such a way that the proposition expressed by the sentence is one that is true. 
Of course, it is up to the world to supply a set of true non-modal propositions. The state 
of language-independent reality determines whether a given non-modal proposition is 
true or false, and the true propositions are candidates to be made necessary by our 
linguistic conventions. Once a true proposition has been selected as the meaning of some 
sentence, the linguistic rules governing the sentence will determine whether it is analytic, 
and in turn whether the proposition expressed is necessary. That is to say, the analyticity 
of a sentence is responsible for the necessity of the proposition it expresses but not for its 
truth. For example, it’s a linguistic rule that ‘bachelor’ is to be applied only where 
‘unmarried’ is applied. This makes ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ an analytic sentence. 
Then, given that the sentence expresses the true proposition that all bachelors are 
unmarried, that proposition gets to be necessary in virtue of our making the sentence that 
expresses it analytic. 
5.4.1 From conventional modal statuses to conventional truth 
Despite its promise, this proposal falls to an objection that parallels the one raised for 
conventionalism about modal properties in chapter 3. In that case, the problem arose 
because of the tight connection between something’s existence, identity and persistence 
conditions and its modal properties. By determining the conditions under which 
something exists, and the changes through which it can retain its identity, we can 
conventionally determine what exists in a given circumstance and what is identical to 
what. Similarly, if we endow a proposition with its modal features, we determine which 
states of affairs counts as one in which the proposition is true. This is because of the 
modal status of a proposition, and the relations of consistency in which it stands to other 
propositions, are tightly connected to its truth conditions.  
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Consider the following scenario. As it happens, there are no people who are 10 feet tall or 
taller, and there never have been. According to LMC, the proposition <No person is over 
10 feet tall> cannot come with a modal status independently of linguistic conventions. 
What’s more, consistency between propositions is a modal notion that can be cashed out 
as ‘possibly true together’. As such, there can be no facts about which propositions are 
consistent with which independently of linguistic conventions. Therefore, the modal 
status of true propositions, and the consistency relations between them, must be 
determined by the linguistic rules that govern terms. Since <No person is over 10 feet 
tall> is a true proposition, it is a candidate to be made necessary according to LMC. (Of 
course, our current conventions do not treat this proposition as necessary, but we are 
considering what would be the case if they did.) 
According to the current proposal for LMC, we could make <No person is over 10 feet 
tall> necessary by introducing the right rules to govern the terms ‘person’, ‘tall’, ‘feet’ 
and so on, such that the sentence expressing the proposition counted as analytic. One way 
to do so would be to stipulate that the term ‘person’ only applies where ‘10 feet tall or 
less’ applies. On the view under consideration, our introducing such a rule is sufficient to 
make the proposition necessary. In introducing such a rule, however, I have made the 
truth conditions of <No person is over 10 feet tall> conventional. Specifically, the new 
linguistic rule determines that the proposition is true in all circumstances. Alternatively, I 
could have introduced a rule according to which ‘person’ applies only where ‘10 feet tall 
or less’ applies, unless ‘over 100 years old’ applies. In that case, <No person is over 10 
feet tall> would be contingent. However, I have still conventionally determined truth 
conditions for the proposition; no circumstance in which everyone is 100 years old or 
younger counts as a circumstance in which there is a person over 10 feet tall. This will 
hold even in circumstances in which our current conventions for ‘person’, ‘feet’, ‘tall’ 
and so on would dictate that there is a person over 10 feet tall. An example of such a 
circumstance is one in which there is a human born of human parents, who happens to 
grow to be taller than 10 feet.  
Determining which propositions are necessary, which are contingent, and which are 
which are consistent with which means determining the conditions under which a 
proposition is true. However, the truth conditions of a proposition are what give it its 
identity. To be a proposition is to be a representative entity; it is to carry information 
about how the world is. And, the conditions under which a proposition is true allow it to 
carry that information. A proposition that carries the information that it is raining is a 
proposition that is true when and only when it is raining, for example. A proposition that 
that is not true when and only when it is raining cannot be the proposition that it is 
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raining. Similarly, the proposition that <No person is over 10 feet tall> cannot be the 
proposition that <Only persons over 100 years of age are over 10 feet tall> insofar as they 
have different truth conditions. Since truth conditions have modal import, they cannot 
come built into propositions according to LMC. However, because a proposition’s 
identity is determined by its truth conditions, conventionalism about the modal features of 
propositions entails conventionalism about propositions themselves. By conventionally 
determining what truth conditions are had by propositions, we conventionally determine 
what propositions there are. Independently of our conventions, propositions have no 
modal truth conditions according to this proposal. However, a proposition is individuated 
by its truth conditions. As such, the proposition itself does not exist independently of our 
endowing it with truth conditions.  
On its own, conventionalism about propositions might not seem so threatening to LMC. 
However, from conventionalism about the truth conditions of propositions we can 
generate conventionalism about truth itself. Of course, conventionalism about proposition 
truth would run counter to the assumption we made when setting up the proposal under 
consideration; at the beginning of section 5.4, I suggested that LMC should accept that 
the world determines which propositions are true and which are false. However, we now 
know that independently of linguistic conventions, propositions do not have conditions of 
truth and falsehood. Ordinarily, we would say that a proposition counts as being made 
true by the world if the world satisfies its truth conditions. If the matter of the conditions 
under which a proposition is true is conventional, however, then the matter of whether the 
world counts as making a proposition true must also be conventional. On the other hand, 
if the truth of non-modal propositions is to be ‘worldly’ rather than conventional, there 
must be some special relationship such as truth-making that holds between the true 
propositions and the world that fails to hold between the false propositions and the world. 
If a proposition lacks convention-independent truth conditions, however, we have no 
informative way of characterising when that relation holds without appealing to 
conventional factors. Therefore, if LMC wishes to maintain that we endow propositions 
with their modal features, it must also accept that the world alone cannot determine which 
propositions are true; the truth of a proposition must be partly worldly, and partly 
conventional.  
One might worry that the argument provided above confuses the conditions under which 
a proposition is true with whether or not those conditions are fulfilled. Perhaps the former 
can be conventional while the latter is not. For example, it is a matter of convention that 
public nudity is frowned upon; but whether anyone in fact counts as naked in public or 
not is not a matter of convention. Rather, it is determined by whether or not the person is 
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clothed, whether she is in public, and so on. Of course, while it may be that whether 
someone is naked in public is not conventional, it is conventional whether or her action 
constitutes a contravention of a social convention. The same applies to the case of 
proposition truth. The physical universe and its arrangement of matter is not 
conventional, and the physical universe plays a part in determining whether a particular 
proposition is true. However, the arrangement of the world alone does not suffice for 
proposition truth; what’s also required is that our conventional linguistic rules have 
created an entity with truth conditions that count as satisfied by the arrangement of the 
world.  
Once again, this problem for LMC parallels the case made in chapter 3 for why 
conventionalism about EIP conditions leads to conventionalism about objects. If the 
conditions of existence for an object are conventional, whether the object in fact exists is 
conventional. Similarly, if the conditions of truth for a proposition are conventional, 
whether the proposition is in fact true must also be conventional.  
5.4.2 From conventional de dicto modality to contradiction 
A second route from conventionalism about the modal statuses of propositions to 
conventionalism about propositions themselves can be constructed along the lines of 
Sidelle’s argument for object conventionalism set out in chapter 3. Sidelle argued that 
combining conventionalism about modal properties with realism about objects led to 
contradiction. Similarly, non-conventionalism about propositions is incompatible with 
conventionalism about the modal statuses of those propositions. To begin, let’s assume 
that linguistic conventions serve to endow modal statuses upon convention-independent 
propositions. As noted above, this view takes the modal status of a proposition to be 
determined by the rules governing a sentence that expresses it.  
The trouble arose in chapter 3 due to cases in which we appear to have incompatible 
conventions for terms that refer to a single object. In the context of de dicto modality, we 
can see that LMC may also allow for incompatible conventions for sentences that express 
the same proposition. Consider the proposition p.  Given realism about propositions, p is 
a convention-independent entity by hypothesis. Given LMC, whether or not p counts as 
necessary will depend on the linguistic rules governing sentences that express p. 
Specifically, if p is expressed by an analytic sentence it will be true necessarily, and if it 
is expressed by a non-analytic sentence it will be true only contingently. However, there 
is nothing to stop us expressing p using both an analytic sentence and a non-analytic 
sentence. Perhaps p is expressed by both the analytic ‘All humans are human’ and the 
contingent ‘All featherless, non-marsupial bipeds are human.’ By virtue of being 
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expressed by an analytic sentence, p must be necessary, but by virtue of being expressed 
by a non-analytic sentence, p must be contingent. A response in the spirit of Sidelle, of 
course would be to give up on the convention-independent status of propositions. Once 
again though, if propositions are conventional, whether or not some proposition is true 
must also be conventional.  
Now, we are in a position to express our dilemma for LMC’s treatment of de dicto 
modality in full. On the one hand, the theory could countenance non-conventional 
propositions with modal truth conditions built-in. On that view, the role played by 
linguistic expressions is simply to help determine which proposition is expressed by 
which sentence. However, such a theory does not count as genuine LMC because it fails 
to satisfy both conditions for the theory set out in chapter 2. This is the first horn of our 
dilemma. On the other hand, the theory could treat the modal statuses of propositions as 
conventional. This meets the conditions for LMC, but given that truth conditions are 
modal, this strategy quickly results in conventionalism about non-modal truth. What’s 
more, the combination of conventionalism about the modal statuses of propositions and 
realism about propositions themselves commits us to the possibility of generating 
contradictions according to the theory. This is the second horn of our dilemma. 
 
5.5 Abelardian sentences 
In chapter 3, we considered whether treating predicates as ‘Abelardian’ offered a way to 
maintain conventionalism about modal properties with realism about objects. A similar 
strategy could be adopted for propositions, but similar considerations count against it. An 
Abelardian approach to sentences would require that the modal status of a proposition is 
relativised to the sentence that expresses it. To return to our example from section 5.4.2, 
the single proposition expressed by both ‘All humans are human’ and ‘All featherless 
non-marsupial bipeds are human’ would count as necessary qua expressed by the first 
sentence, and contingent qua expressed by the second sentence. This strategy allows us to 
avoid contradictions in the style generated in 5.4.2, but it does not help with the argument 
from section 5.4.1. Modal truth conditions had by a proposition relative to a sentence 
must still be conventional, according to LMC. As such, proposition truth will end up both 
conventional and sentence relative according to this strategy.  
What’s more, while the notion of an object with sortal-relative modal properties seems at 
least coherent, it is difficult to understand what a proposition with sentence relative truth 
conditions could be like. Objects can be characterised at least in part by their non-modal 
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properties. Apart from its truth conditions, however, there is little else we can say about a 
proposition that distinguishes it from other propositions. As such, a single proposition 
with sentence relative truth conditions has very few features, besides its actual truth or 
actual falsehood, that are not sortal-relative. A proposition is meant to represent how 
things are in the world, and this is captured by its conditions of truth. The Abelardian 
strategy requires that a single proposition can represent the world to be some specific way 
but have one set of truth conditions relative to one sentence, and another set of truth 
conditions relative to a second sentence. An example cited above can help show why this 
position is incoherent. The proposition <It is raining> is the proposition that is true when 
and only when it is raining; any other truth conditions cannot be had by the proposition 
that it is raining.
254
 A proposition that is true when and only when it is raining relative to 
one sentence, but is sometimes false when it is raining relative to a second sentence is not 
a single proposition at all.  
 
5.6 Are conventional propositions so bad? 
A Sidelle-style resolution to this problem that mirrors the solution he adopts for the case 
of objects would be to embrace proposition conventionalism. This means accepting that 
propositions are conventional entities with conventional truth conditions. On this view, 
there is no proposition that can be expressed by both an analytic sentence and a non-
analytic sentence because propositions depend on the sentences that express them. The 
proposition expressed by ‘All humans are humans’ would be distinct from the proposition 
expressed by ‘All featherless non-marsupial bipeds are humans’ in virtue of being 
expressed by different sentences. By making a sentence analytic, we make it the case that 
there is a necessary proposition expressed by that sentence. And, by making some distinct 
sentence not analytic, we make it the case that there is a contingent proposition it 
expresses, distinct from the previous one.  
I’ve argued above that conventionalism about propositions leads to conventionalism 
about proposition truth. However, perhaps that result ought to be embraced by LMC too. 
After all, one might argue, propositions are exactly the kind of non-natural, abstract 
entities about which metaphysical naturalists ought to be suspicious. There are reasons to 
reject this view however, stemming from the nature of propositions and the function they 
have as representative entities. Intuitively, as the contents of sentences, propositions 
                                                     
254 Note that while this argument suggests a single proposition can only have one set of truth conditions, it is 
compatible with the view that in some cases, several propositions have the same truth conditions as each 
other. Some might think that <It is raining> has the same truth conditions as <It is raining and 2+2=4>, for 
example.  
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contain the information we convey to other through our communication. Usually, we take 
for granted that our communication is about the convention-independent world. However, 
insofar as the meanings of our sentences are conventional, the information we convey 
with our talk must also be conventional. If the contents of our communications are not 
mind-independently true or false, it is difficult to explain why when we express truths we 
help each other to successfully navigate the world, while when we express falsehoods we 
do not. For example, when I tell you that it’s raining, the fact that I express something 
mind-independently true about the world explains why when you take an umbrella, you 
don’t get wet. Finally, as was the case with realism about objects, it’s worth noting that it 
is a desirable feature of a theory of modality that it remains compatible with a range of 
other positions when it comes to other domains. As such, a commitment to 
conventionalism about proposition truth is to be avoided by LMC if possible.  
 
5.7 On modal truth conditions and the need for possible worlds 
In section 5.4.1, I argued that if a proposition’s modal status is conventional, its truth 
conditions are also conventional. In making that argument I relied, perhaps illicitly, on 
the notion of the circumstances under which a proposition is true. For example, I 
suggested that if we were to make the proposition <No person is over 10 feet tall> 
necessary, we would make it the case that it was true in all circumstances. Of course, the 
circumstances in question must be metaphysical possibilities; and LMC cannot allow the 
existence of such possibilities independently of linguistic rules. This suggests a need to 
clarify what’s meant by the claim that conventional modal statuses had by propositions 
entail conventional truth conditions. Usually, the truth conditions of a proposition are 
represented as the set of possible worlds at which the proposition is true. Given that such 
worlds cannot exist independently of convention, we cannot read the claim that truth 
conditions are conventional as the claim that we assign a set of independently existing 
worlds to each proposition. Luckily, the argument from 5.4.1 does not require the 
existence of convention-independent possible worlds in order to have force. LMC entails 
that there are no such worlds, and that propositions cannot have truth conditions 
represented in terms of them. Such worlds, if they exist at all, must be conventional. 
Therefore, independently of convention, propositions cannot have modal truth conditions. 
As such, if propositions are individuated by their truth conditions, there can be no 
propositions independently of convention. This is all that’s required for the argument 
from 5.4.1 to go through. 
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5.8 Searching for a path back to the real world 
At the end of chapter 2, I set out two conditions a theory must meet in order to qualify as 
linguistic modal conventionalism: 
a) The truth values of all metaphysical modal sentences are determined in a non-
trivial way by conventional linguistic rules governing the use of terms. 
b) All modal features of the world are dependent on these conventional linguistic 
rules. 
The dilemmas facing LMC set out above, and in chapters 3 and 4, suggest that satisfying 
both a) and b) is a difficult task. On the one hand, it is difficult to meet the non-triviality 
requirement for a). The truth of all sentences, including de dicto and de re modal 
sentences, is determined in part by the conventional linguistic rules that govern terms. A 
modal realist who countenances non-conventional properties had by objects, and non-
conventional modal facts, can allow that the linguistic rules governing terms help to 
determine which modally individuated objects our singular terms pick out, and which 
non-conventional modal facts our modal sentences express. Such a view does not satisfy 
the non-triviality requirement, and nor does it satisfy b). On the other hand, views that 
satisfy both a) and b) lead quickly into a widespread ontological conventionalism 
encompassing both objects and truth. If the modal properties had by objects are 
conventional, objects themselves must be conventional too. And, if the modal truth 
conditions had by propositions are conventional, the truth of those propositions must also 
be conventional. It’s worth noting that even Sidelle, who embraces object 
conventionalism, does not wish to endorse conventionalism about truth. However, the 
same arguments that suggest object realism is incompatible with modal conventionalism 
also suggest that truth realism is incompatible with modal conventionalism.  
The remainder of this thesis will be devoted to providing a way out of this dilemma for 
LMC. The position I will defend is that LMC should reject the problematic ontology that 
makes a) and b) so difficult to satisfy. If LMC accepts that objects have modal properties 
determining EIP conditions for objects, and that propositions have modal statuses 
determining truth conditions, those features of the world must be explained in terms of 
linguistic conventions. The attempt to do so is what led LMC into so much trouble. On 
the other hand, if objects are not individuated modally, and propositions are not 
individuated by modal truth conditions, the need to explain those features is removed. 
Furthermore, I will argue that rejecting worldly modality does not mean that LMC must 
deny that there are any modal truths. Instead, LMC can still accept that both de dicto and 
de re modal sentences are true, and that their truth is explained in terms of linguistic 
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rules. In other worlds, LMC can still satisfy condition a). Condition b) will be met 
trivially; there will be no such modal features to explain.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World: Metaphysics 
As we left things at the end of chapter 5, linguistic modal conventionalism was lost in a 
maze of conventional objects and conventional truth. In what follows, I argue that the 
path back to reality requires LMC to reject the problematic ontology that led it into the 
maze. Specifically, LMC should deny that objects have modal properties, and deny that 
propositions have modal truth conditions. This position will be articulated in two parts. In 
this chapter, I defend the a-modal metaphysical picture of the world the view requires. In 
the next chapter, I set out a semantics for de re and de dicto modal sentences that does not 
rely on worldly modality. Section 6.1 below provides a brief summary of the overall 
strategy, foreshadowing both the metaphysical picture that is discussed in this chapter, 
and the semantic picture that is discussed in the next chapter. Then, section 6.2 defends 
an account of objects without modal properties, and section 6.3 defends an account of 
propositions without modal truth conditions. Finally, section 6.4 discusses the nature of 
non-modal properties, and how they can be used to fix reference to a-modal objects. 
 
6.1 A strategy for being an ontological realist and a modal conventionalist 
The problem for LMC when it came to de re modality arose due to the theory’s treatment 
of objects as entities possessing modal properties. Sidelle’s view, for example, was 
committed to object conventionalism because it took modal properties to be endowed on 
objects via our conventional linguistic practices. As argued in chapter 3, the modal 
properties of objects determine their conditions of existence, identity and persistence, and 
if the latter are conventional, then objects themselves must also be conventional. 
Similarly, the problem for LMC when it came to de dicto modality arose because of its 
treatment of propositions as possessing modal truth conditions. As argued in chapter 5, 
the truth conditions of a proposition partly determine whether it is in fact true, and as 
such, if the former are conventional the latter must be too.  
Any version of LMC must hold that the truth of both de re and de dicto modal sentences 
depends on conventional rules governing language use. However, the conventional status 
of sentence truth is not sufficient for genuine conventionalism about de re modality so 
long as objects are treated as having modal properties that are independent of convention. 
And, the conventional status of sentence truth is not sufficient for genuine 
conventionalism about de dicto modality so long as propositions are treated as having 
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modal truth conditions independent of convention. Sidelle places himself squarely inside 
one horn of this dilemma; he achieves a strong conventionalism about de re modality by 
treating the modal properties of objects as dependent on the meaning of terms used to 
refer to them, and embraces object conventionalism. A way to avoid the dilemma 
entirely, however, is to give up on worldly modality. If objects have no modal properties, 
and propositions have no modal truth conditions, we can explain the truth conditions of 
de re and de dicto modal sentences purely in term of the conventional rules governing 
language without fear of leaving unexplained modality in our ontology. 
For this strategy to succeed, it must contain three elements. Firstly, it requires a 
metaphysical theory of objects and propositions that is not committed to their having 
modal features. Below, I will argue that objects should be viewed as spatiotemporally 
extended parts of the physical world that instantiate numerous non-modal properties, but 
no modal properties. These a-modal objects cannot have modal existence, identity and 
persistence conditions. Nonetheless, I will argue that denying that there are any such 
conditions is compatible with holding that there are existence, identity and persistence 
facts about objects. LMC must also embrace an a-modal theory of propositions. The view 
most amenable to the rejection of modal truth conditions is the structured propositions 
theory endorsed by Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon. I will argue that despite their lack 
of modal truth conditions, LMC can still treat structured propositions as true and false.  
The second element of the strategy is a semantic account of de dicto and de re modal 
truth given in terms of linguistic rules. For the most part, the project of providing such an 
account will be delayed until chapter 7. Briefly, note that the truth conditions assigned to 
modal sentences by LMC must be entirely conventional; they cannot make reference to 
the a-modal physical world we inhabit. Instead, whether or not a given sentence counts as 
necessary, contingent, possible and so on must be fully determined by the linguistic rules 
that govern its terms. My project in chapter 7 will be to construct a set of possible worlds 
determined by the linguistic rules governing terms. Then, truth conditions for both de 
dicto and de re modal sentences can be given in terms of truth at worlds. As we will see, 
a priori, analytic sentences can be straightforwardly treated as true at all conventional 
worlds. However, a posteriori necessary truths, contingent analytic truths and de re 
modal truths are more difficult to incorporate into the conventionalist picture. De re 
modal sentences will be assigned truth conditions based on counterpart relations between 
possible individuals induced by the rules governing sortal terms. A posteriori necessities 
and analytic contingencies will be accounted for using the framework of two-dimensional 
semantics.  
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The third element that is required for LMC to succeed using the current strategy is an 
account of reference to a-modal objects, and an account of non-modal sentence truth. In 
chapters 3 and 5, I argued that LMC should maintain that we succeed in referring to 
objects in the real world, and that we succeed in communicating about goings on in the 
real world. As argued in section 3.4, Sidelle’s view struggles to account for how we can 
achieve reference to non-conventional entities, as the rules governing terms provide their 
referents with modal properties on his view, thereby guaranteeing that those referents are 
conventional. To avoid this problem, LMC must be able to treat a-modal objects as the 
referents of terms in English. Furthermore, it must be able to maintain that non-modal 
sentences in English, such as ‘Something is a person,’ are made true by the physical 
universe we inhabit. I argue that these goals can be achieved by LMC if it adopts a theory 
of reference along the lines of the one endorsed by Frank Jackson. In order to make use of 
this theory, an account is required of the nature of non-modal properties and how we 
become acquainted with them. These matters are discussed in section 6.4.  
In summary, the version of LMC that avoids the dilemmas articulated in chapters 3 – 5 is 
captured by the following claims: 
(1) The world is composed of non-modal properties and relations instantiated by 
physical matter and distributed in space-time. 
(2) Objects are parts of the world so defined; they are extended in space and time, 
and instantiate non-modal properties and relations. 
(3) Propositions are structured complexes composed of objects and non-modal 
properties and relations. 
(4) Singular terms pick out non-modal objects, predicates pick out non-modal 
properties and relations, and sentences express structured propositions. 
(5) The truth of non-modal sentences is determined by the world, once their meaning 
is fixed. 
(6) The truth of modal sentences is determined by the linguistic rules governing 
terms. 
 
6.2 Objects without modal properties 
Doing away with modal properties means accepting a particular kind of view about the 
metaphysics of objects. Ordinarily, objects are thought to have qualitative properties such 
as ‘greenness’, ‘circularity’ and so on, perhaps some temporal properties, such as ‘being 
green at time t1’, and modal properties, such as ‘being possibly blue’. Objects conceived 
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this way have properties that tell us what they are like at various times during their 
existence, and also what they could have been like had things been different. A-modal 
objects have the first two sorts of property, but do not have the last sort of property; 
there’s nothing about them that constitutes what they could or would have been like in 
different circumstances. A-modal objects should be thought of as ‘slices’ of the physical 
universe. They take up space and time, and instantiate various non-modal properties, but 
insofar as they do not instantiate any modal properties they cannot serve as the truth-
makers for modal sentences.
255
  
David Lewis provides an account of what an a-modal world might look like. One way to 
think about the metaphysical picture endorsed by LMC is as similar to Lewis’ picture if 
all the worlds in his pluriverse except the one we occupy were taken away. Lewis 
provisionally defends a view he calls ‘Humean supervenience’, according to which all 
that exists at the actual world is the ‘perfectly natural’ properties distributed across space-
time, and that everything else supervenes on those.
256
 He says: 
‘We have a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distance between 
points. Maybe points of space-time itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or 
fields, maybe both. And, at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural 
intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. 
For short: we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all.’257 
The position is called ‘Humean’ due to Hume’s famous rejection of ‘necessary 
connections between distinct existences’; such a rejection is of course an essential 
element of LMC. Any position that denies that the world has modal features 
fundamentally but accepts that there are modal truths must explain how some modal 
sentences are true. Lewis achieves this using his pluriverse; LMC must achieve it using 
conventional linguistic rules, as we will see in chapter 7. 
Dana Goswick provides a defence of what she calls ‘non-modal’ objects for similar 
reasons to those supplied by LMC; she points out that any metaphysical theory that is 
anti-realist about non-trivial modality but realist about objects will require them.
258
 She 
also makes use of non-modal objects in her ‘response-dependence’ theory of modally 
                                                     
255 Jonathan Schaffer defends this view of objects in ‘Spacetime the One Substance,’ Philosophical Studies 
Vol. 145 (2009): pp.131-148. 
256 Daniel Nolan points out that Lewis’s defence of Humean supervenience is only partial; it may turn out to 
be false pending discoveries to the contrary in physics, such as that there are non-spatiotemporal fundamental 
relations. See Daniel Nolan, David Lewis (Chesham: Acumen, 2005) pp.29-30. 
257 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp.ix-x. See also Nolan, 
David Lewis chapter 2 discussion of Lewis on Humean supervenience.  
258 Dana Goswick, ‘Why Being Necessary Is Not the Same as Being Not Possibly Not,’ Acta Analytica Vol. 
30 (2015): pp.267-274. 
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individuated objects.
259
 Goswick attributes a belief in non-modal objects to Lewis, as well 
as to Quine, who says of objects: 
‘Physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to be 
distinguished from events or, in the concrete sense of the term, processes. Each 
comprises simply the content, however heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, 
however disconnected and gerrymandered.’260 
Elsewhere, Quine is famously sceptical of de re modality; he argues that allowing for 
modal operators to attach to formulas with free variables leads to ‘Aristotelian 
essentialism,’ and that counts against countenancing de re modal sentences.261  
Ultimately, it’s worth noting that any reductionist theory of modality must allow that at 
bottom, the world is a-modal. However, one source of worry for the metaphysical view 
required by LMC may be that entities construed a-modally do not constitute objects in 
any interesting sense. This is a worry raised by Iris Einheuser in the context a defence of 
her ‘conceptualist’ theory of objects.262 Einheuser argues that the world itself is 
‘ontologically inarticulate’ in that it does not come with modally individuated objects 
built in. On her view, we configure objects in the world by applying our concepts to 
‘ontologically inarticulate stuff,’ thereby producing objects complete with modal 
properties.
263
 Einheuser argues that by configuring objects like statues and lumps we give 
those objects absolute modal properties and absolute conditions of existence and identity. 
However, she suggests that an alternative picture could treat modal properties as attaching 
to bits of the ontologically inarticulate world directly. Then, she says, modal properties 
and identity conditions will be sortal-relative. Her rejection of such an approach is based 
on the claim that the entities to which sortal-relative modal properties apply simply don’t 
constitute objects. The options for the conceptualist, she says, are as follows:  
‘She can either factor sortal identity conditions right into the items that make up the 
ontology and thereby obtain configured objects governed by absolute identity. Or she 
can use sortal identity conditions to obtain relative identity conditions that govern mere 
portions of stuff.’264  
                                                     
259 Dana Goswick, ‘A New Route to Avoiding Primitive Modal Facts.’ See also section 2.4.4 of this thesis. 
260 W. V. Quine, Word and Object, (New York: MIT Press and John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1960) p.171. 
261 W, V. Quine, ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement,’ in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays.  
262 See Einheuser, ‘Towards a Conceptualist Solution to the Grounding Problem’ pp.307-309. 
263 Note that Einheuser is not concerned about arguments such as those provided in chapter 3, since she 
happily accepts that her view constitutes a kind of conventionalism about objects. 
264 Ibid, p.308. 
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However, she says, ‘The relative identity conceptualist tells us there are no objects and 
goes on to do justice to what appears to be modal talk about objects.’265  
Einheuser’s worry is that entities that do not have modal properties built in, conventional 
or otherwise, do not constitute objects. Her view is that part of what it is for there to be 
tables, chairs, trees and so on is for there to be modal conditions of existence and identity; 
entities without those properties are not tables, chairs and trees. An innocuous version of 
the worry would simply require that we don’t use the term ‘object’ to pick out a-modal 
entities; LMC should be willing to give up the term ‘object’ if nothing hangs on it. A 
serious version of the worry, however, denies that a-modal entities can constitute the 
referents of ordinary singular terms in English, or that classes of them can constitute the 
extensions of our predicates. However, the view that trees and tables must be entities with 
modal properties is a substantive metaphysical claim and requires argumentation to 
support it.
266
 So long as the metaphysical nature of objects is an open question for 
metaphysicians, it is open for LMC to deny that they are the sorts of things that instantiate 
modal properties. As such, it not incoherent for LMC to suggest that objects are a-modal. 
What’s more, treating objects as a-modal helps LMC meet the metaphysical desiderata 
established in the introduction; the Humean view outlined in this section is both 
parsimonious and reductionist when it comes to objects. This topic will be discussed 
further in chapter 8.  
Objects without modal properties must also lack modal conditions of existence, identity 
and persistence. Recall that a central argument for the view that conventionalism about 
modal properties leads to conventionalism about objects, as discussed in chapter 3, was 
that modal properties are intimately related to the EIP conditions of objects. To be 
necessarily human means that you can only be identical to something human, and that 
you can only exist where the property being human is instantiated, for example. 
Similarly, having certain EIP conditions means having certain modal properties. If it’s a 
condition of your existence that that you can only exist as a human, then you are human 
necessarily. Given the relation of co-dependence between modal properties and EIP 
conditions, rejecting the former means rejecting the latter. The consequences of this for 
the nature of objects are potentially momentous. I argued in chapter 3 that 
conventionalism about modal properties and EIP conditions leads to conventionalism 
about objects. A concern, then, is that denying that there are any modal properties or any 
EIP conditions means denying that there are any objects. A central premise in the 
                                                     
265 Ibid, p.308. 
266 Note that Einheuser’s main reason for rejecting a-modal objects is that she thinks that such entities would 
fall prey to the grounding problem. However, I address that problem in chapter 7.  
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argument from chapter 3 was that whether some object counts as existing in a 
circumstance depends on whether its conditions of existence are met. So, if the conditions 
under which it exists are conventional, so too is the matter of whether it exists. The 
parallel argument here would be that if an object lacks any conditions of existence, there 
can be nothing that makes it the case that the object exists.  
Luckily for LMC, the parallel argument can be rejected. The argument from chapter 3 
assumed that there were EIP conditions had by objects, and examined what follows from 
treating those conditions as conventional. As such, the argument from section 3.2 can be 
stated using conditionals: If there are modal properties, then there are EIP conditions; and 
if there are EIP conditions, then existence depends on them. Here, I am arguing that LMC 
should reject the antecedents of both conditionals: there are no modal properties, and no 
EIP conditions. As such, it is also open to LMC to deny the consequent: that existence 
depends on EIP conditions. By rejecting the assumption that there are EIP conditions had 
by objects, we reject the claim that whether something exists depends on whether any EIP 
conditions are met. This is compatible with claiming however, that if there were EIP 
conditions, they would play a role in determining what exists.  
An analogy can to help show why this is consistent. In a simple monarchical system, 
whether or not an action is legal depends on whether the absolute sovereign allows it. As 
such, if you think the matter of whether something is allowed by the absolute sovereign is 
conventional, you will also be committed to holding that whether some action is legal is 
conventional. In particular, you are committed to the conditional, ‘If there is an absolute 
sovereign, and if what the absolute sovereign allows is conventional, what is legal is 
conventional.’ What should you then say about a society in which there is no absolute 
sovereign? You do not have to reject your conditional; it is still the case that if there was 
an absolute sovereign, her will would determine the laws. However, your maintaining 
commitment to the conditional does not mean you must deny that there can be any facts 
about the laws of a state without an absolute sovereign. After all, the dependence of the 
law on the sovereign’s will is conditional on there being a sovereign. In the absence of a 
sovereign, some other factor may be what determines the laws.  
Similarly, LMC can hold that in the absence of EIP conditions, there are other factors that 
determine which objects exist. Given that objects are simply parts of the physical world 
on this view, a natural suggestion is that facts about which objects exist are determined by 
facts about which arrangements of qualitative properties in space-time there are. This is 
compatible with thinking that if there were conditions of existence, facts about 
distributions of properties would not be sufficient for determining what exists. Consider a 
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yellow flower. Those who believe in EIP conditions can ask, ‘What are the conditions 
under which the flower would exist, such that those conditions are met? What would the 
world be like if it didn’t contain the flower? What would it take to destroy the flower?’ 
According to LMC, however, the flower’s properties alone are not sufficient to answer 
those questions. We can ask these questions in English, but their answers will be 
determined by the rules of use governing the English term ‘flower’. When it comes to the 
flower itself, it simply is. Nonetheless, there are other questions one might ask about the 
flower. ‘How did the flower come into existence?’ for example, can be answered by a 
description of the germination of a seed, its exposure to light and water, and so on. On the 
other hand, if it is demanded that the explanation for the existence of the flower is to be in 
modal terms, LMC can deny that the demand is fair.  
 
6.3 Propositions without modal truth conditions 
In chapter 5, I argued that LMC is committed to conventionalism about truth if it allows 
for the existence of propositions with modal truth conditions. The task here is to explain 
how propositions, as the contents of sentences, can be made to form part of a ‘Humean 
mosaic’. Unlike with a-modal objects, LMC cannot take advantage of the work of Lewis 
in this case, as Lewis provides propositions with modal truth conditions given in terms of 
concrete possible worlds. Any account that treats propositions as constructed out of 
possible worlds, or assigns them truth conditions relative to worlds, will be unavailable to 
LMC.  
The way to avoid assigning modal truth conditions to propositions is to treat them as 
structures composed of elements of the a-modal world. Somewhat surprisingly, such an 
account can be found in the work of two well-known opponents of the approach to 
modality and meaning taken by LMC. Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon both argue for 
an account of propositions as complex structures composed of objects, properties and 
relations.
267
 Soames calls these structured propositions ‘Russellian’ after Russell’s 1903 
account in which he treats objects as forming literal parts of propositions.
268
 Soames and 
Salmon’s view is that the meaning of a sentence (a proposition) is a composed of the 
meanings of the parts of the sentence, and has a structure that mirrors the sentence’s 
syntax. Both theorists endorse the ‘direct reference’ theory according to which the 
                                                     
267 Scott Soames, ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content,’ Philosophical Topics 
Vol. 15, No. 1 (1987): pp.47-87, Scott Soames, What is Meaning? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010), Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986). For a helpful overview, see 
Jeffrey C. King, ‘Structured Propositions,’ In Edward N. Zalta Ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2017 edition). 
268 Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics 2nd ed., (London: Routledge, 2010) pp.43-49. 
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meaning of a name is simply the object it picks out. As such, it is the object itself that 
forms part of a proposition expressed by a sentence using the name. Properties and 
relations, as the meanings of predicates, also form part of propositions.  
Soames provides a detailed account of the propositions expressed by sentences including 
sentences using a range of meaningful expressions and instantiating a range of syntactical 
structures.
269
 Which proposition is expressed by a sentence is determined relative to a 
context and an assignment of variables, on Soames’s view. His account covers sentences 
involving quantification, conjunction, negation, belief reports and more. For example, the 
sentence ‘Cormac is a person’ expresses the proposition <<o>, P>, where P is the 
property of being a person, and o is the object referred to by ‘Cormac’. The sentence 
‘Cormac believes that he is hungry’ expresses the proposition <<o, prop S>, B> where B 
is the belief relation, o is the object referred to by ‘Cormac’ and prop S is the proposition 
expressed by ‘that he is hungry’.   
Treating propositions as structures composed of objects, properties and relations has a 
number of advantages and disadvantages, some of which are particularly relevant in the 
context of LMC. A well-known advantage of the view is that it treats propositions as 
more fine-grained than propositions represented as sets of possible worlds; it can 
distinguish ‘All triangles are triangular’ from ‘All triangles are trilateral’ for example.270 
The proposition expressed by the first sentence will have the property being triangular as 
a constituent, while the proposition expressed by the second sentence will have the 
property being trilateral as a constituent. On the other hand, a purported disadvantage of 
the view is that it treats the proposition expressed by ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ as 
identical to the proposition expressed by ‘Hesperus is Hesperus,’ since the object that is 
the meaning of ‘Hesperus’ is the same as the object that is the meaning of ‘Phosphorus’. 
For LMC, this consequence is not so bad, since unlike Soames and Salmon, LMC does 
not deny that names have non-extensional meanings. According to LMC, names pick out 
objects in the real world, but they are also governed by linguistic rules that confer them 
with a kind of conventional meaning. Insofar as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are 
governed by different rules, they have different conventional meanings. As we’ll see in 
chapter 7, the rules governing terms can also be used to assign conventional meanings to 
sentences; this results in intensions for sentences that can be thought of as a conventional 
proposition. As such, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ both express 
the same worldly proposition, but express distinct conventional propositions.  
                                                     
269 Soames, ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content’ pp.72-73. 
270 Note that this advantage also requires a sufficiently fine-grained theory of properties such that 
triangularity and trilaterality are distinguished.  
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 Another purported disadvantage of the Soames / Salmon view is that the structured 
entities that constitute propositions do not seem to be the sorts of things that possess 
conditions of truth or falsehood.
271
 After all, <<o>, P> is an ordered pair composed of a 
singleton set containing an object, and a property. However, we normally do not treat sets 
as having truth conditions. Of course, this purported disadvantage is an advantage for 
LMC, because it explicitly wishes to avoid assigning modal truth conditions to 
propositions. However, if structured propositions do not have modal truth conditions, we 
owe an explanation of how they can be true or false. A simple way to achieve truth or 
falsehood for structured propositions is to say that true propositions are the ones for 
which the objects that form part of the propositions instantiate the properties and stand in 
the relations attributed to them by the propositions. Presumably, there are as many 
structured propositions in the world as there are ways to construct them using worldly 
entities. So, for example, both of the following count as propositions according to the 
view at hand, where e is the Eiffel Tower, l is London, p is Paris, and S is the relation of 
being situated in: 
<<e, l>, S> <<e, p>, S> 
The first proposition represents the Eiffel Tower as being situated in London, and is false. 
The second proposition represents the Eiffel Tower as being situated in Paris, and is true. 
Using this method, the true propositions can be separated from the false ones without 
requiring that any proposition is inconsistent with any other, or that any proposition is 
necessary, and so on.  
One objection to the treatment of objects as a-modal claimed that objects so construed did 
not qualify as objects. A similar line of objection could be run against propositions 
without truth conditions. It might be argued that without conditions of truth and 
falsehood, propositions cannot be meaningful; one might argue that in order to carry 
information, propositions require truth conditions. However, structured propositions do 
carry information; they carry the information that the objects that form part of their 
structure stand in the relations that form part of their structure. The proposition is about 
objects and properties because those entities form its parts. In fact, structured propositions 
can even be thought to have truth conditions in an a-modal sense. A proposition is true if 
and only if it represents the world to be how it in fact is, and it is false otherwise. 
However, propositions are not associated with sets of possible circumstances in which 
                                                     
271 For an argument to this effect, see Michael Jubien, ‘Propositions and the Objects of Thought,’ 
Philosophical Studies Vol. 104, (2001): pp.47-62. 
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they are true, and they do not come with modal statuses. For example, where o and o
1 
are 
objects and T is the taller than relation, consider the following propositions: 
<<o, o1>, T> <<o, o>, T> 
If o1 is in fact taller than o, both propositions are false. However, according to LMC, the 
second proposition does not also have the status of being impossible. Rather, the sentence 
‘Object o is taller than itself’ is impossible, due to the linguistic rules governing ‘taller 
than’.  
As in the case of objects, the arguments from chapter 5 cannot be used to show that the 
rejection of truth conditions entails the rejection of truth. In chapter 5 I argued that if 
propositions have modal truth conditions, and if those truth conditions are conventional, 
whether a proposition in fact counts as true must be conventional. However, this 
argument does not commit LMC to denying that there is truth on the basis that there are 
no truth conditions. LMC can consistently maintain that truth would be conventional if 
there were conventional modal truth conditions while maintaining that the absence of any 
truth conditions is compatible with the existence of truth. All that’s required is an account 
of how propositions have the properties of truth and falsehood that does not rely on the 
existence of modal truth conditions. Such an account was given above; a proposition is 
true when its constituent objects stand in its constituent relations and instantiate its 
constituent properties.  
 
6.4 Properties and reference 
Before moving on to discuss the semantics for LMC in detail, I will address one more 
metaphysical question alongside a semantic question. Firstly, the account of objects 
provided in section 6.2 and the account of propositions provided in section 6.3 both 
require the existence of non-conventional properties. As such, some account of the nature 
of those properties must be provided. Secondly, LMC must be able to account for how it 
is that our singular terms come to refer to objects, and how our predicates come to pick 
out properties, however they are characterised. As we will see in chapter 7, the linguistic 
rules governing terms can be used to create a system or structure that represents the 
interrelations of meaning between linguistic expressions. However, in order to determine 
which parts of the language represent which parts of the world, the system must somehow 
be anchored. As Lewis argues in his paper ‘Putnam’s Paradox,’ this anchoring cannot be 
achieved simply through structural isomorphism between the system of language and the 
world. After all, structure is cheap; there are many different systems of entities (for 
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example mathematical entities) that are structurally isomorphic to any given system of 
language. As such, the meaning relation must be fixed using some other kind of 
relationship between entities in the world and language; for example, many have argued 
that meaning is fixed by causal relationships. I will argue that Frank Jackson’s work can 
be used to demonstrate how the meanings of predicates are fixed to properties, and how 
the reference of singular terms can then be fixed to objects by association with properties. 
 Michael Devitt expresses the problem for descriptivist theories as follows: 
‘Description theories of reference... are essentially incomplete. A description theory 
explains the reference of a word by appealing to the application of descriptions 
associated with the word. So the theory explains the reference of the word by appealing 
to the reference of other words. How then is the reference of those other words to be 
explained? Perhaps we can use description theories to explain their reference too. This 
process cannot, however, go on forever: There must be some words whose referential 
properties are not parasitic on those of others. Otherwise, language as a whole is cut 
loose from the world. Description theories pass the referential buck. But the buck must 
stop somewhere.’272 
Devitt’s thought is that if singular terms have their reference fixed using definite 
descriptions, definite descriptions must have their reference fixed via some other means. 
Otherwise, the connection to the world is never made. Specifically, Devitt argues, ‘If we 
are to be naturalistic, it seems that the external relation that we seek must be a causal 
one.’273 Devitt’s conclusion is that the description theory of reference is inadequate, and 
must be replaced by a causal theory.  
In order for our language to come to be about the world, then, it cannot be that the 
meanings of terms are given simply by the relations in which they stand to other terms. It 
must also be that terms come to be related with non-linguistic parts of reality. Jackson 
refers to Devitt’s objection as the ‘passing the buck’ objection and argues that it is 
misguided.
274
 According to the description theory he endorses, the reference of singular 
terms is not secured via association with descriptions conceived as other bits of language. 
Rather, reference is secured via association of singular terms with worldly properties. 
Jackson endorses a picture of language in the world according to which such associations 
are taken for granted. He says: 
                                                     
272 Micheal Devitt, Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) p.159. 
273 Ibid, p.160. 
274 Frank Jackson, ‘Reference and Description Revisited,’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol.12 (1998): pp.203-
204. 
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‘If we are to use physical structures to give information on how we take things to be, we 
need associations in the minds of transmitters and receivers of the putative information 
between the various structures and the various ways things might be. We use flags to 
give information about deaths of the famous, roadworks, the nationalities of visiting 
dignitaries, and so on. The system depends on known associations. Flying a flag at half-
mast flag would not be much use for telling about the death of someone famous if the 
association between flying the flag at half-mast and death were a dark secret. In the same 
way, if we are to use the physical structures known as words to tell about how we take 
things to be, we must associate various words with various ways things might be; or, as 
we will put it, we must associate words with properties.’275 
Jackson takes it to be evident that terms in English are associated with worldly properties. 
He then argues that reference to objects can be fixed by associating terms with properties 
had by objects. Ultimately, Devitt also endorses a picture according to which we come to 
associate terms with properties by having experiences of those properties in the world. He 
argues that finding out about properties requires empirical investigation. Then, we 
associate predicates like ‘F’ with these empirically discovered properties.276 If Jackson is 
right, our associating terms with worldly properties allows us to fix reference of singular 
terms to objects that instantiate the right properties. LMC can make use of this argument 
to maintain that associating predicates with properties provides the ‘anchor’ to the world 
that is required to secure reference.  
Two questions remain to be answered: What are properties such that we can come to pick 
them out via our interactions in the world; and how does this view cohere with the 
position that terms are governed by rules of application and coapplication? The answer to 
the first question cannot be that properties are sets of objects existing in possible worlds. 
Perhaps this answer, impermissible for LMC, is suggested by Jackson’s use of the phrase 
‘ways things might be’ to represent the nature of properties in the quotation above. 
However, properties need not be modally characterised. For example, a theory that treats 
properties as universals in Armstrong’s sense would be amenable to LMC.277 What’s 
required by LMC is simply that properties are real (non-conventional) features of the 
world, that we come to know about through the use of our senses, and with which we can 
come to associate terms. Universals play this role; their principal feature is that they are 
what is shared by objects similar in some respect, and what explains that similarity. Two 
red objects are similar, for example, because they share the universal redness. As for the 
                                                     
275 Ibid, p.202. 
276 Devitt, Coming to Our Senses, pp.72-82. 
277 See David Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism Vols. I and II, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). See also David Lewis, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals,’ Australasian Journal 
of Philosophy Vol. 61, No. 4 (1983): pp.343-377. Note that LMC may require a more theory that treats 
universals as more abundant than those countenanced by Armstrong.  
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second question: accepting that properties come to be associated with terms in a language 
via causal connections need not threaten LMC’s position that terms are also associated 
with linguistic rules that connect their use to the use of other terms. The properties 
redness and greenness for example, are both worldly entities, and are not conventional in 
nature. However, there are no worldly facts about whether such properties are 
inconsistent or consistent. Rather, once the reference of the predicates ‘redness’ and 
‘greenness’ has been attached to these entities, it is up to the linguistic rules governing 
those terms to determine whether or not they are consistent, and therefore which modal 
sentences about them are true and which are false. The truth conditions of such modal 
sentences, given in terms of linguistic rules, are to be discussed next in chapter 7. 
 
6.5 From worldly meaning to conventional meaning  
This chapter has provided an account of the metaphysical picture that should be endorsed 
by the proponent of LMC who wishes to avoid commitment to conventionalism about 
objects and conventionalism about truth. Objects ought to be treated as bits of the 
‘Humean mosaic’; they are extended in time and space, and instantiate non-modal 
properties, but they do not instantiate any modal properties. Propositions ought to be 
treated as structured complexes composed of objects, properties and relations. Some of 
them count as true, and others count as false. However, none of them have modal 
conditions of truth or falsehood.  
I have also argued that LMC can treat properties as worldly entities that we come to know 
about and associate terms with via our causal interactions with them. As agents moving 
around and experiencing within the physical world, we stand in acquaintance relations 
with various properties and the objects that instantiate them. As we become acquainted 
with these entities, we can fix the meanings of terms in our language such that those 
terms pick them out. Given that our terms pick out real, worldly objects and properties, 
our talk succeeds in communicating about those entities, and their arrangements make 
some of our sentences true. In particular, arrangements of objects and properties are what 
make our non-modal sentences true. The task that remains for LMC is to provide an 
account of the truth of modal sentences. I pursue this task in chapter 7, arguing that the 
linguistic rules governing terms can be used to construct a set of possible worlds, and that 
modal sentences can be assigned truth conditions in terms of those worlds. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World: Semantics 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the way for linguistic modal conventionalism to 
maintain realism about objects and non-modal truth is to give up on the view that objects 
have modal properties and propositions have modal statuses. However, giving up on 
modal propositions and properties means providing an alternative account of the truth of 
de re and de dicto modal sentences. Specifically, LMC must provide truth conditions for 
modal sentences such that their truth or falsehood is determined by the linguistic rules 
governing terms. A natural way to achieve this is to construct a set of worlds determined 
to be possible by the linguistic rules.
278
 Using that apparatus, LMC can provide truth 
conditions for de dicto and de re modal sentences in terms of truth at worlds. This chapter 
provides a sketch of how this might be achieved. Section 7.1 describes how worlds ought 
to be built. Section 7.2 provides a brief overview of the approach taken to de dicto modal 
sentences, and section 7.3 provides an in depth discussion of how LMC should treat the 
semantics of de re modal sentences, including an account of cases of de re inconstancy. 
Section 7.4 provides a basic model of the semantics for de re modal truth I suggest on 
behalf of LMC in 7.3. Then, section 7.5 considers how LMC can account for cases of 
necessary synthetic truth and contingent analytic truth by making use of tools from two-
dimensional semantics. Next, section 7.6 presents a revised model. Finally, section 7.7 
argues that the position described in this chapter avoids the objections to LMC set out in 
chapters 3-5.  
 
7.1 Building conventional possible worlds 
One way for LMC to treat possible worlds would be as maximal sets of consistent 
sentences. Theories that characterise possible worlds this way are species of what Lewis 
calls ‘linguistic ersatzism’.279 Carnap’s treatment of ‘state descriptions’ as maximal sets 
of atomic sentences is an example of such a view. The variety of linguistic ersatzism I 
will construct is slightly different; it treats possible worlds as ‘Ramsey sentences’ in the 
sense described by Lewis.
 280
 A possible world so defined is an existentially quantified 
                                                     
278 Note that there may well be other ways to respond to the challenge set out in chapters 3-5 that are different 
from the one developed here. As we will see, one benefit of using the apparatus of possible worlds is that 
doing so makes providing truth conditions for sentences easier; a good example of this is the case of iterated 
modality discussed in section 7.2. 
279 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, chapter 3.2.  
280 Lewis’s account of Ramsey sentences and Carnap sentences can be found in ‘How to Define Theoretical 
Terms,’ Philosophical Papers I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp.78-82. 
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sentence using expressions from a fragment of English to be specified shortly. The 
Ramsey sentence that constitutes a world, in conjunction with the linguistic rules 
governing terms, will determine for every sentence in English whether that sentence is 
true or false according to the world in question. In effect, this means the linguistic rules 
can be used to construct a ‘Carnap sentence’ that connects the Ramsey sentence to each 
English sentence or its negation. Briefly, here is an example of how this view is intended 
to work. If a possible world w is constituted by the Ramsey sentence ‘xy(Fx & Gy),’ it 
might be combined with the Carnap sentence ‘xy(Fx & Gy)  (x(x = a) & Fa & y(y 
= b) & Gb)’ to produce ‘x(x = a)’ and ‘Fa’ and ‘y(y = b)’ and ‘Gb’ as truths at w.281  
Two points about this strategy must be emphasised. Firstly, a sentence constituting a 
possible world should ideally be expressed using English, as should the sentences that 
count as true at worlds. This is because according to LMC the modal truths must be 
determined by the rules governing the natural language of which they form a part; for us, 
that will be English.
282
 After all, the primary epistemological advantage of LMC is that it 
explains modal knowledge in terms of competence with the conventional rules governing 
the language we speak. This can only be achieved if modal truth depends on rules 
governing natural language, rather than some idealised or artificial language. In what 
follows (especially in 7.4 and 7.6), I make use of a somewhat formalised language that I 
take to be an approximation of a fragment of English, in order to allow for ease of 
expression and precision. However, the truth conditions assigned to sentences should be 
thought of as close to the ones we would assign similar sentences in English. Of course, 
English is a very complex language, and I will not be able to provide truth conditions for 
every English sentence type here. Instead, I focus on the parts of English that have tended 
to cause trouble for LMC, and that have been discussed in earlier chapters: de re modal 
sentences, synthetic necessary sentences and contingent analytic sentences.  
The second point is that it is essential that possibilities must be ‘maximal’ in that for 
every sentence in the language, either it or its negation will be true at each possibility.
283
 
                                                     
281 Note that this account will be revised slightly below. I argue that there is more than one equally good way 
to assign extensions to names at a given world. As such, the rules will often associate more than one 
‘maximal way things might be’ with a single Ramsey sentences. Details are in section 7.5. 
282 The primary objection to using English as the world-making language is that it is not adequately 
expressive. Section 8.5 discusses this objection as it is put forward by Lewis. Section 8.4 also discusses the 
objection that according to LMC, the modal truths cannot be translated into other languages. Note that while 
the natural language used to construct worlds here is English, the project could just as well be pursued in 
other languages.  
283 There are complications that arise from this requirement, given various ways in which English is messy 
and imprecise. Examples of when a sentence does not seem straightforwardly true or false at a world include 
cases of presupposition failure, such as in ‘Jim still swims well’ (given that Jim never swam well), and cases 
of vagueness, such as in ‘Jim is bald’, if ‘bald’ is a vague predicate and Jim is a borderline case. I will not 
address these issues here, but LMC ought in principle to be able to account for such cases, even if doing so 
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An important terminological point to make is that since I am identifying possible worlds 
with Ramsey sentences expressed in a limited vocabulary, worlds will not themselves 
qualify as maximal. Instead, possible worlds determine what I will call ‘maximal 
possibilities’ in conjunction with the rules. Below, I often refer to a sentence as ‘true at a 
world’. This should be read as ‘a member of the set of sentences constituting the maximal 
possibility that is generated by a Ramsey sentence world in conjunction with the rules.’ 
The requirement of maximality helps to determine what vocabulary must be used in the 
Ramsey sentences that constitute worlds. The Ramsey sentences must be constructed 
using a sufficiently rich vocabulary such that the truth or falsehood of all sentences in 
English can be determined by them in conjunction with the linguistic rules. Due to 
complications that arise due to the necessary a posteriori, any terms that designate rigidly 
cannot be included in our Ramsey sentences. As such, the Ramsey sentences will not 
include any proper names or kind terms; section 7.5 describes how the linguistic rules 
determine which sentences involving this vocabulary are true at which worlds. The 
expressions that will be used in our Ramsey sentences will be the existential quantifier, 
variables for individuals, a restricted class of qualitative predicates, the negation sign, the 
conjunction sign, and the identity sign. The predicates that are to be left out of the 
Ramsey sentences are the ones which, as we will see in section 7.5, generate a posteriori 
necessities; an example is ‘containing water’.  
Importantly, a maximal possibility must be consistent in that it is possible for all 
sentences it treats as true to be true together. Of course consistency is a modal notion, and 
according to LMC it must be determined by the conventional linguistic rules governing 
terms. Determining a relation of consistency is the primary way that the linguistic rules 
determine which Ramsey sentences count as possible worlds and which do not; the 
linguistic rules must be able to determine whether a Ramsey sentence is internally 
consistent. Given that the linguistic rules determine consistency, any internally consistent 
Ramsey sentence is guaranteed to produce an internally consistent set of sentences that 
follow from it via the rules. (By definition, the rules won’t take from you a consistency to 
an inconsistency.)
284
 Recall that the linguistic rules governing terms determine when it is 
permissible to apply terms together. So, a rule according to which ‘bachelor’ and 
‘unmarried’ cannot be applied together will determine that ‘Something is a married 
bachelor’ is internally inconsistent, and cannot be true according to any world, or a 
member of any set of sentences constituting a maximal possibility. The same rule can 
                                                                                                                                                 
requires adopting a three-valued logic. Ultimately, according to LMC the treatment of these cases will be 
determined by the rules of English.  
284 Some cases, such as the liar paradox, might be interpreted as suggesting that the rules of English are 
inconsistent. Here, I assume on behalf of LMC that the English rules are consistent by their own standards.  
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determine that ‘If something is a bachelor, it is unmarried’ will follow from all Ramsey 
sentence worlds. Similarly, ‘A is bachelor’ and ‘A is married’ will be inconsistent with 
each other, and the truth of one at a world will entail that the other is false at that world.  
We can already see how some sentences in English will count as true or false at a world 
due to rules governing English terms. Firstly, we can abstract smaller English sentences 
from the big quantified Ramsey sentence that constitutes a world; the rules will determine 
that these small sentences must be true given that the Ramsey sentence is true. For 
example, if the Ramsey sentence says ‘There is something white and something green 
that is distinct from the white thing, and...’ the linguistic rules will guarantee that, ‘There 
is something white’ is a member of any maximal possibility associated with the world. 
They will also guarantee that ‘There is something green’ is a member of any maximal 
possibility associated with the world. Then, the rules for constructions involving terms 
like ‘or’ and ‘if... then’ will generate truths like ‘There is something white or there is 
something blue’ and ‘If there is something green, there is something green.’ Say, for 
example, that the English ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if... then’ and so on are defined as according to the 
classical truth tables. Then, the truth of sentences involving them will be determined at a 
world by the rules from the truth of the simple sentences true at a given world. Of course, 
if those connectives are defined differently from how they are defined in classical logic, 
the complex sentences true at each world will be slightly different. And if there are 
multiple senses of some connectives, then there will be distinct truths at worlds for each 
distinct use of the term. Finally, the truth values of universally quantified sentences will 
be determined by the existentially quantified ones.
285
 
 
7.2 De dicto modal truth at worlds 
Armed with a set of possible worlds as Ramsey sentences, we can start to look at how the 
rules determine truth conditions for modal sentences of various types at those worlds. As 
noted above, the linguistic rules can be used to determine smaller sentences that follow 
from each Ramsey sentence. So, for example, the rules might determine that some 
sentence ‘S’ is true at w by requiring that if the Ramsey sentence that constitutes w is 
true, ‘S’ is true. For now, the sentences that are true at worlds will only include 
vocabulary from the Ramsey sentences, plus any vocabulary that is not directly included 
but whose application is fully determined given the vocabulary that is included in 
                                                     
285In order to generate universally quantified sentences from the Ramsey sentence, the Ramsey sentence will 
have to explicitly say that nothing else exists except the things mentioned. This can be achieved using 
negation and the identity sign. I.e., a Ramsey sentence can say x(x  y & x  z...) for every variable 
mentioned in the sentence.  
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combination with the rules. So, ‘Some chair is comfortable’ and ‘All tables are wooden’ 
are examples of sentences that might be true at some world given the resources we have 
so far.  
Armed with a set of sentences true at each world, de dicto modal truths expressed using 
this limited vocabulary can be determined at worlds relatively straightforwardly. Which 
system of modal logic is used will depend on the rules governing the modal terms in our 
language. For simplicity, assume that the system governing English metaphysical modal 
adverbs is S5. Then, ‘Necessarily S’ will be true at a world if and only if ‘S’ is true at all 
worlds. ‘Possibly, S’ will be true at a world if and only if ‘S’ is true at some world. 
‘Possibly, necessarily S’ will be true at a world if and only if ‘Necessarily S’ is true, and 
so on. If it turns out that the best interpretation of English requires the accessibility 
relation between worlds to be restricted, which modal sentences are true at which worlds 
will be determined accordingly. Note that treating modal truths as determined by truths at 
conventionally articulated possible worlds makes the issue of dealing with iterated 
modality much easier as compared to the traditional treatment of necessity as equivalent 
to analyticity. On this view, the truth of ‘Necessarily, necessarily S’ does not require that 
‘Necessarily, S’ is analytic. 286 Instead, the rules governing the modal adverbs directly 
determine whether, for example, ‘necessarily, necessarily’ ought to be applied where 
‘necessarily’ is applied. This general approach to de dicto modality will be expanded 
once a posteriori necessity has been dealt with in sections 7.5 and 7.6. 
 
7.3 De re modal truths at worlds 
Accounting for de re modal truths is not so straightforward. Doing so will require an 
account of possible individuals existing at a worlds (7.3.1), and the counterpart relations 
that exist between them (7.3.2). Armed with that apparatus, I will outline a strategy for 
assigning truth conditions to quantified de re modal sentences, including those involving 
restricted quantification and definite descriptions (7.3.3 – 7.3.8). In 7.4, I construct a 
model for quantified modal sentences based on the strategy I discuss below.  
7.3.1 Laying the groundwork for de re modal truth: possible individuals  
Most accounts of de re modality provided in terms of possible worlds assume the 
existence of possible individuals at those worlds, and define de re modal truth in terms of 
                                                     
286 Gillian Russell notes that this is one implausible consequence of treating necessity as equivalent to 
analyticity. The present account avoids that consequence. (See Russell, ‘Necessity and Meaning’ pp.786-
787.) 
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the properties had by those individuals. Quantified modal logics normally introduce a 
domain, and the constants and variables in the relevant language are assigned a member 
of that domain as their denotation under an interpretation and variable assignment. Then 
the truth values of formulas such as ‘x(□Gx)’ or ‘x(Fx)’  are determined by whether 
the denotation of the variables and constants are part of the interpretations of the 
predicates at worlds.  
In order to assign truth conditions to de re modal sentences then, it is helpful for us to 
construct possible individuals existing at worlds. We can do this using the existentially 
quantified sentences that count as true according to our possible worlds. The Ramsey 
sentence that constitutes a possible world effectively tells us how many objects there are 
at a world and what they are like, and therefore provides the resources for building 
entities to act as possible individuals. Lewis offers a way to do this on behalf of the 
linguistic ersatzer.
287
 He notes that a possible individual should not be represented as a 
subset of a world, or in other words, as a subset of the sentences that make up a world set 
or are evaluated as true at a world. After all, he notes, a subset of the full sentences true at 
a world is an incomplete description of a world, not a complete description of an 
individual. Lewis’s suggestion is that a possible individual can be represented as a 
maximal consistent set of open sentences with a free variable, or equivalently, a maximal 
consistent set of predicates. For us, the rules will determine which sets of predicates are 
consistent. In fact, for every maximal set of predicates that the rules determine to be 
consistent, there will be a sentence true at some world that asserts that such an individual 
exists. So, if {F, G, H} are one such set, there’ll be some world where x(Fx & Gx & Hx 
& Ix & Jx...) will be true. An individual exists at a world if and only if there is an 
existentially quantified sentence true at that world according to which there is something 
that instantiates all the predicates in the individual’s set.  
Here, we have a choice. We can include every predicate that is true of an individual in the 
individual’s set, or only the ones that use the limited vocabulary that makes up our 
Ramsey sentence. I will opt for the latter as it makes dealing with de re inconstancy and a 
posteriori necessity easier later on. Remember that the vocabulary in the Ramsey 
sentences is intended to be sufficiently rich such that all English sentences can be 
assigned truth values at worlds on the basis of the linguistic rules. Similarly, the possible 
individuals constructed using the Ramsey sentence vocabulary will be such that the rules 
determine whether any other predicate is consistent or inconsistent with those included in 
the individual’s set. So, for example, if the sentence ‘x(Fx & Gx)’ is true at a world, ‘F’ 
                                                     
287 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds pp.148-150. 
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and ‘G’ will be members of the set of predicates that constitutes an individual at that 
world. However, if the rules require that ‘H’ is applied wherever ‘G’ is applied but ‘H’ is 
not directly mentioned in the Ramsey sentence, ‘H’ will not be included in the 
individual’s set. On the other hand, it will remain the case that at the world in question, it 
is true that there is something that is F, G and H. An important consequence of adopting 
this approach, as we will see later (7.3.3), is that modal predicates do not form part of an 
individual’s predicate set.  
As with worlds, the set constituting an individual will not itself be maximal, but the set of 
predicates true of an individual will be maximal. Note that since the set of predicates true 
of an individual is maximal, no two worlds will contain the same possible individual. To 
exist at a world where ‘S’ is true, for example, will be part of what defines an individual 
existing at that world. As Lewis puts it, ‘by the time we are done describing an individual 
completely, we have en passant described the world wherein it is situated.’288 Above, I 
noted that an individual exists at a world if and only if there is an existentially quantified 
sentence true at that world according to which there is something that instantiates all the 
predicates in the individual’s set. Lewis’s point is that for an individual to be maximal it 
will need to contain complex predicates such as ‘coexists with something F,’ ‘is such that 
S is true’, and so on. An individual of this sort will be such that only a single world 
contains the existentially quantified sentence according to which there is something with 
all the predicates in the individual’s set.  
It is important to note that individuals defined as maximal consistent sets of predicates do 
not replace objects in our theory. As argued in chapter three, LMC ought to endorse 
object realism. But, the maximal consistent sets of predicates that constitute ‘possible 
individuals’ are pieces of language, not the flesh and blood objects that vindicate object 
realism. Such flesh and blood objects should still constitute the referents of our names 
and definite descriptions as they are used by us in speech and writing, as part of the 
happenings of the physical universe we inhabit. Sometimes, a flesh and blood object will 
instantiate all the non-modal properties picked out by the predicates in a set that 
constitutes an ‘individual’. In these cases, we can say that the individual is actualised. 
Indeed, all the possible individuals that exist according to the actual maximal possibility 
will correspond to flesh and blood objects. This chapter includes much talk about entities 
such as people, statues and lumps. Unless otherwise specified, it should be assumed that 
the entities in questions are possible individuals as defined above, rather than flesh and 
blood objects. 
                                                     
288 Ibid, p.149. 
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7.3.2 Laying the groundwork for de re modal truth: counterpart relations and dominant 
sortals 
Using the notion of a possible individual, we can start to think about what it takes for de 
re modal sentences to be true at worlds. Ultimately, the truth of sentences involving 
modal predicates must be determined by the linguistic rules governing terms. Broadly, 
my strategy will be to argue that the modal predicates that apply to some individual are 
determined by the rules governing the predicates that make up the individual’s set. So for 
example, if a predicate in some individual’s set is ‘person’, and the rules governing 
‘person’ say that the term must only be applied where ‘worthy of moral concern’ is 
applied, the predicate ‘necessarily worthy of moral concern’ will apply to the individual. 
Of course, we must say which predicate in an individual’s set is the one that determines 
which modal predicates true are true of it. Plausibly, the rules for English determine that 
some predicates are the ones with which we tend to associate conditions of existence, 
identity and persistence while others are not. For example, we do not judge that 
someone’s status as a bachelor is what determines what they could survive. After all, we 
do not treat bachelors as ceasing to exist after they are married. Normally, we judge it to 
be a bachelor’s personhood that determines what he can survive and what he cannot 
survive. I will use the term ‘dominant sortal’ to pick out those predicates with which we 
associate EIP conditions, and which determine the modal predicates that apply to a given 
possible individual.
289
 Usually, there is just one dominant sortal belonging to any 
individual’s set. A person might by a philosopher, a sister, tall, friendly, and so on, but 
none of the latter predicates determine her modal properties. In some cases, English does 
allow for more than one dominant sortal to apply to a given individual. These are the 
cases that generate de re inconstancy, as we will see shortly.  
Which de re modal predicates apply to an individual, then, is determined by its dominant 
sortal(s). In effect, we want the rules governing dominant sortals to define a counterpart 
relation among individuals at worlds. Then, we can say that an individual is possibly F if 
one of its counterparts is F. While a similar strategy might define a cross-world identity 
relation among individuals rather than a counterpart relation, I use a counterpart relation 
for two reasons. Firstly, it’s plausible that the rules might provide a given individual with 
more than one counterpart in a single world. Secondly, using counterpart relations rather 
than cross-world identity helps deal with cases of de re inconstancy. Both such cases are 
also discussed below. 
                                                     
289 This terminology comes from Michael Burke, ‘Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel 
Account of the Relations among Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions,’ Philosophy and 
Phenomenal Research, Vol. 54. (1994): pp.591-624. Note however that Burke argues that there is only one 
dominant kind per object, and his account of which kind is dominant is not conventionalist.  
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So, how can dominant sortals define counterpart relations for individuals at worlds? A 
natural first pass is to say that an individual u qualifies as a counterpart of a second 
individual v so long as v falls under a dominant sortal ‘G’, such that it is permissible 
according to the rules to apply all the predicates in the set corresponding to u alongside 
‘G’. Intuitively, this captures the thought that u is a counterpart of v when v’s dominant 
sortal determines the predicates in u to be a way for v to be. This first pass treats every 
member of a dominant sortal as a counterpart of every other member of the dominant 
sortal; every person will be a counterpart of every other person, for example. That means 
denying that people have their origins essentially, or that they have any other features 
essentially that are not had by all people essentially. I think this position is at least 
plausible; after all, it seems possible that I could have been just like you in all qualitative 
respects and you could have been just like me in all qualitative respects. However, section 
7.5 below discusses how the LMC could adopt a position like the essentiality of origin if 
she wished, and how counterpart relations in general can be restricted. I’ll maintain the 
assumption that all members of a dominant sortal are counterparts of all other members 
for the rest of section 7.3. Taking this approach is one of the reasons why we had to 
analyse de re modal truth in terms of counterpart relations, rather than cross-world 
identity relations: very often, an individual will have more than one counterpart within a 
single world. 
7.3.3 How not to assign truth conditions to de re modal sentences 
Armed with a relation of counterparts between individuals, we can start to think about 
how to spell out the truth conditions for de re modal claims. When doing so, there are two 
important desiderata that must be met. Firstly, the account must live up to the standards 
set for it in chapters 3 – 6. In chapters 3 and 4, I argued that views according to which we 
endow objects with modal properties lead to object conventionalism. And in chapter 6, I 
argued that the way for LMC to avoid that uncomfortable consequence was to deny that 
(flesh and blood) objects have modal properties. Secondly, the position must be able to 
account for cases of de re inconstancy, like the statue / lump case. In chapter 3 I argued 
that treating the statue and the lump as distinct due to modal differences was untenable if 
LMC wishes to avoid object conventionalism. As a result, the strategy pursed here must 
treat statues and lumps as identical. These desiderata mean the position must be spelled 
out such that a) it is not committed to the view that objects come to have conventional 
modal properties and b) it can account for cases of de re inconstancy without falling into 
contradiction. The first step toward achieving this second goal is already taken by treating 
individuals as standing in counterpart relations to individuals at other worlds rather than 
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cross-world identity relations, since it is open to LMC to treat these counterpart relations 
as sortal-relative, but harder to treat identity as sortal-relative.
290
  
Both desiderata would create issues if we had included modal predicates such as ‘F’ or 
‘□G’ as members of the sets of predicates that constitute individuals. Say, for example, 
that the set of predicates constituting an individual at a world includes {statue, lump, 
beautiful, admired, valuable...}. We could argue that when something has a counterpart 
that is F, ‘F’ goes into the set that constitutes the individual. However, this leads to 
problems on two fronts. First of all, given that one of this individual’s lump counterparts 
is squashed into a ball of clay, the individual will end up satisfying the predicate ‘possibly 
squashed into a ball of clay’ simpliciter, even though none of its statue counterparts are 
squashed. Secondly, it is difficult to avoid the commitment that we endow objects with 
modal properties if we include modal predicates in the sets that constitute individuals, 
given that which modal predicates go in the sets must be determined by conventional 
linguistic rules.
291
 As noted above, whether or not some possible individual corresponds 
to a flesh and blood object is determined by whether some flesh and blood object satisfies 
all the predicates in the set that constitutes the individual. If modal predicates are included 
in those sets, either none of them will correspond to flesh and blood objects, or flesh and 
blood objects must come to instantiate modal properties by convention. 
Sidelle’s strategy for avoiding the problem of inconsistent modal predicates applying to a 
single individual was to deny that two dominant sortals governed by different rules can 
ever form part of the same individual’s set, given that they induce different counterpart 
relations.
292
 (At least, that is Sidelle’s solution translated into the language used here; his 
way of putting things is very different.) This strategy would allow us to put modal 
predicates in the sets for individuals, but leads to object conventionalism so long as flesh 
and blood objects correspond one-to-one to possible individuals, as per Sidelle’s 
argument discussed in chapter 3. Briefly, here is why. In order to avoid object 
conventionalism, the physical world must determine how many objects there are. In 
chapter 6, I suggested that LMC should treat objects as portions of space-time 
instantiating non-modal properties. As such, the world will determine whether any 
portion of the world instantiates both of the non-modal properties statuehood and 
lumphood. It seems that these properties in fact are both instantiated by a single portion 
                                                     
290 Note that treating counterpart relations as sortal-relative does not fall prey to the objections raised for the 
Abelardian approach in chapter 3 because real world, flesh and blood objects are not treated as satisfying 
modal predicates at all on the view defended here. As a result, they do not end up with sortal-relative EIP 
conditions. 
291 In section 7.7, I consider that objection that even allowing modal predicates to be true of actualised 
possible individuals endows flesh and blood objects with conventional modal properties.  
292 See Sidelle, ‘Modality and Objects’, and also chapter 3 of this thesis for discussion.  
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of the world. But, the Sidellian strategy requires that all lumps are distinct from statues. 
That means that, once again, unless non-identical possible individuals can correspond to a 
single flesh and blood object, conventional practices determining that individuals are 
distinct must also determine that flesh and blood objects are distinct. A second way to 
avoid the problem of contradictory modal predicates applying to statues / lumps is to 
relativise modal predicates to dominant sortals. Then, ‘F qua statue’ can go in the same 
set as ‘F qua lump’, since the predicates do not contradict one another. However, this 
option still means that we endow objects with modal properties, insofar as a flesh-and-
blood object must satisfy all the predicates in an individual’s set in order for it to 
correspond to an individual. As argued in chapter 3, endowing objects with modal 
properties (even sortal-relative ones) means endowing them with conditions of existence, 
identity and persistence, which once again leads to object conventionalism.  
7.3.4 Relativising reference 
The strategy I will pursue here does not include modal predicates in the sets of predicates 
that constitute individuals. As noted above, the only predicates included in an individual’s 
set are those that are included in the Ramsey sentence constituting the world at which the 
individual exists. Nonetheless, I will assign truth conditions to quantified de re modal 
sentences such as ‘x(Fx)’ so that they sometimes come out true, and their truth is 
determined by the rules governing dominant sortals. The strategy will account for de re 
modal inconstancy by treating reference as relative to a counterpart relation or dominant 
sortal. Rather than treating predicates like ‘possibly squashed’ as implicitly meaning  
‘possibly squashed as a lump’ or ‘possibly squashed as a statue’, I treat referring terms as 
associated with a denotation (here a possible individual, rather than a flesh and blood 
object), only under a dominant sortal. Once again, we are still setting aside sentences 
involving names for now; we will simply look at quantified sentences involving variables, 
modal operators and qualitative predicates, such as ‘Something is possibly F’ or ‘All 
bachelors are necessarily people’.  
To see how reference can be ‘sortal relativised’ in a way that meets our desiderata, we 
need to start with a picture of how truth values are usually assigned for ordinary sentences 
involving quantification. (This picture will be altered shortly to allow for sortal 
relativity.) Usually, we check whether ‘Something is F’ is true by checking whether there 
is something in our domain which is part of the interpretation for the predicate ‘F’. For 
us, the domain is our set of individuals, which is to say a set of sets of predicates. The 
interpretation of a predicate will be a subset of the domain. In particular, the 
interpretation of ‘F’ will be those individuals that include ‘F’ as one of their members. 
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Slightly more technically, we should say that a ‘variable assignment’ assigns each of our 
variables ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ and so on a denotation that is a member of the domain. Then, we 
check the truth of ‘x(Fx)’ by checking whether for, some member of the domain u, when 
the variable assignment is altered just so that ‘x’ is assigned u as its denotation, ‘Fx’ is 
true.
293
 We check the truth of x(Fx) by checking whether for every member of the 
domain, when the denotation of ‘x’ is fixed to that member, ‘Fx’ is true. What about 
quantified sentences with modal predicates? ‘x(Fx)’ is normally taken to be true when 
there is some member of the domain u such that when the variable ‘x’ is assigned u as its 
denotation, Fx is true. For counterpart theorists, Fx is true when x picks out u so long as 
u has a counterpart that is in the interpretation of ‘F’ at some world.   
The strategy I’ll adopt is to argue that variables are assigned denotations only relative to a 
dominant sortal. Given that dominant sortals induce counterpart relations between 
possible individuals, Fx will then depend for its truth on the counterpart relation induced 
by the dominant sortal via which ‘x’ refers. One way to achieve this result is to treat the 
values assigned to variables as pairs consisting of an individual and a dominant sortal that 
is a member of the individual’s set. Say that ‘F’ and ‘G’ are both dominant sortals, and u 
is an individual that includes F and G as members. The variable ‘x’ might be assigned <u, 
F> by a variable assignment, while the variable ‘y’ is assigned <u, G>. Predicates will 
still be assigned members of the domain (individuals) simpliciter by an interpretation 
function. We’re only interested in one such interpretation of our predicates: the one that 
treats an individual as part of the interpretation of a predicate if and only if the individual 
includes that predicate as a member.  
7.3.5 Truth conditions for de re modal sentences 
Now, we can start to assign truth conditions for various de re modal sentences. First of 
all, when will ‘x(Fx)’ be true? The truth of this sentence will require that there is some 
member of the domain u paired with some dominant sortal G such that when ‘x’ picks out 
<u, G>, ‘Fx’ is true. This latter condition will be met when the dominant sortal from the 
pair (G) induces a counterpart relation such that one of the counterparts of the individual 
from the pair (u) is F. For example, ‘Something is possibly a carpenter’ will be true if an 
individual u in the domain is a person, because the ‘person’ sortal provides any person 
with counterparts that are carpenters. That means the pair <u, person> will be a value of 
‘x’ that can make the sentence true. How about ‘x(Fx)’? This will be true when every 
                                                     
293 In what follows I often casually refer to ‘when a variable is assigned u’ or ‘when the denotation of ‘x’ is 
fixed to u’ in the context of discussing truth conditions for sentences. This should be read as holding fixed 
some variable assignment that is altered such that ‘x’ is assigned u.  
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value of ‘x’, or every individual / sortal pair, satisfies Fx. In other words, ‘Everything is 
possibly F’ will only be true if every counterpart relation for every individual includes a 
counterpart that is F.  
This strategy meets our first desideratum because it does not require us to assign modal 
properties to ‘real objects’, and those objects don’t ‘satisfy’ modal predicates in that 
modal predicates don’t make up the possible individuals which represent objects. 
However, we are not forced to give up on the truth of de re modal sentences. This 
strategy should also allow us to account for cases of de re inconstancy, and thereby to 
meet our second desideratum. If something in our domain (u) is a clay statue, then when 
‘x’ is assigned <u, lump>, ‘x is possibly squashed (‘Sx’) should be true. When ‘y’ is 
assigned <u, statue>, ‘Sy’ should be false. So far so good; however, we still need to 
show we haven’t committed ourselves to contradictions. Is it the case that x(Sx & 
Sx) is ever true? The answer is no; that would require that some value of x pairs a 
member of the domain with a dominant sortal that has in its interpretation at least one 
individual that include ‘squashed’ as a member, and no individuals that include squashed 
as a member. Of course, there is no such dominant sortal.  
Still, the sentence ‘x y(Fx & Fy & (x = y))’ can be true according to this strategy, if 
we spell out what it takes for ‘x = y’ to be true in the right way. In order for ‘x = y’ to be 
true, x and y must be assigned the same denotation, but it doesn’t matter under which 
counterpart relation. In other words, the pairs that constitute the values for the variables x 
and y under our variable assignment must pair the same member of the domain with some 
sortal, but it doesn’t matter if the sortals in each pair are different. ‘x = y’ is true even if 
the value of x is <u, G> and the value of y is <u, H>. In order for ‘xy(Fx & Fy & (x 
= y))’ to be true, it must be that there are two individual / sortal pairs <u,G> and <u, H> 
such that a) G permits the application of F, so that when x is assigned <u, G> Fx is true, 
and b) H does not permit the application of F, so that when y is assigned <u, H>, Fy is 
true. Given that the truth of ‘x = y’ pays attention only to which individual the variable 
picks out, not the sortal it’s paired with, ‘x = y’ is also true. In general this strategy has the 
result that variables picking out the same individual can be substituted while preserving 
truth in non-modal contexts no matter what sortal they are associated with. This is 
because the truth of sentences involving non-modal predicates such as ‘F’ depends only 
on the individual picked out, not the sortal it’s selected under, and the same applies to 
identity sentences. In modal contexts, however, this isn’t so; in these cases, which sortal 
an individual is selected under matters. Given that the truth conditions for de re modal 
sentences do not allow us to substitute x and y in modal contexts even when x = y is true, 
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the truth of ‘x y(Fx & Fy & (x = y))’ does not commit us to a contradiction. With 
this basic strategy in place, I will go on to discuss cases of restricted quantification and 
definite descriptions. Note however, that the model presented in section 7.4 is based 
purely on the strategy articulated above.  
7.3.6 Three strategies for restricted quantification 
As things stand, the strategy of relativising reference does not appear to get the right truth 
conditions for sentences involving restricted quantification. Take for example, ‘Some 
statue is possibly squashed’, or ‘x(Stx & Sx)’. This sentence is apparently false, but it 
comes out true given what’s been said so far. In order for the sentence to be true on the 
relativised reference strategy, there must be some value of x that is in the interpretation of 
‘statue’ that also satisfies ‘Sx’. If u is a clay statue, <u, lump> will be such a value of x. 
After all, ‘statue’ will be one of the predicates in the set that constitutes u, and non-modal 
predicates do not care about dominant sortals. So ‘Stx’ should be true when x takes the 
value <u, lump>. And, given that Sx pays attention to the sortal paired with u, which is 
‘lump’, Sx should be true also. This looks like the wrong result. Similarly, ‘All lumps 
are possibly squashed’ will be false when it should be true, because an individual / sortal 
pair <u, statue> will satisfy ‘lump’ while failing to satisfy ‘possibly squashed.’  
There are three options available for us when it comes to these cases. The first option is to 
change our truth conditions to account for them. One way to do that would be restrict the 
values of variables that can satisfy dominant sortals. We already know that the values of x 
that can satisfy ‘Sx’ are only the ones that pair an individual with a dominant sortal with 
which ‘S’ can be applied. However, we could also require that if ‘F’ is a dominant sortal, 
‘Fx’ is only satisfied by values of x that pair an individual with F itself.294 If we institute 
this requirement, ‘x(Stx & Sx)’ comes out false, because ‘Stx’ is not satisfied by <u, 
lump>, and ‘Sx’ is not satisfied by <u, statue>. The problem with this approach is that 
other sentences that we wanted to be true are now false also. For example, ‘x(Stx & Lx)’ 
will be false, because the only values of x satisfying ‘St’ are those pairing individuals 
with the ‘statue’ sortal, and the only values of x satisfying ‘L’ are those pairing 
individuals with the ‘lump’ sortal. This result is particularly strange given that the 
sentence ‘x(Stx & Lx)’ is treated as false even though a single individual includes both 
‘St’ and ‘L’ as predicates that make up its set. Of course, we could still maintain the truth 
of ‘xy(Stx & Ly & (x = y))’, because the truth of ‘x = y’ does not require the values of x 
and y to pair individuals with the same sortal. In effect, this option allows dominant 
                                                     
294 Note that on this strategy, if the rules require that ‘G’ can only be applied where some dominant sortal ‘F’ 
is applied, ‘Gx’ will only satisfied by values of ‘x’ that pair some individual with ‘F’.  
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sortals to create ‘modal contexts’ themselves in that terms picking out the same individual 
won’t be substitutable in those contexts unless they refer via the same sortal. 
The second option available is to leave our truth conditions as they are and allow 
conversational context to restrict the domain of individual / sortal pairs over which we 
quantify when we are making modal assertions. For example, in the context of discussing 
a particular piece of art, we may ignore all <u, lump> pairs. With such pairs temporarily 
removed from our domain of quantification, ‘x(Stx & Sx)’ comes out false because 
there is no <u, lump> to satisfy ‘Sx’. On the other hand, in the philosophy classroom, 
‘x(Stx & Sx)’ can rightly be considered true, since our domain of quantification is 
unrestricted. (Consider: a philosopher who favours a ‘monist’ solution to the statue / lump 
problem may well want to say, ‘There is some object, namely a lump of clay, that counts 
as a statue but could be squashed.’) This option for dealing with restricted quantification 
may be preferable to the first option because it allows context to select dominant sortals 
(and the counterpart relations they induce) for attention in vastly more complex ways than 
simply by ‘mentioning’ one over another in the sentence, as we do when we consider 
whether a statue is possibly squashed, or a lump is possibly squashed. Perhaps merely 
being in an art gallery is enough to make us ignore the <u, lump> pairs and focus on <u, 
statue> pairs when considering possibilities for certain individuals. Similarly, watching 
an artist create and mould clay might bring the <u, lump> pairs into focus.   
Finally, a third option leaves our domain of quantification fixed across conversational 
contexts, and relativises truth conditions to contexts. It allows context to decide when a 
sentence has truth conditions like those originally provided in 7.3.5, and when a sentence 
has truth conditions like those provided according to the first option described above. The 
idea would be that sometimes sentences of the form ‘There is an F that is G’ are made 
true only by <u, F> pairs that satisfy G, and other times they are made true by any <u, > 
pair that satisfies G. If LMC were to adopt this option, it would be helpful to modify its 
syntax so that similar sentences with different truth conditions can be distinguished. For 
example, when ‘Some F is G’ is such that it can only be made true by <u, F> pairs, it 
could be written ‘x:Fx(Gx)’. And, when the same sentence can be made true by any <u, 
> pair, it could be written ‘x(Fx & Gx)’. While it seems that one of the two contextual 
approaches will serve better than the first approach discussed, I will not commit make a 
hard and fast commitment on behalf of LMC to any of these three options. However, note 
that the model constructed below assumes the second option described in this section.
295
  
                                                     
295 A number of authors have provided contextualist solutions to problems involving modals. For example, 
see Angelika Kratzer, ‘What “Must” and “Can” Must and Can Mean,’ Linguistics and Philosophy Vol. 1, No. 
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7.3.7 Definite descriptions 
With truth conditions for quantified de re modal sentences in place, we can also deal with 
definite descriptions by analysing them in terms of quantification. We can do this using 
Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. (However, Russell’s account will have 
to be modified slightly, as we’ll see in a minute.) For Russell, ‘The unique F is G’ can be 
written as ‘x(Fx & y(Fy  (x = y)) & Gx)’.296 Treating definite descriptions this way 
allows us to give de re modal sentences involving them truth conditions using the 
resources we already have. Take for example the sentence, ‘The biggest thing in the 
universe in the world is necessarily massive.’ According to Russell’s strategy, this says 
‘x(BTx & y(BTy  (x = y)) & □Mx)’. For us, the truth of that sentence requires that 
there is individual / sortal pair <u, F> such that when x is assigned that pair as its value, 
BTx is true, and every individual / sortal pair that satisfies BT is such that when ‘y’ is 
assigned that pair as its value, ‘x = y’ is true, and ‘□Mx’ is true. The latter will be true so 
long as F induces a counterpart relation such that all F counterparts of u satisfy M.  
While this account will work in many cases, it doesn’t work in cases of de re inconstancy. 
If the biggest thing in the universe is a clay statue, ‘The biggest thing in the universe is 
not possibly squashed’ will be true, as will ‘The biggest thing in the universe is possibly 
squashed.’ This is because all that’s required for ‘x(BTx & Sx)’ to be true is that some 
value of x satisfying BT also satisfies S. <u, lump> will do this. Similarly, for ‘y(BTy 
& Sy)’ to be true, all that’s required is that some variable value satisfies both BT and 
S. <u, statue> will do this. And of course, this is compatible with the truth of y(BTy 
 (x = y)) because, ‘x = y’ is true when x picks out <u, lump> and y picks out <u, 
statue>. As a result, ‘x(BTx & y(BTy  (x = y)) & Sx)’ is true, as is ‘x(BTx & 
y(BTy  (x = y)) & ~Sx).’297 
Fortunately, fixing the problem is straightforward; all we need is to change our 
interpretation of definite descriptions slightly. We can analyse ‘The biggest thing in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 (1977) pp.337-335 and David Lewis, ‘Scorekeeping in a Language Game,’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 
Vol. 8, No. 1 (1979) pp.339-359 for examples of how different ‘flavours’ of modality might be thought to 
express the same concept, with truth relativised to context. Among others, Keith DeRose, ‘Epistemic 
Possibilities,’ Philosophical Review Vol. 100, No. 4 (1991) pp.581-605 and Andy Egan, John Hawthorne and 
Brian Weatherson, ‘Epistemic Modals in Context,’ in G. Preyer & G. Peter eds., Contextualism in Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005) offer a contextualist treatment of epistemic modality. These accounts may 
offer useful guides as to how LMC could relativise metaphysical modal claims to context in order to account 
for de re inconstancy and definite descriptions.  
296 See Bertrand Russell, ‘On Denoting,’ Mind Vol. 14, No. 56 (1905): pp.479-493. 
297 Note that given Russell’s interpretation of definite descriptions, combined with the account given above 
according to which the truth of ‘x=y’ does not permit the substitution of ‘x’ and ‘y’ in modal contexts, ‘The 
biggest thing in the universe is possibly squashed’ and ‘The biggest thing in the universe is not possibly 
squashed’ do not directly contradict one another. However, as is explained below, altering Russell’s account 
slightly can remove even the appearance of contradiction.  
156 
 
universe is possibly squashed’ as  ‘x(BTx & y(BTy  ((x = y) & Sy)))’ This sentence 
says that there is some variable value (say <u, lump>) such that a) it satisfies ‘the biggest 
thing in the universe, b) every variable value that satisfies BT is identical to our first 
variable value, (this can be true if <u, statue> also satisfies BT), and c) every variable 
value that satisfies BT also satisfies S. This last requirement is not met, however, 
because as we know, <u, statue> satisfies BT but not S. One consequence of this view is 
of course that now neither ‘S’ nor ‘S’ is true of ‘the biggest thing in the universe’. 
Both are ruled out by the requirement that everything satisfying ‘BT’ satisfies the modal 
predicate. As such, the sentence ‘If there is a biggest thing in the universe, either it is 
possibly squashed or it is not possibly squashed’ will come out false. However, we could 
use the contextual strategies discussed in section 7.3.6 to account for these cases. Perhaps 
in the majority of contexts, some dominant sortal is selected such that ‘S’ or ‘S’ does 
apply when ‘BT’ applies. However, there may be a perfectly good sense in which 
‘x(BTx & y(By  ((x = y) & Sy)))’ and ‘x(BTx & y(By  ((x = y) & Sy)))’ are 
both false in the context of a philosophy classroom.  Another option would be to suggest 
that when context does not supply a dominant sortal, or at least a ranking of sortals, our 
use of a definite description does not succeed in picking anything out.  
One of the three strategies discussed in 7.3.6 will also have to be used to account for 
cases in which the definite description directly mentions a dominant sortal. If we go for 
our first option, the rules mentioned kick in. Take for example ‘The most beautiful statue 
in the world is not possibly squashed.’ This sentence is analysed as ‘x(BSx & y(BSy  
((x = y) & Sy)))’ On the first strategy, this sentence would count as true because for a 
variable value to satisfy ‘BS’ it must pair an individual with ‘statue’. So, <u, statue> will 
be the only value that satisfies ‘most beautiful statue’; <u, lump> won’t count. Therefore, 
the strategy allows for the truth of ‘y(BSy  Sy). On the other hand, we could 
account for such cases by allowing the conversational context to restrict either a) which 
individual / sortal pairs are considered when determining the truth of the sentence, or b) 
which truth conditions are had by a sentence.  
7.3.8 A note on contingent identity and Leibniz’s Law 
Finally, before we move on from discussion of de re modality, we must acknowledge that 
by allowing for de re inconstancy, we are also allowing for identity sentences to be 
contingent. As yet, we have not said anything about truth conditions for modal sentences 
involving names. However, ultimately, our account will require that in most cases, names 
are associated with dominant sortals in a way that is ‘rigid’. The details to do with rigidity 
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are to be spelled out in the section 7.5; however, we can say for now that a name is 
always associated with the same dominant sortal, wherever it picks out anything at all. 
Say at world w, ‘Lumpl’ picks out <u, lump>, and ‘Goliath’ picks out <u, statue>. At w 
‘Lumpl = Goliath’ will be true. However, the counterpart relation induced by ‘lump’ 
allows ‘Lumpl’ to pick out <v, lump> at w1, where ‘statue’ is not a member of the 
predicate set associated with v. As such v cannot be paired with any sortal to count as a 
value of ‘Goliath’ at w1, so ‘Lumpl = Goliath’ must be false at w1. This means we are 
committed to the truth of ‘Lumpl = Goliath’ at w, as well as the truth of □(Lumpl = 
Goliath). Does this commit us to a contradiction? Once again, the answer should be ‘no’ 
because our truth conditions do not allow that terms pairing the same individual with 
different sortals can be substituted in modal contexts while preserving truth. Allowing for 
contingent identity means breaking Leibniz’s Law, since there is at least one predicate 
that applies to ‘Lumpl’ that does not apply to ‘Goliath’. However, Leibniz’s Law is 
broken in a principled way. Firstly, flesh and blood objects do not instantiate any 
incompatible properties, as they do not instantiate any modal properties at all. Secondly, 
since co-referential terms cannot be substituted in de re modal contexts, we are not 
committed to contradictions. 
 
7.4 A model for quantified modal truths without constants 
To sum up, we can construct a simple model to help describe the truth conditions for 
modal sentences. Once again, we will leave out constants for individuals. This will be 
remedied in section 7.6 below. Note that this model assumes option 2 for accounting for 
restricting quantification is adopted, and that context does the work required to restrict 
our variable domain where necessary. 
The language we are modelling consists of the following vocabulary: 
 Connectives: ,  
 Quantifier:  
 Variables: a, a1... 
 For each n > 0, n-place predicates F, G... 
 Parentheses 
 Modal operator: □  
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A well-formed formula in defined as follows: 
 If  is an n-place predicate and a1...an are variables, ( a1...an) is a well-formed 
formula 
 If () is a well-formed formula and (ψ) is a well-formed formula and a is a 
variable then (), (  ψ), (a()) and (□()) are well-formed formulas.298  
Our model M consists of an ordered quintuple <D, Dv, R, W, I> where:  
  D is a non-empty set (the set of individuals) 
 Dv is a non-empty set (a set of pairs of members of D with predicates) 
 R is a binary relation on Dv (the counterpart relation)  
 W is a non-empty set (the set of worlds), such that each member of W is a subset 
of Dv  
 I is a function (the interpretation function) that assigns each n-place predicate a 
set of n+1-tuples of the form <u1...un, w>, where u1...un are members of D and w 
is a member of W. 
A variable assignment g for M is a function that assigns each variable a member of Dv.  
An individual-variable assignment h for M is a function that assigns each variable a 
member of D. 
A valuation function for M relative to g and h (VM,g,h) assigns to each well-formed 
formula ‘T’ or ‘F’ relative to a world as follows: 
 For any world w and any variables a and b, VM,g,h (a = b, w) = T iff h(a) = h(b), 
and for some , <h(a), >  w.  
 For any world w, any n-place predicate , and any variables a1...an, VM,g,h 
(a1...an, w) = T iff <h(a1)... h(an), w>  I(). 
 For any world w and any formula , VM,g,h (, w) = T iff VM,g,h (, w) = F.  
 For any world w and any formulas  and ψ, VM,g,h (  ψ, w) = T iff VM,g,h (, w) 
= F or VM,g,h (ψ, w) = T. 
 For any world w, any variable a, and any formula , VM,g,h (a(), w) = T iff for 
every <u,>  w, VM,g,h (, w) = T when g(a) = <u,>.
299
   
                                                     
298 Note that in what follows, parentheses are sometimes omitted.  
299 Here ‘when g(a) = <u,>’ should be read as ‘when the variable assignment g is altered just so that a picks 
out <u,>.’ 
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From here, things become trickier, because we need separate truth conditions for when 
modal operators attach to open formulas as compared to when they attach to full 
sentences. 
 For any world w, any variables a1...an, and any n-place predicate , VM,g,h 
(□a1...an, w) = T iff for all <u1,1> such that <g(a1), <u1,1>>  R... and all 
<un, n> such that <g(an), <un,n>>  R, if for some v <<u1,1>....<un, n> >  
v, < u1...un,, v>  I(). 
 For any world w, any variable a and any formula , VM,g,h (□a(), w) = T iff 
VM,g,h (a(), v) = T for every v in W.  
 For any world w, and any variables a and b, VM,g,h (□ a = b, w) = T iff g(a) = g(b), 
and g(a) w.  
 For any world w and any formula , VM,g,h (□□, w) = T iff VM,g,h (□, w) = T.  
The possibility operator and the existential quantifier can be defined using negation, the 
necessity operator and the universal quantifier as follows: 
 For any world w and any formula , VM,g,h (, w) = T iff VM,g,h (□, w) = T 
 For any world w, any formula  and any variable a, VM,g,h (a(), w) = T iff VM,g,h 
(a(), w) = T.  
This model ought to provide truth conditions for any well-formed formula that can be 
constructed using the means set out above. 
Intuitively, Dv is intended to contain the <individual, dominant sortal> pairs that form the 
values of variables according to the strategy outlined in section 7.3.4. The counterpart 
relation R will be determined by the rules governing the dominant sortals with which 
individuals are paired in Dv. Despite the fact that in the version of LMC explicated above 
worlds are construed as Ramsey sentences, they are here construed as sets of individual / 
sortal pairs in order to simplify the model. In order to make sense of the idea that an 
individual can have multiple counterparts in a single world, individuals exist at a single 
world only. What’s more, variable assignments assign variables denotations simpliciter 
rather than relative to worlds. This means that each variable does not have a distinct 
denotation in every world. Instead, there is a counterpart relation R connecting individual 
/ sortal pairs, and the truth conditions for de re modal sentences are given in terms of it. 
‘Necessarily Fx’ is true at a world, for example, if the individual / sortal pair picked out 
by x only has counterparts that are F.  
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Even though variables are given an absolute value by a variable assignment, truth should 
still be treated as relative to worlds. Intuitively, we do not want ‘Fx’ to be true at w if the 
value of x exists at v, not w. To capture this, I have required that sentences involving 
variables are true at a world only if the values of those variables exist at the world of 
evaluation. For example, ‘x = y’ is true at a world only if x and y are the same individual, 
and that individual exists at w. And, ‘Fxy’ is true at a world only if x and y both exist at 
that world, and are related by F. More generally, n-place predicates are assigned n-tuples 
plus a world as their interpretations, such that the n-tuples are related by the property 
picked out by the predicate, and exist at that world. Ultimately, this was a matter of 
choice. If you think ‘x = y’ should be true at the actual world even if x and y are 
(identical) merely possible individuals, the model could be altered such that ‘x = y’ is true 
at every world. However, this would have the odd result that ‘x = y’ can be contingent 
even though it is true at every world. This is because the truth condition for ‘□(x = y)’ is 
given in terms of the dominant sortals with which the individuals picked out by ‘x’ and 
‘y’ are paired.  
The two different variable assignments g and h were required to supply truth conditions 
both for sentences sensitive to the dominant sortal paired with an individual, and for 
sentences that are not sensitive to the dominant sortal paired with an individual. If g 
assigns a variable <u, >, h will assign the same variable u. In other words, h will be a 
function composed of g and a function that assigns members of Dv members of D.  Call 
the latter function f. Then, h = f o g, such that if g(a) = <u, >, h(a) = f(g(a)) = u. 
  
7.5 Synthetic necessities, analytic contingencies and actual-world dependence 
Up to now, I have explicitly left out proper names and kind terms in my account of 
worlds and modal truth at worlds. In order to put them in, a strategy must be developed 
for dealing with necessary a posteriori truths, or synthetic necessary truths. We left 
names and kind terms out of the Ramsey sentences that constitute our worlds because 
consistency relations between names and kind terms cannot be determined directly by the 
linguistic rules. This is apparent when we consider necessary synthetic truths. For 
example, given that ‘Water is H2O’ is a necessary truth, it ought to be case that ‘There is 
something that’s water and not H2O’ is a sentence that is internally inconsistent, and can 
be true at no worlds; but the linguistic rules do not determine that to be the case in an 
obvious way. After all, there’s no rule governing our use of ‘water’ that directly restricts 
its application to where ‘H2O’ applies. If there were such a rule, we’d expect the sentence 
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to be knowable a priori, and of course it isn’t. The same goes for ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus’. This sentence is true necessarily since both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
name the same planet, but it isn’t plausibly a priori or analytic. Up until now I have also 
left indexical expressions out of the account of worlds. These cause trouble in the other 
direction; they generate sentences that are analytic without being necessary. The sentence 
‘I am here now’ is an example.  
7.5.1 The necessary synthetic: basic strategy 
In order to deal with these cases, we will need to borrow some tools from the framework 
of two-dimensional semantics. First of all though, we can look in a general way at why 
they arise from the perspective of LMC. To do so, we will need to introduce the notion of 
a ‘rigid designator’.  To be a rigid designator is to be a term that picks out one and the 
same thing in every world in which it designates anything at all. For us, of course, what 
counts as ‘the same thing’ in different worlds is determined by linguistic rules, and in 
particular, by the counterpart relations induced by the rules governing dominant sortals. 
Names, by definition, are used as ‘identity tracking’ terms and thereby qualify as rigid 
designators; we judge that different uses of the same name count as picking out the same 
individual. (And as we’ll see shortly, the same applies to kind terms.) Translated into the 
system introduced above in section 7.3 we can say that names, like variables, are 
associated with individual / sortal pairs. Unlike variables in the system above however, 
the same name can refer in more than one world. The model outlined in 7.4 treats 
individuals as confined to worlds, and assigns each variable a single individual. A name, 
on the other hand, can be assigned ‘extensions’ (individual / sortal pairs) in multiple 
worlds; which individual it picks out at a world will be determined by the counterpart 
relation induced by the sortal with which it is associated.  
Since names are rigid designators, when two different names are associated with the same 
dominant sortal, and pick out the same individual, they must rigidly pick out the same 
individual. That is to say, unlike descriptions, at any given world a name will only pick 
out counterparts of the individual it picks out at the actual world, determined by the sortal 
with which it is associated. For example, while ‘the happiest being’ might pick out a 
human at the actual world, and a dog at world w, the name ‘Fin’ can only pick out 
counterparts of the person it picks out at the actual world. Note that as discussed in 
section 7.3.8, when co-referring names are associated with different sortals, those sortals 
will induce different counterpart relations such that the two names might co-refer only 
contingently. However, co-referring names associated with the same sortal will co-refer 
necessarily; their reference at any given world will be the same if they refer to anything at 
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all.
300
  And identity statements connecting names that co-refer at every world will be true 
necessarily by virtue of being true at every world. This gives us a beginning of an 
explanation of the ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ case. Given that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ are both names, they both designate rigidly. What’s more, they pick out the 
same individual, under the same dominant sortal. That means that an identity statement 
between them (‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’) must be true necessarily.  
Explaining how linguistic modal conventionalists should deal with rigid designation, 
however, is not enough to show how it is that synthetic necessary sentences arise. Given 
that the linguistic rules determine that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer in every 
world, why isn’t ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ analytic? Synthetic necessary identity 
statements like this one arise because of how we fix reference. When we fix the reference 
of a name, we often do so in a state of ignorance about many or most of the features of its 
referent. Recall that at the end of chapter 6, I argued that reference gets fixed to flesh and 
blood objects in the world because we interact with them causally, and associate 
properties instantiated by objects with names. Here’s an example of how that might 
happen. An observer of the stars might decide to associate the name ‘Hesperus’ with the 
property of being the celestial body first visible in the evening. And she might associate 
the name ‘Phosphorus’ with the property of being the celestial body visible last in the 
morning. Each of these names will then pick out an object in the world. The object picked 
out by each name will satisfy a set of predicates that constitutes the possible individual 
that represents the object. Given that reference is fixed in this way, the possible individual 
that is associated with the name ‘Hesperus’ must have as part of its set the predicate 
‘visible first in the evening’. Similarly, the individual that is associated with ‘Phosphorus’ 
must include ‘visible last in the morning’ in its set. However, reference can be fixed in 
ignorance of whether both these descriptions apply to the same individual. As it happens, 
a single object has both the properties via which reference was fixed, and therefore the 
names are associated with a single individual. As a result, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is 
true. And, insofar as the dominant sortal (‘celestial body’, say) with which the names are 
associated is the same, the sentence will also be necessary. However, it is neither analytic 
nor a priori. What’s more a similar story can be told for all sorts of reference-fixing 
mechanisms. Perhaps the reference of each name is fixed simply by pointing to a star and 
saying, ‘Let that celestial body be called “Hesperus”’ or ‘Let that celestial body be called 
“Phosphorus”.’ Again, insofar as the dominant sortal associated with both names is the 
same, and the identity statement is true, it will be true necessarily.  
                                                     
300 Note that this ‘sortal-relative’ rigid designation is what Lewis calls ‘quasi-rigid designation’. (Lewis, On 
the Plurality of Worlds, p.256.) 
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To sum up, we can isolate the factors that combine to make ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
necessary, despite being synthetic and a posteriori. Firstly, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
are names, and therefore are identity-tracking terms. As a result, so long as they are 
associated with the same dominant sortal, actual co-reference means necessary co-
reference, according to the linguistic rules for names. Secondly, reference is fixed via a 
mechanism that a) is not such that the rules explicitly require the two names to be applied 
together,
301
 and b) involves ignorance of at least some of the properties had by their 
intended referents. Finally, the object to which the reference of one name is fixed is the 
same as the object to which the reference of the other name is fixed. Together these three 
factors determine that ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true necessarily, but it is neither 
analytic nor a priori. Note that the final factor leads to a kind of actual world-dependence 
for the necessity of ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’. There seems to be some sense in which it is 
possible that the names could have turned out to refer to distinct celestial bodies, in which 
case ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would have been not just false, but impossible. Assume 
that reference was fixed by description; then, had the non-modal sentence ‘The celestial 
body visible first in the evening is the celestial body visible last in the morning’ actually 
been false, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would have been necessarily false. We will return to 
this actual-world dependence in section 7.5.3.  
A second kind of synthetic necessity arises if we allow, contra the assumptions made in 
section 7.3, that not all members of a dominant sortal are counterparts of all other 
members. As we left the discussion in the previous section, every member of a dominant 
sortal was treated as a counterpart of every other member. Every person, for example, 
was treated as a counterpart of every other person. Perhaps, however, some sortals 
determine more restricted counterpart relations. For example, a person’s particular 
genetic makeup may be essential to her.  Say, for example, that Fin’s genetic makeup can 
be described using the predicate ‘G’. Then, ‘Fin has genetic makeup G’ is necessary but 
is not analytic. In order to explain this case, we must first explain how the linguistic rules 
can restrict counterpart relations in the relevant way. Remember that the rules governing 
sortals are what determine sortal-relative counterpart relations between individuals. 
What’s possible for something that counts as an F must always be determined by the rules 
governing ‘F’, and in particular the coapplication conditions for ‘F’. So, the rule that’s 
needed to restrict the ‘person’ counterpart relation must require that ‘same person’ is 
applied to two possible individuals only if they a) instantiate the sortal ‘person’, and b) 
share one of a specified set of predicates. Say that ‘G’,’ H’ and ‘I’ are all the predicates 
                                                     
301 An example of such a process would be a stipulation that ‘Hesperus’ is to apply to the same celestial body 
as ‘Phosphorus’.  
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describing genetic makeup. The rules governing ‘person’ can require that ‘person’ applies 
only where ‘G’ or  ‘H’ or ‘I’ is applied. That would make it analytic that every person has 
some genetic makeup or other. Any predicate set of which ‘person’ is a member must 
then also have ‘G’ or ‘H’ or ‘I’ as a member. The rules can also require, however, that 
‘same person’ applies to two individuals only if ‘G’ applies to both, ‘H’ applies to both or 
‘I’ applies to both. This procedure restricts the ‘person’ counterpart relation such that all 
of a person’s counterparts share the same genetic makeup.  
Now, we have a restricted counterpart relation among people such that a person’s 
counterparts all share the same genetic makeup. How does this help us to explain the 
synthetic necessity of ‘Fin is G’? First of all, we know that ‘Fin’ is a rigid designator 
associated with the ‘person’ dominant sortal; any use of ‘Fin’ qualifies as applying to one 
and the same individual. For us, that means that the reference of ‘Fin’ at a given world 
will be a person-counterpart of the individual ‘Fin’ picks out at the actual world. And, the 
rules for ‘person’ specify that ‘same person’ only applies to two individuals where they 
share their genetic makeup predicate. That means that given that ‘G’ is one of the 
predicates that forms part of Fin’s set, all Fin’s counterparts will include ‘G’ in their sets. 
This is enough to determine that ‘Fin is G’ is true necessarily. However, the reference of 
‘Fin’ can be fixed in ignorance of many or most of the predicates in his set. Perhaps 
reference is fixed by a definite description, such as ‘Cecily’s second child’, or perhaps it 
is fixed by ostension, or by a process such as a baptism ceremony. Given that reference 
can be fixed without knowing Fin’s genetic makeup, we’d expect ‘Fin is G’ to be a 
posteriori. Also, even though the rules for ‘person’ guarantee that all a person’s 
counterparts share a genetic makeup predicate, they do not connect the use of ‘Fin’ to ‘G’ 
directly, so ‘Fin is G’ is not analytic. The rules require that ‘Fin’ applies where ‘G’ 
applies only indirectly, by first fixing the reference of ‘Fin’ to a person, and then 
restricting the counterpart relation for persons by genetic makeup. Again, this case 
involves a kind of actual-world dependence. We can imagine a sense in which it is 
possible that ‘Fin is G’ could have turned out to be not just false, but impossible. If the 
actual world had been such that ‘Cecily’s second child is H’ had been true instead of 
‘Cecily’s second child is G’, ‘Fin is H’ would have been true necessarily, and ‘Fin is G’ 
would have been false necessarily. 
Now, we can turn to the case of ‘Water is H2O’. This case is similar on the surface to the 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ case in that it involves a necessary identity statement 
connecting two rigid designators. However, it is also different in important respects. In 
this case, the rigid designators pick out a natural kind, rather than an individual object. As 
with ordinary objects, the matter of what individuals constitute members of the same kind 
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at different worlds must be determined by conventional linguistic rules. This can be 
achieved by treating entities like bodies of water as possible individuals defined as sets of 
predicates. (Consider: the physical body of water that is the Indian Ocean is a bit of 
space-time instantiating non-modal properties; the predicates true of it make up a set that 
constitutes a possible individual.) Then, the rules ought to determine which individuals at 
worlds qualify as falling under the same kind term. It is tempting then, to explain ‘Water 
is H2O’ in the same way as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ by arguing that the case involves 
two rigidly designating names applying to the same kind in ignorance of the fact that they 
co-refer. However, there are necessary sentences involving ‘water’ that are not identity 
statements. An example is ‘All water is partly composed of hydrogen atoms.’ This 
sentence is true necessarily but synthetic, and cannot be explained in terms of necessary 
co-reference, like in the ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ case.  
In the new sentence, ‘water’ operates like a predicate picking out entities that qualify as 
members of the relevant kind, rather than as a name of a kind. But, it remains a posteriori 
which entities qualify as satisfying this predicate. Similar cases will arise with other 
predicates. If what counts as a lion is determined by genetic features, then ‘All lions have 
such and such genetic features’ will also be necessary synthetic. So, how does LMC 
explain such sentences? We need a rule governing ‘water’ that restricts which possible 
individuals count as water in such a way that all individuals qualifying as water share a 
predicate, but empirical investigation is required to work out which predicate. Our 
treatment of Fin’s necessary genetic features can help us provide an account to do that 
job. Say that ‘water’ is introduced, as Sidelle suggests, as a ‘chemical kind’ term and that 
the rules say that ‘member of the same chemical kind’ applies only to individuals that 
share certain chemical features. As in the case of genetic features, the chemical features 
that might be had by some individual can be given by a predicate set. Say that this set is 
{C, D, E}. Then, the linguistic rules will require that ‘member of the same chemical kind’ 
applies to two individuals so long as they share ‘C’ or ‘D’ or ‘E’ as members. Given that 
‘water’ names a chemical kind, ‘water’ used as a predicate will also apply to two 
individuals only if they share one of those predicates. Just as which individuals counted 
as Fin’s counterparts depended on which genetic features Fin had, which substances 
count as water depend on which chemical features the thing we actually refer to as 
‘water’ has. The rules for ‘same chemical kind’ determine which individuals qualify as 
the members of the same kind. However, when we introduce a term as a chemical kind 
term, we are often in ignorance of which chemical features the kind we are referring to 
has. In the case at hand, the term ‘water’ is introduced as a chemical kind term, and its 
reference is fixed by some process such as description, ostension, etc. And the rules for 
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chemical kind terms dictate that substances qualify as belonging to the same chemical 
kind so long as they share certain chemical features. Given that ‘being partly composed of 
hydrogen atoms’ is one of the predicates that is had by all members of the chemical kind 
we actually refer to as ‘water’, ‘All water is partly composed of hydrogen atoms’ will be 
true necessarily.  
Now, we can see how the sentence ‘All water is partially composed of hydrogen atoms’ is 
necessary although synthetic. Firstly, ‘water’ is a rigidly designating term picking out a 
chemical kind. As a result, it must pick out the same kind in any world in which it 
designates anything at all. Secondly, the rules require that ‘member of the same chemical 
kind’ applies to two individuals only if they share the same member of the ‘chemical 
features’ predicate set. One member the predicates shared by all members of the kind we 
refer to as ‘water’ is ‘being partly composed of hydrogen atoms’. As such, when ‘water’ 
is used as a predicate ranging over individual samples of stuff, it only picks out entities 
that are partly composed of hydrogen atoms. However, when the reference of ‘water’ is 
fixed, it is fixed in ignorance of many of the properties of the flesh and blood substance 
the term is used to pick out. Perhaps the reference of ‘water’ is fixed, for example, when 
someone says, ‘“Water” is to pick out the chemical kind to which the substance in this 
glass belongs.’ Such a reference-fixing process can take place without knowing which 
chemical feature predicate is instantiated by the substance in the glass. Nonetheless, the 
rules governing ‘member of the same chemical kind’ determine that individuals only 
qualify as belonging to the same kind if they share the same member of the chemical 
features predicate set. So long as the substance in the glass is in fact composed of H2O 
molecules, individuals qualifying as water must share ‘being partly composed of 
hydrogen atoms’ as a member of their sets. As a result, ‘All water is partly composed of 
hydrogen atoms’ is necessary, but is a posteriori and synthetic. Once again, there remains 
a sense in which the sentence might have been false; if the substance in the glass had 
instantiated a different predicate from the chemical features set, ‘All water is partly 
composed of hydrogen atoms’ would have been necessarily false. Once again, the case 
involves dependence on truths at the actual world.  
All three cases of synthetic necessity discussed share some features in common. Here are 
some of those features: 
(1) A term (Hesperus, Fin, water) is used as a rigid designator. That means that the rules 
require that it picks out the ‘same thing’ in every world in which it designates anything at 
all. 
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(2) The term is associated by the rules with some sortal (celestial body, person, chemical 
kind) such that the rules governing that sortal determine which individuals that satisfy it 
count as the ‘same thing’ in each world, or which individuals belong to the ‘same kind’ in 
each world. 
 (3) The rules governing the relevant sortal F require that ‘same F’ is only applied to 
individuals sharing the same member of some specified set of predicates.  
(Note that (1), (2) and (3) alone guarantee that the rigidly designating term will only pick 
out individuals sharing the same member of the relevant specified set.)  
(4) The reference of the term is fixed in ignorance of which member of the specified set is 
instantiated by its referent. 
This gets us our necessity a posteriori. The rules require that ‘same F’ applies only where 
some unknown predicate ‘G’ applies, and they also require that our referring term 
(Hesperus, Fin, water) applies only where ‘same F’ applies. As such, our referring term 
only applies where some unknown predicate applies. 
 (5) The final feature of the cases is that the place to check which member of the specified 
predicate set an individual instantiates is the actual world.  
At this point, it’s worth revisiting a problem that was raised for Sidelle’s account of the 
necessary a posteriori back in section 2.1. Recall that Sidelle’s account took such 
sentences to be generated by an analytic truth in combination with a contingent, empirical 
truth. His idea was that the necessity of such sentences could be explained by the analytic 
truth, while their aposteriority could be explained by the empirical truth. For example, the 
analytic ‘If water is a chemical kind, then if its chemical composition is H2O, it is H2O in 
every possible circumstance in which it exists’ was to combine with ‘Water is a chemical 
kind’ and ‘Water’s chemical composition is H2O’ to make ‘Water’s chemical 
composition is H2O’ necessary. The problem was that ‘Water’s chemical composition is 
H2O’ was meant to be contingent and empirical on Sidelle’s account. However, that is the 
same sentence that is made necessary by the analyticity of the conditional. I suggested 
that this problem might be helped by changing the ‘empirical discovery’ sentence to read, 
‘Water’s chemical composition is actually H2O’. Then at least, the sentence whose 
necessity is being explained is not the same sentence that is taken to be a contingent 
empirical discovery. This also helped to capture Sidelle’s central thought that the 
necessity of ‘Water is H2O’ depends partly on linguistic conventions and partly on what 
we discover about the world we inhabit.  
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The problem was that ‘Water’s chemical composition is actually H2O’ was also plausibly 
necessary rather than contingent, insofar as all truths of the form ‘Actually, S’ are 
necessary. The strategy suggested on behalf of LMC in this section does not fall prey to 
this problem because it does not require that a contingent truth plays any role in helping 
to determine necessary synthetic truths. In the water case, the necessity of ‘Water is H2O’ 
is determined by a) the reference-fixing process for ‘water’ at the actual world, and b) the 
conventional ‘same substance’ relation that connects water to other possible substances at 
other worlds. The aposteriority of the sentence is not explained by the contingency of 
discoveries about water in the actual world. Instead, it is explained by ignorance about the 
features of the thing to which reference has been fixed. 
7.5.2 The contingent analytic: basic strategy 
Finally, we must address how LMC should diagnose cases of analytic contingencies. In 
these cases, the linguistic rules associated with terms guarantee the truth of a sentence, 
rendering it analytic, even though the sentence is contingent. A commonly cited example 
of such a sentence is ‘I am here now.’  The reason ‘I am here now’ is treated as analytic is 
because the rules for the indexical expressions ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ guarantee that 
whatever context the sentence is uttered in, it will express a truth. Indexical expressions 
have the feature that what they pick out depends on the context of utterance. If Madeleine 
is the speaker, ‘I’ picks out Madeleine. But if Angus is the speaker ‘I’ picks out Angus. 
Similarly, if the sentence is uttered on Monday, ‘now’ picks out Monday, and if the 
sentence is uttered on Tuesday ‘now’ picks out Tuesday. Following Kaplan, the aspect of 
meaning of an expression that determines what it picks out relative to a context of 
utterance has been called the ‘character’ of the expression.302 In the case of ‘I am here 
now,’ the character of ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ guarantee that the sentence will express a 
truth relative to any context, because the speaker of the utterance is always located at the 
place of the utterance at the time of utterance. There is no way to shift the context of 
utterance to make ‘I am here now’ express a falsehood. However, it is plausibly 
contingent that I am here now. After all, I could have chosen to stay at home today rather 
than go out, or I could have chosen to leave later.  
In order to deal with this case, indexical expressions must be included either in the 
Ramsey sentences that constitute worlds according to LMC, or in the maximal 
possibilities that those worlds generate in accordance with the rules. The next section will 
deal more thoroughly with how to add names, kind terms and indexicals into maximal 
                                                     
302 David Kaplan, ‘Demonstratives,’ in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein eds., Themes from 
Kaplan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).  
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possibilities. For now, note that a common way to add indexicals to worlds is to give 
them a ‘centre’ by specifying a single individual at a single time and place. Then the 
individual at the centre is picked out by ‘I’, the place at the centre is picked out by ‘here’ 
and the time at the centre is picked out by ‘now’. In section 7.5.4 I’ll describe how 
centres should be added to worlds according to LMC. 
As with synthetic necessities, analytic contingencies can be explained by LMC using the 
notion of actual-world dependence. First of all, note that ‘I’ has two interesting features. 
On the one hand, it is pronoun and therefore works similarly to a name. That means that it 
designates rigidly; relative to a context of utterance, ‘I’ picks out the same individual in 
any context of evaluation. That is why when I say, ‘I could have been elsewhere today’ I 
express a truth. The truth of that sentence is determined by whether I have counterparts 
that are elsewhere today; and, given the rules for ‘person’ (my dominant sortal), it’s 
plausible that I do. This explains the contingency of ‘I am here now’. The second 
interesting feature of ‘I’ comes from its Kaplanian character, as mentioned above. This 
character helps to explain why ‘I am here now’ is analytic; the reference-fixing 
mechanisms for those terms guarantee the truth of ‘I am here now’ in any context of 
utterance, given that the context of utterance is also the context of evaluation. These two 
features can be accounted for by LMC by, once again, using actual-world dependence. 
Start with a maximal possibility at which I am at the centre. Given that ‘I’ designates 
rigidly, ‘I’ picks out my counterparts at other worlds. As a result, ‘Possibly, I am 
elsewhere’ is true so long as one of my counterparts is elsewhere. However, the 
analyticity of ‘I am here now’ can be explained by the fact that relative to the actual 
centred maximal possibility, ‘I am here now’ is true. And, if we treat different centred 
maximal possibilities as actual, ‘I am here now’ will remain true. After all, the individual 
at the centre is in the time and place at the centre of each possibility.
303
  
Gillian Russell has argued that Sidelle’s modal conventionalism struggles to account for 
indexicals.
304
 Interestingly, the trouble for Sidelle doesn’t come from the contingent 
analyticity of ‘I am here now’; instead it comes from cases in which ‘I am here now’ is 
used to express a necessary truth. More specifically, the problem is that the sentence can 
sometimes be used to express something contingent, and other times used to express 
something necessary. Russell’s example is a case in which ‘I am here now’ is expressed 
by a necessarily existing, omnipresent god. In the mouth of such a god, ‘I am here now’ 
must be necessary, because the god is in all places at all times. Nonetheless, it remains the 
                                                     
303 The notion of treating other maximal possibilities as actual is explicated further in the next section. 
304 Gillian Russell, ‘A New Problem for the Linguistic Doctrine of Necessary Truth,’ in C. Wright and N. 
Pedersen eds., New Waves in Truth, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.267-281. 
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case that all my utterances of ‘I am here now’ express contingencies, since I am neither 
fixed in one place and time, nor omnipresent. 
Sidelle’s view, Russell argues, struggles to account for this case because the conventions 
governing the sentence can, on his view, either be such that they make it contingent or 
that they make it necessary, both not both. Her diagnosis of the problem is that necessity 
should be thought of as attaching primarily to propositions, rather than to sentences. The 
fact that ‘I am here now’ expresses different propositions in different contexts would then 
explain why the sentence sometimes says something contingent and other times says 
something necessary. That fact would also explain why the rules governing the sentence 
alone aren’t sufficient to make it necessary or contingent. Sidelle allows for two different 
ways that analyticity can act as the source of necessity. The first is by making an analytic 
sentence itself necessary, as in ‘All bachelors are unmarried.’ The second is by combining 
with some empirical discovery to make a sentence necessary, as in synthetic necessary 
sentences like ‘Water is H2O.’ Clearly, the first strategy won’t work for ‘I am here now,’ 
because we want a result where it is sometimes necessary and sometimes contingent. 
What of the second? Russell argues that there isn’t any straightforward way to combine 
an analytic truth with an empirical truth to get the result that ‘I am here now’ is in some 
contexts necessary and in others contingent. She suggests that one option Sidelle might 
take is to make the analytic sentence that is (sometimes) the source of necessity for ‘I am 
here now’ conditional on who ‘I’ picks out. For example, the analytic sentence could be 
something like, ‘If I am god, then if I am here now I am necessarily here now.’ However, 
then the ‘empirical’ truths that combine with the sentence to yield the necessity have to be 
a) I am here now, and b) I am god. Neither of these look like good candidates for 
empirical discoveries.  
Of course, LMC cannot accept Russell’s diagnosis of the problem; it cannot take 
propositions to be the primary bearers of necessity or contingency. Luckily, the strategy 
suggested above can help LMC diagnose the case. According to the suggested account, ‘I 
am here now’ is contingent because the speaker at the actual world has non-actual 
counterparts at other worlds; it is analytic, however, because it is true at every centred 
world when it itself is considered as actual. On this approach, the contingency of ‘I am 
here now’ is due to the fact that some of the speaker’s counterparts are not in the place of 
utterance at the time of utterance. Then, if the actual world is centred on an omnipresent 
god, ‘I am here now’ will, as Russell argues, qualify as necessary. Which modal status 
attaches to ‘I am here now’ relative to which world considered as actual remains 
conventional because the rules for the ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ are conventional, as are the 
counterpart relations that individuals stand in.  
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Finally, note that the same strategy used for dealing with ‘I am here now’ can be used to 
apply to truths involving the ‘actually’ operator. Normally, we treat sentences of the 
form, ‘If actually S, then S’ as contingent, since ‘Actually, S’ is true at every world 
considered as counterfactual so long as ‘S’ is true at the actual world, while ‘S’ may be 
false at other worlds. The sentence seems analytic, however, since the rules for ‘actually’ 
plausibly entail that if ‘S’ is actually true, ‘S’ is true. As with the indexical case, the 
contingency of ‘If actually S, then S’ can be explained by the fact that ‘Actually S’ can be 
true even though the rules do not guarantee the truth of ‘S’. Its analyticity, however, can 
be explained by the fact that the sentence is true relative to every world considered as 
actual.  
7.5.3 Adding an extra dimension for actual-world dependence 
One of the features had in common by the cases of necessary synthetic truth discussed 
above was that how a rigidly designating term applied in different worlds was determined 
by truths at the actual world. This allowed for a sense in which if the actual truths had 
been different, the modal truths would have been different. Similarly, cases of contingent 
analytic truth relied on treating a centred world as actual. Accounting for this actual-
world dependence requires us to augment our story about how truth at worlds works. To 
do so, we can borrow some tools from two-dimensional semantics. The framework of 
two-dimensional semantics has been used by philosophers to represent how varying one 
aspect of the meaning of a term can have implications for other aspects. For example, as 
we’ve just seen, varying the context of utterance of indexicals changes their content. 
(When you are the speaker, ‘I’ picks out you, and when I am the speaker, ‘I’ picks out 
me.) Importantly for us, two-dimensional semantics has been used by philosophers such 
as Frank Jackson and David Chalmers to explain the necessary a posteriori.
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Given these applications, two-dimensional semantics is well-suited for our purposes of 
explaining necessary synthetic truths and contingent analytic truths.  The guiding thought 
of the Jackson / Chalmers framework is that even though there’s an aspect of the meaning 
of some terms that’s settled by the external world, there must be some aspect of meaning 
that is settled by our internal states if we are to explain our competence in judging the 
application of terms in various circumstances. The fact that we can use thought 
experiments like Putnam’s twin earth scenario to make judgments about the application 
of ‘water’, for example, suggests that even the aspects of meaning that are determined by 
                                                     
305 See Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) and Jackson, Reference and Description Revisited. See also chapter 2 of David J. 
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), David J. Chalmers, ‘On Sense and 
Intension,’ Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 16 (2002): pp.135-182, and David J. Chalmers, ‘Epistemic Two-
Dimensional Semantics,’ Philosophical Studies Vol. 118 (2004): pp.153-226. 
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the external world are ‘anchored’ in an aspect of meaning that is a priori and / or settled 
by us in some way. It is open to LMC to argue that this a priori or internal aspect of the 
meaning of terms is a conventional aspect, determined by linguistic rules. 
The basic strategy used by two-dimensionalists is to argue that the application of our 
terms at worlds depends in part on how those terms apply in the actual world. To see how 
we can make use of the strategy, let’s revisit how worlds are defined. For us, possible 
worlds are Ramsey sentences expressed in a fragment of English. In section 7.1, I argued 
that linguistic rules governing terms determine which Ramsey sentences are internally 
consistent. And, I argued, the linguistic rules governing terms can also be used to 
determine a maximal set of sentences in English that are a) guaranteed to be true if the 
Ramsey sentence is true, given the rules, and b) are consistent with each other, since they 
follow from an internally consistent sentence by the rules. I suggested that the set of 
sentences following from a possible world should be called a ‘maximal possibility’. One 
of the Ramsey sentences that constitutes a possible world will be true. This is the actual 
world. As such, the set of English sentences that follow from it will be the actual maximal 
possibility. As yet, we don’t know how the rules determine all of the English sentences in 
a set from a given Ramsey sentence; the Ramsey sentences included logical vocabulary, 
variables and those qualitative predicates that cannot be used to generate synthetic 
necessities. (For example, ‘blue’ is included, but not ‘contains water’.) At this point, we 
still haven’t said how to get the sentences including names, kind terms, indexicals and the 
missing predicates from the Ramsey sentence that constitutes a world. In what follows, 
I’ll outline a strategy for using two-dimensional semantics to get maximal possibilities 
from Ramsey sentences.  
To help demonstrate how the strategy works, we can work through an example. Let’s use 
the example of Fin and his genetic properties. First of all, we can start from the Ramsey 
sentence that is true: the actual possible world. This sentence describes all the individuals 
in the world, and their qualitative properties; for example, it describes all the people there 
are, and each person’s genetic makeup. As flesh and blood people moving about in the 
physical universe, we come to associate names with people via various processes of 
reference-fixing. Assume that via one of these processes, the name ‘Fin’ comes to refer to 
a given person. This person instantiates a range of qualitative properties. Corresponding 
to the properties, there is a set a set of predicates that constitutes the possible individual 
representing Fin. The rules governing a name like ‘Fin’ can express conditionally the 
various reference-fixing processes that might connect ‘Fin’ to a <possible individual / 
sortal> pair. So for example, the rules might say, ‘If “Such and such physical process 
occurs” is true, “‘Fin’ refers to the individual {F, G, H...} and is associated with ‘person’” 
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is true.’ This allows us to move from the Ramsey sentence that is the actual world to the 
truth of ‘“Fin” is associated with “person” and picks out individual {F, G, H...}.’ 
With reference fixed, we have truths about Fin at at least one maximal possibility: the 
actual maximal possibility. However, we need to say something about the truths 
involving the name ‘Fin’ at other maximal possibilities. How do we get from other 
Ramsey-sentences-as-worlds to truths about Fin? In order to work out how, we need to 
return to the considerations discussed in 7.5.1. Say that the rules for ‘person’ tell us that 
‘same person’ applies to any two possible individuals only if they share the same genetic 
makeup predicate. One of the predicates in Fin’s set will be his genetic makeup predicate. 
Say, for example, that predicate is ‘G’. Then, the rules determine that ‘Fin’ must pick out 
an individual at another possible world only if that individual includes G as a member. 
More generally, the rules for ‘person’ determine the reference of ‘Fin’ in other possible 
worlds by determining a counterpart relation among persons. Given that ‘Fin’ only 
applies to individuals that are ‘G’, ‘Fin is G’ will be true necessarily, even though it is 
synthetic and a posteriori.  
At this point, we can turn to why the necessity of ‘Fin is G’ involves actual-world 
dependence. First of all, note that the reference-fixing process at the actual world is what 
determined the reference of ‘Fin’ at all worlds. At a given world w, the Ramsey sentence 
and the rules alone are not enough to determine which individual ‘Fin’ picks out. Instead, 
which individual ‘Fin’ picks out partly depends on the Ramsey sentence that is the actual 
world. At the actual world, it is true that if process p occurs, ‘Fin’ refers to an individual 
with genetic makeup G. And, the antecedent of that sentence is true. Let’s go to world w. 
No matter what reference-fixing processes are in place at w, ‘Fin is G’ remains true, given 
that at the actual world, ‘Fin’ picks out an individual who is G, and the rules governing 
person terms determine that all his counterparts must be G. However, there does remain a 
sense in which the rules alone do not guarantee that ‘Fin is G’ is necessary. We can 
capture that sense by considering how things would have been if w had been the actual 
world. Say the reference-fixing process at w fixes the reference of ‘Fin’ to an individual 
that includes ‘G1’ as the genetic makeup predicate in his set instead of ‘G’. Then, when w 
is considered as actual, ‘Fin is G1’ is necessary, and ‘Fin is G’ is impossible.  
Similar considerations apply to the case of ‘water’; starting with the actual world, the 
reference-fixing processes in place can generate a maximal possibility in which ‘All 
water is composed of H2O molecules’ is true. Then, the application conditions for ‘water’ 
determine that the term will pick out substances composed of H2O molecules at every 
maximal possibility. The actual-world dependence in both cases can be represented if 
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sentence truth is relativised to a pair of worlds, rather than to an individual world. The 
first world in the pair relative to which truth is assessed is a world considered as actual, 
and the second is a world considered as counterfactual. Say that at w the reference of 
‘Fin’ is fixed to an individual including the genetic makeup predicate ‘G’. Then, ‘Fin is 
G’ will be true at the following world pairs: <w, w>, <w, w1>, <w, w2>, <w, w3>... <w, 
wn>. However, changing the world considered as actual changes the truth of ‘Fin is G’ at 
worlds considered as counterfactual. Assume that the reference-fixing process at w1 
connects ‘Fin’ to an individual whose genetic makeup predicate is G1. Then, ‘Fin is G1’ 
will be true relative to the following world pairs: < w1, w>, < w1, w1>, < w1, w2>, < w1, 
w3>.... < w1, wn>. Recall that maximal possibilities are intended to be determined by 
Ramsey sentence worlds in accordance with the rules. A first pass at how to achieve this 
is to treat maximal possibilities as determined by pairs of worlds, rather than individual 
ones. (This first pass will be revised slightly in the next section.) 
The two-dimensionalist strategy of assessing truth relative to world pairs can also help 
with accounting for analytic contingent truths. Starting with a given Ramsey sentence 
world, we can add a centre wherever we like.
306
 Say that we make Madeleine on Tuesday 
the centre of a maximal possibility generated by some world. Given that ‘I’ designates 
rigidly, ‘I’ will pick out Madeleine at every maximal possibility considered 
counterfactually. At many of those, ‘I am here now’ will be false. However, relative to 
any maximal possibility which is itself considered as actual, ‘I am here now’ will be true. 
So, for example, ‘I am here now’ will be true at the following world pairs: <@, @>, < w1, 
w1>, < w2, w2>, < w3, w3>... < wn, wn>, but can be false at the following world pairs: <@, 
w1>, <@, w2>, <@, w3>... <@, wn>.  
7.5.4 From possible worlds to maximal possibilities 
On the two-dimensional picture, a Ramsey sentence possible world on its own can no 
longer be taken to straightforwardly determine a single maximal possibility. Recall that in 
order for a set of sentences to count as maximal, it must include every sentence 
expressible in English or its negation. As we’ve seen, however, which sentences 
involving names, kind terms and indexicals are true at a given maximal possibility 
depends on which world is actual and where its centre is added. As noted above, a first 
pass for dealing with these terms is to treat maximal possibilities as generated from world 
pairs, rather than from individual worlds. However, accounting for indexicals means 
adding a centre to maximal possibilities, and the rules plus a Ramsey sentence world 
                                                     
306 Note that this will mean that there is more than one maximal possibility associated with any particular 
Ramsey sentence world. This is discussed in section 7.5.4. 
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treated as actual do not suffice for that centre to go in any specific place; after all ‘I’ can 
be used by anyone. A natural solution would be to treat worlds as centred by adding 
indexicals to our Ramsey sentence vocabulary. As we’ve seen, however, the truth of 
sentences involving indexicals at maximal possibilities involves actual-world 
dependence. We’d be in trouble if a Ramsey sentence world w had ‘I’ pick out an 
individual in Australia if relative to some other word considered as actual, ‘I am in 
Australia’ was false at w. Because of their actual-world dependence, indexicals must be 
added to maximal possibilities, rather than to worlds. However, the fact that we have to 
leave indexicals themselves out of our worlds doesn’t mean we have to leave centres out. 
LMC could maintain that indexicals get added to maximal possibilities instead of worlds, 
but include a centre marker using other terms that do not designate rigidly. Then, relative 
to any given world pair, ‘I’ would pick out the individual at the centre of the world 
considered as actual from the pair. Adding a centre marker to a Ramsey sentence world 
on this approach means using the resources from the vocabulary in the Ramsey sentence 
to describe a person, place and time such that the rules determine that if the Ramsey 
sentence is true, ‘I’ picks out that person, ‘here’ picks out that place and ‘now’ picks out 
that time. A natural way to do that is to provide a description according to which some 
individual at some time is the speaker. Then, any maximal possibility generated from that 
Ramsey sentence considered as actual will be such that ‘I’ refers to that individual and 
‘now’ refers to that time.  
However, there’s also another reason why a single world pair can be thought to generate 
many different maximal possibilities. Back in section 7.3, I argued that some sortals 
might induce very liberal counterpart relations such that all members of a dominant sortal 
count as counterparts of each other. Let’s assume a ‘liberal’ counterpart relation among 
people, for example, according to which every person is a counterpart of every other 
person. This makes sense of the intuition that you could have been just like your friend in 
all qualitative respects, and your friend could have been just like you. Holding fixed some 
world as actual, assume that ‘Cormac’ comes to refer rigidly to a person at the actual 
world. As such, ‘Necessarily, Cormac is a person’ is true at the actual world. And, 
‘Necessarily, Cormac is F’ is true at the actual world for every F that the rules require to 
be applied with ‘person’.  
This suffices for ‘Cormac is a person’ to be true at all maximal possibilities relative to the 
actual world. How though do we fill in other truths about Cormac at each individual 
world considered as counterfactual? First of all, remember that individuals are sets of 
predicates using the same vocabulary as the vocabulary in the Ramsey sentences. As 
such, the same individuals must exist at any maximal possibility associated with a world, 
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no matter which world is actual. What’s dependent on the world considered as actual is 
which name is associated with which individual. On our liberal counterpart relation, 
every person at every world qualifies as a person-counterpart of the individual ‘Cormac’ 
picks out. However, we can’t say that a possible world with two or more people 
corresponds to a maximal possibility in which ‘Cormac’ picks out two or more people, 
because we will end up being committed to saying that Cormac is possibly in two places 
at once, that Cormac is possibly both tall and short, and so on. However, the option of 
denying that names refer at all at worlds where there are equally good candidates does not 
seem viable either. After all, any world in which there is more than one person counts as a 
world with equally good candidates for a person name given our liberal counterpart 
relation. 
To avoid that commitment, we can borrow a suggestion from Lewis.
307
 Lewis rejects 
haecceitism, which he defines as the denial of a particular supervenience thesis: that what 
a world represents of individuals de re supervenes on their qualitative character. Still, 
Lewis accepts that there will be circumstances in which two or more qualitatively 
described individuals within a world count as counterparts of someone in another world. 
Perhaps, for example, there is world in which your mother gives birth to twins with your 
genetic makeup. It seems that in such a world, there is no qualitative difference that can 
single out one twin as ‘you’ rather than the other. But it would also be wrong to say that 
you do not exist in such a world. Lewis’s response is so say that representation de re of 
individuals is not something that is done by possible worlds as a whole, but it is done by 
possible individuals. Given that both twins are your counterparts, they are both possible 
ways you might have been. Of course, the representation of you provided by the first twin 
includes that you are not at the same time the second twin. And, the representation of you 
provided by the second twin includes that you are not at the same time the first twin.  
LMC can make use of a similar strategy by arguing that relative to a single world 
considered as actual, there can be many maximal possibilities associated with other 
worlds considered as counterfactual. Given our liberal counterpart relation induced by 
‘person’, there are equally good ways of assigning names to individuals relative to a 
single world pair. For each of these equally good ways, there is a distinct maximal 
possibility associated with that world pair. Let’s return to the example of Cormac. We 
know that the reference of ‘Cormac’ has been fixed to an individual at the actual world. 
Now, let’s go to a Ramsey sentence world that says one person is F and G and another 
person is F and H. Relative to the actual world, that world will be associated with one 
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maximal possibility according to which Cormac is F, G and not H, and another maximal 
possibility according to which Cormac is F, H and not G.  
Now, we are in a position to say how possible worlds construed as Ramsey sentences 
determine maximal possibilities. First of all, remember that according to LMC, the 
Ramsey sentences themselves are determined to be possible by the linguistic rules 
governing English, and count as complete descriptions of ways things might be in a 
limited vocabulary. Effectively, the Ramsey sentences include terms whose conditions of 
application do not depend on which world is considered as actual. However, maximality 
requires that every English sentence is determined to be true or false at a maximal 
possibility, and that includes sentences including names and kind terms. Given that there 
is more than one maximal possibility per world, maximal possibilities cannot be 
represented as functions from single worlds to sets of sentences, or even as functions 
from world pairs to sets of sentences. Instead, LMC must argue that a set of maximal 
possibilities (i.e., a set of sets of sentences in English) is determined relative to each 
centred world considered as actual, plus the set of other centred worlds. The Ramsey 
sentence constituting a possible world will be true at every maximal possibility generated 
when that world is considered as counterfactual, no matter which world is considered as 
actual. As such, it will be a member of all those maximal consistent sets of sentences. 
Effectively, some maximal possibilities will contain the same possible worlds as parts. 
To sum up, maximal possibilities are generated from worlds as follows. Each centred 
possible world will generate a single maximal possibility when it is considered both as 
actual and counterfactual. However, considering one world as actual and a distinct one as 
counterfactual can generate many different maximal possibilities as there will often be 
more than one equally good way of assigning names at a world relative to some other 
world considered as actual. As a result, the relation between world pairs and maximal 
possibilities will be one-to-many. This has an interesting consequence. Normally, two-
dimensional models provide sentences truth conditions in terms of functions from world 
pairs to truth values, such that one and the same world can be treated as either actual or 
counterfactual; it can be either member of the pair. This approach won’t work given the 
considerations noted above, since a world pair alone is not enough to provide a verdict on 
many sentences. Instead, truth conditions must be given relative to worlds considered as 
actual, and maximal possibilities generated from those worlds. 
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7.6 A two-dimensional model 
Based on the account given above, I will now construct a basic model for a limited 
number of sentences included names, predicates, variables, quantifiers and modal 
operators. (Note that this model does not include indexicals.) 
The language we are modelling consists of the following vocabulary: 
 Connectives: ,  
 Quantifiers: ,  
 Variables: x, y... 
 Constants: a, b... 
 For each n > 0, n-place predicates F, G... 
 Parentheses 
 Modal operators: □,  
A well-formed formula in defined as follows: 
 If  is an n-place predicate and a1...an are variables or constants,  a1...an is a 
well-formed formula 
 If  is a well-formed formula and ψ is a well-formed formula and a is a variable 
then , (  ψ), a(), □() and () are well-formed formulas  
Our model M consists of an ordered sextuple <D, Dv, W, P, I, Ic> where:  
  D is a non-empty set (the set of individuals) 
 Dv is a non-empty set (a set of pairs composed of a member of D and a predicate) 
 W is a non-empty set (the set a set of worlds), such that each member of W is a 
subset of Dv  
 P is a non-empty set (the set of maximal possibilities), such that each member of 
P is a set of ordered quadruples composed of a member of W, a second member 
of W, a constant, and a member of Dv.
308
  
 C is a non-empty set (the set of sets of counterparts), such that each member of C 
is a subset of Dv 
                                                     
308 Intuitively, the set of quadruples that makes up a maximal possibility is as follows. The first member of 
each quadruple is the world considered as actual, the second member is the world considered as 
counterfactual, and the third and fourth members are a constant and an individual assigned to that constant 
relative to the world considered as actual and counterfactual. Within a given set of quadruples (a maximal 
possibility), the world considered as actual and the world considered as counterfactual will be the same in 
each quadruple. However, two different maximal possibilities can assign constants differently relative to the 
same pair of worlds, so two different sets of quadruples might share the same worlds as the first two members 
in each quadruple, but assign names differently.   
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 I is a function (the interpretation function) that assigns  
- each n-place predicate paired with a member of P a set of n-tuples of the form 
<u1...un,>, where u1...un are members of D; and, 
- each constant paired with a member of P a member of Dv.  
 Ic is a function that assigns each constant paired with a member of P a member of 
D.  
A variable assignment g for M is a function that assigns each variable a member of Dv.  
A individual-variable assignment h for M is a function that assigns each variable a 
member of D. 
Denotation is defined as follows. [a, p]M, g, h = Ic(a, p) if a is a constant, and [x, p]M, g, h = 
h(x) if x is a variable. Terms are constants or variables. 
A valuation function for M relative to g and h (VM,g,h) assigns to each well-formed 
formula ‘T’ or ‘F’ relative to a world and a maximal possibility as follows: 
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p, and any terms a and b, VM,g,h (a = b, 
w, p) = T iff [a, p]M, g, h = [b, p]M, g, h 
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p, any n-place predicate , and any 
terms a1...an, VM,g,h (a1...an, w, p) = T iff [a1, p] M, g, h...[an, p]M, g, h  I(, p) 
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p and any formula , VM,g,h (, w, p) = 
T iff VM,g,h (, w, p) = F.  
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p and any formulas  and ψ, VM,g,h ( 
 ψ, w, p) = T iff VM,g,h (, w, p) = F or VM,g,h (ψ, w, p) = T 
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p, any variable x, and any formula , 
VM,g,h (x(), w, p) = T iff for every <u,>  <w, wx, c, <u,> >  p, VM,g,h (, 
w, p) = T when g(x) = <u,>. 
Again, we need separate truth conditions for when modal operators attach to open 
formulas as compared to when they attach to full sentences. 
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p, any variable x and any predicate , 
VM,g,h (□x, w, p) = T iff g(x) = <u,> such that I(, px)  I(, px) for all px  P. 
 For any world w and maximal possibility p, any constant a, and any predicate , 
VM,g,h (□a, w, p) = T iff I(a, p) = <u,> such that I(, px)  I(, px) for all px  
P. 
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 For any world w and any maximal possibility p, any variable x and any formula 
, VM,g,h(□x(), w, p) = T iff VM,g,h(x(), w, p) = T for every p  P such that w 
forms the first member of all its sets.   
 For any world w, any maximal possibility p, and any terms a and  b, VM,g,h (□ a = 
b ) = T iff I(a, p) or g(a) = I(b, p) or g(b).  
 For any world w and any maximal possibility p and any formula , VM,g,h (□□, 
w, p) = T iff VM,g,h (□, w, p) = T  
 For any world w and any maximal possibility p and any formula , VM,g,h (, w, 
p) = T iff VM,g,h (□, w, p) = T 
 For any world w and any maximal possibility p and any formula  and any 
variable x, VM,g,h (x(), w, p) = T iff VM,g,h (x(), w) = T.
309
  
This model is intended to fill in some of the gaps left by the model in section 7.4, most 
notably by including truth conditions for sentences involving constants. It retains the 
approach to de re modal truth taken in 7.3 and 7.4 by treating de re modal truths as 
dependent on the dominant sortals with which individuals are paired. However, it 
captures the insight that the individual a name picks out depends on which world is 
considered as actual by relativising truth to a world considered as actual paired with a 
maximal possibility, rather than simply a single world. A maximal possibility is 
represented as a set of sets intended to contain the information needed to get the right 
truth conditions for sentences. They tell you which world is to be considered as 
counterfactual, which world is to be considered as actual, and which constants are paired 
with which possible individuals. While I have not added indexicals to the model above, 
doing so should be relatively straightforward. Currently, worlds are represented as sets of 
possible individuals paired with sortals. Centres could be added to worlds by specifying 
one such individual as ‘special’. (Of course, we would need a separate centred world for 
each possible individual existing at a non-centred possible world.) Then, sentences 
involving ‘I’ would need to be assigned truth conditions relative to the counterpart 
relations governing the individual at the centre of the world considered as actual.  
 
7.7 Have modal properties and propositions snuck in the back door? 
In chapters 3-5, I argued that if LMC accepts there are modal conditions of existence, 
identity and persistence had by objects, and modal truth conditions had propositions, 
                                                     
309 Note that this model is just one suggestion for how sentence truth at maximal possibilities might be 
represented following the strategy outlined in section 7.5. There may well be other (perhaps simpler) ways to 
flesh out the same approach.  
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conventionalism about objects and truth follows. The strategy for avoiding this 
consequence was to deny that flesh and blood objects and structured propositions have 
any of these modal features, and instead to argue that modal sentences should be assigned 
truth conditions based on the rules themselves, independent of any worldly matters. It 
might be objected, however, that the system described in this chapter is a way of 
constructing modal properties and modal propositions. After all, it includes modal 
predicates that will be true of terms referring to worldly objects. And, it allows modal 
adverbs to attach to sentences that express worldly propositions. Why is it then, that these 
do not confer modal properties on objects and modal statuses on propositions in such a 
way that object conventionalism and truth conventionalism result, via the arguments in 
chapters 3-6? 
The central argument from those chapters appealed to existence, identity and persistence 
conditions for objects, and truth conditions for propositions. The argument was that if 
worldly objects and propositions have such conditions, they end up conventional. This 
was because EIP conditions partly determine what exists, and truth conditions partly 
determine what’s true. For an object to be possibly ground to sawdust, for example, is for 
it to be such that it can survive that change in its composition taking place in the real 
world. Similarly, for a proposition to be true necessarily is for it to be true no matter how 
things are in the world, and for two propositions to be inconsistent is for the truth of one 
to preclude the truth of the other.   
It’s important then, that the system outlined here does not supply flesh-and-blood objects 
and structured propositions with modal EIP conditions and truth conditions. The 
difference between the Sidellian strategy described in chapter 3 and the strategy described 
here is that Sidelle wanted to take seriously the idea that objects in the world have modal 
features that are just like their non-modal features. The same applied to Thomasson, who 
wanted to maintain that pleonastic modal properties are just as real as non-pleonastic 
ones. The source of the trouble was that worldly modal features have implications for 
how the world is carved up into objects. The strategy described here does not require 
anything of flesh and blood objects in order for modal sentences to be true. The truth or 
falsehood of all modal sentences is determined by the linguistic rules governing terms via 
possible worlds constructed from those rules. This applies even in the cases of actual-
world dependence described above; the modal truths at a given maximal possibility are 
relativised to which centred world is considered as actual, but the rules alone connect 
centred worlds considered as actual to maximal possibilities. While one such world in 
fact corresponds to how things are in the physical universe, how things are in the physical 
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universe is not what determines the modal truths at any maximal possibility; rather, that 
job is done directly by the rules.  
It’s true that in the system described above modal predicates can be correctly applied to 
referring terms; however, the conditions under which they apply are entirely conventional 
and linguistic. In chapter 6, I argued that non-modal predicates pick out real, worldly 
properties that might be considered to be universals, for example. There are no 
corresponding modal properties had by objects on the view defended here. There are two 
different ways to think of the de re / dicto distinction. One is in terms of the logical form 
of sentences. Modal sentences that are logically de re have modal operators attached to 
open formulas, rather than to full sentences. The other way to think of the distinction is to 
treat de re modality as a feature of things, and de dicto modality is a feature of sentences. 
On this second way of looking at things, modal statuses had by propositions might be 
thought of as a kind of ‘de re’ modality, given that propositions are entities independent 
of language. The view defended here treats all modality as de dicto in this second sense. 
However, this is compatible with maintaining that some sentences are logically de re; a 
method for dealing with such sentences is provided in sections 7.3 and 7.4. By doing 
away with de re modality in the worldly sense, LMC can avoid conventionalism about 
objects and truth. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
In previous chapters, I argued that linguistic modal conventionalists ought to provide 
truth conditions for modal sentences such that modal truth is determined by linguistic 
rules alone, rather than by any features of objects or of propositions. The aim of this 
chapter was to provide a sketch of how this may be done, and call attention to some of the 
more difficult aspects of the task. In particular, the linguistic modal conventionalist will 
have more trouble than some realist modal theories when it comes to explaining de re 
modal truths, necessary synthetic truths and contingent analytic truths. While the task is 
by no means complete, I have suggested here that relativising reference to dominant 
sortals may be helpful for providing truth conditions for de re modal sentences, and that 
taking advantage of insights from the framework of two-dimensional semantics may be 
helpful for accounting for necessary synthetic truths and contingent analytic truths.The 
framework sketched here could be developed to provide more rigorous truth conditions 
for a range of modal sentences in English, compatible with the approach to modal truth 
taken by LMC.  
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CHAPTER 8 
Desiderata Revisited, and Objections and Replies 
Having set out a proposal for linguistic modal conventionalism to avoid object 
conventionalism and truth conventionalism, I will now revisit the desiderata established 
for LMC in the introduction and evaluate how well the theory is able to satisfy them. In 
the context of doing so, I will raise some objections to the theory and discuss if and how 
those objections can be deflected. Section 8.1 discusses LMC’s epistemological 
desiderata and related objections, and section 8.2 discusses its metaphysical desiderata 
and related objections. Sections 8.3 – 8.5 respond to other objections, including that LMC 
makes the modal truths contingent (8.3), that modal truths in LMC are specific to English 
and cannot be translated into other languages (8.4) and Lewis’s objections to linguistic 
ersatzism as they apply to LMC (8.5). 
 
8.1 Epistemological desiderata and objections 
One of the primary motivations for LMC is that it promises to explain our knowledge of 
modal truths in a way that is compatible with empiricism and methodological naturalism, 
and meets the integration challenge posed by Benacerraf and Peacocke. Briefly, that 
challenge is to provide a semantics for modal sentences that is compatible with 
knowledge of modal truths. Whatever it takes for a modal sentence to be true, it must be 
such that we are capable of gaining knowledge of such things, at least in those cases 
where we are confident that we do have modal knowledge. LMC aims to meet this 
challenge by treating the truth of modal sentences as fully dependent on the conventional 
linguistic rules governing the terms in which those sentences are expressed. This 
semantics was set out in chapter 7; the rules governing English terms establish a set of 
internally consistent maximal possibilities, and modal sentences are assigned truth 
conditions relative to those possibilities. Given that modal truth depends on linguistic 
rules, a solution to the integration challenge requires that we have knowledge of the rules 
to explain our knowledge of modal truths.  
8.1.1 Objection: English speakers have insufficient knowledge of the rules of English 
One way to object to LMC is therefore to deny that we have the requisite knowledge of 
the rules of our language. The objector might claim that it is implausible that any average 
speaker of English knows all the rules of the language she speaks. And, if we don’t know 
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the rules of English that determine modal truths but we do know the modal truths, the 
integration challenge isn’t solved.  
A promising line of response to this objection argues that the sort of knowledge of the 
linguistic rules that is required for knowledge of modal truths does not entail that we are 
able to write down every rule of English. Rather, LMC can argue that knowing the rules 
means being able to follow them. In particular, someone who is competent with English 
should be able to recognise when a transgression of the rules has been made. A similar 
point has been made by Chalmers and Jackson when it comes to concepts.
310
 They argue 
that many concepts are analysable, and are understood by us, even though it is 
implausible that we can write down necessary and sufficient conditions for when the 
concepts apply and when they don’t. An example of such a concept is ‘knowledge’ itself. 
Gettier cases, as well as counterexamples for numerous attempts to revise analyses since, 
suggest we may never be able to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for when 
the concept applies. However, that doesn’t mean that the concept doesn’t have conditions 
of application, or that we don’t have knowledge of those conditions. Rather, Chalmers 
and Jackson argue that our ability to make judgments about whether specific cases 
constitute knowledge demonstrates that the concept is analysable, and that we understand 
it. In fact, our understanding of the concept is reflected in our ability to decide whether it 
applies in a given situation, and to construct complex counterexamples to purported 
analyses.  
LMC can argue that similar abilities reflect knowledge of the linguistic rules. While we 
may not be able to write down the rules governing some particular term in English, we 
are able to make judgments about whether the term applies given a description of a 
scenario. What’s more, we are able to judge whether the description of the scenario itself 
is consistent or inconsistent. It’s plausible that this is the sort of knowledge of the rules 
that is required as the basis of modal knowledge. According to LMC, a sentence such as 
‘Possibly, some F is G’ is true because the linguistic rules allow ‘F’ to be applied where 
‘G’ is applied. As such, our ability to recognise that a description of a scenario in which 
an F is a G is not inconsistent can be the basis of our knowledge that possibly, some F is 
G. Our ability to decide, for example, that the term ‘coloured’ applies to something if it is 
described as ‘blue’ reflects knowledge of the rule that ‘coloured’ should be applied where 
‘blue’ applies. Once again, this can form the basis of our knowledge of the sentence, 
‘Necessarily, everything blue is coloured.’ A similar point is often made about grammar; 
the rules of English grammar are enormously complicated, and only experts are able to 
                                                     
310 David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson, ‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation,’ The Philosophical 
Review Vol. 110, No. 3. (2001): pp.315-360.  
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write them down. However, most of us demonstrate a grasp of those rules by being able 
to follow them and by being able to recognise when one is broken. LMC can claim that 
semantic rules are in this respect just like grammatical rules.  
A second line of defence comes from Lewis, who notes that while those who are party to 
a convention (e.g. a convention of language) require knowledge that the convention 
holds, the knowledge required can be of a very minimal sort.
311
 For example, the 
knowledge might be ‘irredeemably non-verbal’. Lewis describes a case in which two 
people rowing a boat have tacitly arrived at a convention to row using a certain rhythm 
and technique, but neither is able to adequately describe using words the specific timing 
or rhythm used. This is similar to the case of the rules of grammar. The convention to 
follow the rules is in place, and speakers of a language have knowledge of the convention 
in some sense, but they may not be able to verbalise that knowledge. Lewis also says that 
knowledge of convention may be of a ‘potential’ sort. Knowledge of a convention does 
not require that we have considered whether the convention holds in every specific 
circumstance; all that’s required is that we are able to work out what the convention 
dictates when we are faced with the circumstance. LMC can argue that knowledge of the 
conventional semantic rules that determine the modal truths is sometimes non-verbal or 
potential. An example of non-verbal knowledge comes from the English convention 
governing adjective order. In English, adjectives follow a specific order: quantity, quality, 
size, age, shape, colour. For example, the English phrase, ‘The three great big old square 
green buildings...’ is acceptable, while, ‘The great three old big green square buildings...’ 
is not.
312
 Many English speakers are not explicitly aware of this rule, but follow it 
anyway; this suggests that they have non-verbal knowledge of the convention. Examples 
of potential knowledge of semantic rules come from cases in which we can only articulate 
our knowledge when we are asked to consider the rule explicitly. For example, you might 
correct a non-native English speaker by saying, ‘That’s a bottle, not a jug.’ However, 
when asked why it’s a bottle, not a jug, you might have to think before concluding that 
jugs must have handles, where bottles do not, or that jugs have spouts where bottles do 
not.  
As with grammatical rules, there are some semantic rules that only experts are competent 
with, even implicitly. In cases of arcane or obscure grammatical rules, ordinary speakers 
of English may not be able to even recognise when the rule is broken, let alone write it 
down. Similarly, there will be semantic rules in English that are only known by experts. 
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312 Note that this rule is not without exceptions. For example, while we follow the rule in ‘ugly, little’ we also 
tend to say, ‘big, ugly’.  
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Clear examples of such cases come from science. Only physicists will be able to 
recognise when certain rules governing terms like ‘quark’, ‘neutron’, and so on are 
broken. Only psychologists and neuroscientists will be able to recognise when rules 
governing terms like ‘reuptake inhibitor’ and ‘axon’ are broken. Therefore, as you would 
expect, there will be certain modal truths that only the experts in these fields know.  
A further objection, therefore, suggests that there are some modal truths that even the 
experts don’t know. One example is mathematical truths. There are still theorems that 
remain to be established by mathematicians but are nonetheless true necessarily if true at 
all, and are expressed using terms that already form part of our language. A famous 
example of such a case is Goldbach’s conjecture that every even integer greater than two 
is the sum of two primes. According to LMC, given that Goldbach’s conjecture is 
expressed in English, the rules governing its terms must determine if it is true necessarily. 
However, if even the experts do not know whether Goldbach’s conjecture is necessary, 
the objection runs, its necessity cannot be determined by linguistic rules.  
One point to make in response to this objection is that because rules governing terms arise 
naturally, they may require study in order for us to make them explicit. English linguistic 
rules have two features that may help to explain cases like Goldbach’s conjecture. Firstly, 
they are at no point legislated by a person or group of people; instead they arise 
implicitly. Secondly, they are often very complex. It’s unsurprising that rules with these 
two features can require significant study if we want to make them explicit. A parallel 
comes from social rules and customs. An anthropologist or sociologist might have to 
engage in significant research to describe the customs of her own society, even though 
she is able to conform with those customs without thought. The same can apply to the 
rules of language. Sometimes, the rules governing language can be complex, and what 
follows from them can be difficult to establish. Nonetheless, mathematicians’ attempts to 
prove theorems are navigated in a confident way in that they recognise when their 
attempts fail and when they succeed. This confident navigation suggests a grasp of what 
counts as an inconsistency, or according to LMC, a grasp of what counts as contravening 
a rule and what doesn’t. LMC might argue that mathematicians might be characterised as 
having ‘potential’ knowledge of what follows from the rules, even though it is very 
difficult to bring that potential to fruition.  
A second line of response that might be suitable for some mathematical cases suggests 
that when it comes to highly specialised fields like mathematics, the process of working 
out what follows from the rules is partly creative or constitutive; the rules after all are up 
to us. Perhaps in some cases, our rules governing terms might themselves be incomplete 
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or inconsistent by their own standards. This is to be expected in circumstances where the 
rules are very complex, especially given that they arise implicitly, rather than being 
explicitly laid down. Experts in fields like mathematics might be thought of as having the 
job of revising existing rules and constructing new ones during the course of their work. 
This allows them to fill in gaps where the rules are incomplete, and fix internal 
inconsistencies. Part of the job of cutting-edge theorists is to help construct systems of 
rules by extending and revising existing systems; this job is done alongside the job of 
establishing what follows from existing rules.  
8.1.2 Objection: In order for knowledge of linguistic rules to provide modal 
knowledge, we must all be linguistic modal conventionalists 
A second epistemological objection calls into question whether even perfect knowledge 
of linguistic rules would allow for knowledge of modal truths, granting that the modal 
truths are determined by the rules. The objector might ask why we should expect 
knowledge that ‘bachelor’ should be applied only where ‘unmarried’ is applied to 
translate to knowledge that ‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is true. Surely, the 
objection runs, in order for the connection to be made, we must also know that the rules 
determine the modal truths. In other words, we must all be conscious adopters of LMC. 
Put in the context of the integration challenge, the objection suggests that integration 
requires more than that we have knowledge of the reduction base for our target. We must 
also have knowledge that the target reduces to the base.  
Plausibly, this objection sets the bar for meeting the integration challenge too high; it is a 
standard that almost any informative theory of modality will struggle to meet. For 
example, those who argue that modality reduces to goings-on at possible worlds must 
explain not only how we know about possible worlds, but also how we know that modal 
truths depend on them. Of course, it’s implausible to suggest that anyone without 
philosophical training could know that modal truths depend on possible worlds; yet many 
such people have modal knowledge. The same goes for theories that reduce modality to 
essence, and a range of other theories. In order to be interesting and substantive, theories 
that explain modality in terms of some other sort of fact or entity will make claims that 
are not known by most people. According to this objection, any such theory precludes our 
having modal knowledge.  
It’s worth noting, however, that while LMC cannot claim that we have explicit 
knowledge of how the modal truths are connected to the rules, it can explain our intuitive 
modal judgments better than its rivals. In section 2.2.2 I referred to an example 
Thomasson uses to provide evidence that analyticities are reflective of rules. When a 
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child asks ‘Will Aunt Dora always be a bachelor?’ we might respond by saying, 
‘Bachelors must be men’. According to LMC, this kind of modal judgment derives from 
our understanding of the rules governing the term ‘bachelor’. This example helps 
demonstrate how knowledge of linguistic rules can inform intuitive modal judgments, 
even if ordinary speakers cannot explicitly make the link between modal sentences and 
linguistic rules. Note that according to Thomasson, modal sentences are nothing more 
than expressions of the rules. As a result, she may wish to respond to this objection by 
claiming that knowledge of the rules simply is modal knowledge, even if we are unaware 
that modal sentences are simply different ways to express rules. 
  
8.2 Metaphysical desiderata and objections 
In the introduction, I argued that LMC ought to aim for a reductionist theory that avoids 
primitive modality, and that it ought to be parsimonious when it comes to ontological 
types and tokens. The central ontological commitments of the version of LMC I have 
described are to: 
a) matter occupying space-time 
b) non-modal properties and relations instantiated by matter 
c) objects construed as bits of matter instantiating non-modal properties and 
relations 
d) propositions construed as complexes composed of objects and non-modal 
properties and relations 
e) a rule-governed natural language 
f) sets 
In chapter 6, I argued that LMC’s metaphysical desiderata are met by the metaphysical 
picture contained in a) – d). After all, a) – d) presents a reductionist metaphysics in which 
matter occupying space-time and non-modal properties and relations are the only 
fundamental entities, with objects and propositions reducible to constructs out of those 
entities. As such, the key challenges for LMC come from e) and f). In section 2.4, I noted 
that LMC would need to appeal to the resources of set theory, as well as abstract 
sentences in a natural language. Ultimately, it’s unclear whether the naturalist can do 
without these entities, or whether they can be reduced to the kind of entities contained in 
a) – d). If not, LMC will not be able to do away with abstract entities altogether, as may 
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seem desirable according to a strict naturalist position.
313
 Here, I will focus on the extent 
to which e) can be elucidated in such a way that primitive modality is avoided. I’ll discuss 
two objections according to which it cannot, as well as a third objection according to 
which LMC fails to satisfy its metaphysical desiderata due to a treatment of the laws of 
nature as conventional.  
8.2.1 Objection: the rules require primitive modality 
The key objection to LMC’s claim to avoid primitive modality is that linguistic rules 
themselves require modality. In order for language to be rule-governed, there must be 
applications of a term that the rules permit, and others that they prohibit. However, these 
notions of permission and prohibition are usually elucidated modally. What is permitted 
by the rules is what is possible given the rules; what is prohibited by the rules is what is 
impossible given the rules. Of course, if the linguistic rules have modal import, LMC 
cannot claim to have achieved a fully reductionist theory of modality. Thomasson’s 
response to this objection is to grant it. She explicitly states that her modal normativism 
does not claim to reduce modal notions to non-modal notions; instead, she claims to have 
reduced metaphysical modality to deontic modality.
314
 As such, she denies that deontic 
modality must be analysed in terms of metaphysical modality and instead takes deontic 
modality to be the primitive notion. Metaphysical modal sentences, she suggests, are 
simply commands in disguise. One option for LMC, then, is to accept that its 
metaphysical desiderata are not fully met, and to retain primitive deontic modality. 
On the other hand, if LMC wants to deny primitive deontic modality, what’s required is 
an account of the rules governing language use such that they can be stated in purely 
descriptive terms. One place to look for such an account is once again in Lewis’s theory 
of convention. Lewis’s account of how conventions arise and what it takes for a 
convention to be in place does not require that conventions have modal force. The basic 
account is given in terms of regularities. Lewis says that a regularity in the behaviour of 
members of a population counts as a convention, when, for some reoccurring situation, 
everyone in the population conforms to the regularity in the situation, everyone expects 
everyone else to conform to the regularity in that situation, and everyone benefits from 
conforming to the regularity. The latter condition is met when some problem of 
coordination is solved by conformity.
315
 This account of convention simply requires that 
                                                     
313 Lewis argues that sets offer such utility in philosophical theories that we ought to accept their existence; 
by appealing to sets our theories incur extra ontological commitments, but that is paid for by a large increase 
in explanatory power. (Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds pp.3-4.) 
314 Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics’ pp.136-137.  
315 Lewis, Convention p.42. For this solution to be helpful, it must be that what counts as a ‘benefit’ can also 
be spelled out non-modally. Note that for Lewis himself, what’s required for conformity to be beneficial is 
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people in fact tend to regulate their behaviour in certain ways, rather than that they must 
or ought to regulate their behaviour in those ways. 
LMC might construct a non-modal theory of rules that takes advantage of this definition 
of convention in terms of actual regularities. A convention to sometimes apply a term and 
other times withhold it, determined by actual patterns of behaviour, could be treated as 
sufficient for a rule of use for that term. Alongside patterns of use for a term, our 
behaviour also exhibits patterns of sanctioning for uses that do not conform, and 
approbation for uses that do conform. If rules of use are determined simply by actual 
regularities, and actual patterns of sanctioning and approbation, modal facts need not be 
assumed in order to get rules of use.
316
 Above, I argued that one way our knowledge of 
rules is revealed is by our ability to judge whether a term applies in a given situation. If 
conventional rules are spelled out non-modally in the way suggested, our judgment need 
not reflect knowledge that a term must or must not be applied in the situation described. 
Instead, our judgment can be taken to reflect a recognition of the extent to which the 
scenario is similar to or different from scenarios in which members of the linguistic 
community have used the term in the past, and a desire to conform due to mutual benefit. 
If actual regularities are sufficient to establish conventions of use for terms, and those 
conventions determine modal truths, LMC need not rely on primitive modality in its rule-
based theory of modal truth.  
A related objection, however, questions how any regularities or patterns of past use could 
determine whether future uses do or do not conform to a given convention. This sort of 
objection is raised in Kripke’s famous interpretation of Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language.
317
  Kripke’s line of argument is that there is no way of 
determining from past uses of a term what convention for use is actually in place. Say that 
as a community, our convention to apply ‘bachelor’ to unmarried men is constituted by an 
actual regularity of applying and withholding the term. How do we know that the rule for 
‘bachelor’ wasn’t that it applies to unmarried men only up until yesterday, and applies to 
married men from today onwards? The objection is that there can be no feature of our 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the behaviours constitute a ‘coordination equilibrium’. This condition is met when no single actor would 
have achieved a better outcome by acting differently (pp.8-24). Since this condition is modal, LMC must 
either explain why the use of the modal condition is non-viciously circular, or provide a way for the benefit of 
conformity to be described without appealing to such modal conditions. 
316 Below, in section 8.2.3, I argue that LMC should embrace the ‘best systems’ theory of natural laws. One 
interesting line of investigation would be whether similar techniques could be established to determine a set 
of ‘linguistic’ laws in English. Perhaps the ‘axioms’ of English can be determined by examining the simple, 
strong regularities in the use of sentences in English.  
317 Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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past behaviour of applying terms that can determine the appropriateness of future 
applications.  
One response to this objection comes from Kripke’s own analysis of the Wittgensteinian 
argument. Kripke says a ‘sceptical’ response to the problem points out that whether some 
application of a term is right or wrong can only be determined by a community as a 
whole, not by a single individual.
318
 He suggests that when it comes to new applications 
of a given term, we cannot establish in advance a rule for whether the application is 
correct or incorrect. Instead, individuals simply have ‘inclinations’ about whether to 
apply the term or not. By itself, a single person’s inclinations cannot reflect a rule of 
use.
319
 However, we judge that when there is great consensus among community 
members’ inclinations, those who do not share them are to be treated as ‘wrong’. On this 
line of thought, linguistic rules are constituted by very minimal patterns of use, 
approbation and sanction among speakers. Whether or not a term applies given a 
description of a hypothetical scenario is determined by patterns of response in the 
linguistic community. While these patterns of use are rules only in a minimal sense, 
Kripke’s considerations may provide a promising line of argument for LMC if it is to 
construct a theory of linguistic rules that does not rely on primitive modality. 
8.2.2 Objection: the modal truths stand in a modal dependency relation to the rules 
Setting aside whether or not the rules themselves are modal, a second place to look for 
primitive modality in LMC is in the relation that stands between the linguistic rules and 
the modal truths. In describing LMC, I have often made claims such as ‘Metaphysical 
modal truth depends on linguistic rules,’ or ‘The rules determine the modal truths.’ LMC 
must say something about the relation of dependency at stake. One objection to the theory 
argues that this dependency relation must be construed modally, and as a result, that LMC 
at best requires primitive modality, and at worst is guilty of vicious circularity. According 
to the objection, the dependency relation between the rules and the modal truths must 
have modal force in order for it to be strong enough to do its required work. Say, for 
example, that some linguistic rule makes some modal sentence true. Is it necessary that 
when the rule is in place, the modal sentence is true? If not, there will be some possibility 
in which the rule is in place but the modal sentence fails to be true. But then, the rule 
itself can’t be doing all the work in determining the modal truth. On the other hand, if it is 
necessary that the modal truth holds whenever the rule is in place, a modal property is 
antecedently required in order for modality to be determined by the rules. Of course, 
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319 After all, if a single person’s inclinations were the judge of whether or a not a rule is accurately followed, 
there is no sense in which she could be wrong, or fail to follow the rule. (See Kripke, ibid p.88.) 
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LMC cannot claim to have fully explained modal truth in terms of linguistic rules if doing 
so requires a pre-existing modal relation between rules and modal truths.  
One response to this objection points out that that LMC should not countenance questions 
about the dependency relation’s modal status that assume it must be determined 
independently of the rules. The objection suggested that if the dependency relation does 
not have modal force, there will be some possibility where the linguistic rule is in place 
but the modal truth fails to hold.
320
 Given that LMC does not accept that there is non-
linguistic modality, it ought not accept that independently of linguistic convention, we 
can assess whether linguistic rules necessitate modal truths. If there are no non-
conventional possibilities, we cannot assess what goes on at them. What’s more LMC can 
claim that the dependency relation between the rules and the modal truths has modal 
force without being committed to the claim that there are modal truths only due to the 
pre-existence of a modal dependency relation. Rather, LMC can assert that the modal 
status of the dependency relation is determined linguistically, just as the modal status of 
any other sentence is determined linguistically. Here is an analogy. One possible theory 
of aesthetic value is that it is determined in some way by human brains. According to 
such a theory, there is a dependency relation between human brains and aesthetic 
properties. Perhaps there are formal or logical properties of that dependency relation that 
render it beautiful. If so, the dependency relation itself has aesthetic properties. Perhaps 
also the human brains that are said to determine aesthetic value also have aesthetic 
properties. The objection that such a theory fails due to circularity is misguided, since the 
aesthetic properties that are had by human brains and dependency relations do not 
themselves play a role in determining the existence of aesthetic properties.  
In order for the case of the modal features of the dependency relation between linguistic 
rules and modal truths to be analogous to aesthetic value case, it must be that the modal 
status of the dependency relation isn’t required in order for linguistic rules to produce 
modal truths. As such, an account must be given of the actual-world relation that stands 
between modal truths and the rules. One such account comes from Thomasson. She 
argues that the modal truths are simply expressions of the linguistic rules. If modal truths 
are simply expressions of the rules using the indicative rather than imperative mood, there 
need be no relation of dependency whatsoever between the rules and the modal truths.
321
  
                                                     
320 It should be noted that this circumstance will trivially fail to occur regardless of the ‘strength’ of the 
dependency relation if S5 holds. In that case, any modal truth will be true at all possibilities if it is true at any 
possibility. 
321 Thomasson’s treatment of modals as expressions of rules is discussed in detail in section 2.2.2 and in 
section 4.2. See Thomasson, ‘Modal Normativism and The Methods of Metaphysics’ section 2.1 and 
Ordinary Objects section 3.3. 
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More generally, it should be noted that LMC has interesting and perhaps controversial 
consequences when it comes to dependency relations that are essentially modal. Often, 
metaphysical dependence relations like grounding, supervenience and truth-making are 
taken to be inherently modal relations. According to LMC then, whether or not those 
relations hold between entities will be determined partly by linguistic convention. 
8.2.3 Objection: LMC makes laws of nature conventional 
One of the metaphysical desiderata of LMC was that it is consistent with metaphysical 
naturalism. One might argue that LMC fails to meet this desideratum if it is committed to 
taking the laws of nature to be conventional. If laws of nature are objective features of the 
physical universe, examinable by scientists, they ought not be considered conventional by 
naturalists. However, on at least some accounts of lawhood, laws of nature are defined as 
requiring the existence of necessary connections between properties. According to such 
views, the way that mere regularities are distinguished from laws of nature is that mere 
regularities hold only contingently, while laws of nature hold necessarily. On 
Armstrong’s view, for example, it is a law that all Fs are Gs if there is a non-logical 
necessitation relation between F and G.
322
 This relation might be thought of as a relation 
of physical necessity. If laws require physical necessity, and physical necessity is a 
restricted form of metaphysical necessity, the laws of nature must be conventional 
according to LMC. 
Nonetheless, those attracted to LMC are unlikely to embrace these sorts of theory of 
lawhood. Rather, they are more likely to embrace a ‘Humean’ theory of lawhood that 
avoids commitment to necessary connections. One such account comes from Lewis in his 
‘best systems’ theory of laws.323 According to Lewis, sets of truths can be arranged into 
numerous different deductively closed systems. In these systems, the virtues of simplicity 
and strength will be traded off. Some such systems will have a great deal of strength, in 
that they account for a large number of truths, but little simplicity, in that they have 
numerous axioms. An example is the system in which every truth is included as an axiom. 
Other systems will have a great deal of simplicity, in that they have few axioms, but little 
strength, in that they do not include many truths. The system in which a single sentence is 
the only axiom and the only truth is an example of such a system. Generally, extra 
simplicity in a true deductive system comes at the cost of extra strength, and vice versa. 
According to Lewis, the ‘best’ systems are those that achieve the greatest amount of 
simplicity that can be had without sacrificing too much strength, and the greatest amount 
                                                     
322 David Armstrong, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.) 
323 See David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) pp.72-77, and Lewis, New Work for a 
Theory of Unviersals, p.367. 
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of strength without sacrificing too much simplicity. And, he says, the laws of nature are 
the regularities that are taken as axioms in the best system, or all the best systems if there 
are ties.  
This sort of view has the advantage that it does not explicitly refer to necessitation in its 
account of what qualifies as a law. As such, it ought to be attractive to proponents of 
LMC. While the ‘Humean’ view comes with extra advantage that it coheres well with 
LMC’s other metaphysical motivations, a second view that does not appeal to necessity to 
explain the laws of nature is the primitivism endorsed by Maudlin, who suggests that the 
explanatory power had by laws of nature justifies treating lawhood as primitive in a 
system of metaphysics.
324
 A third non-modal approach comes from Carroll, who argues 
that merely being a non-accidental regularity is constitutive of lawhood.
325
 It remains the 
case that if physical necessity is conceived as a restricted form of metaphysical necessity 
it must be treated as conventional by LMC. Nonetheless, this consequence need not be a 
threat so long as physical necessity is not required to account for features of the world 
that we want to accept as non-conventional. If the laws of nature are in this category, 
adopting a best systems theory of lawhood, or another non-modal theory of lawhood can 
help achieve this. 
 
8.3 Objection: LMC makes the modal truths contingent  
Another objection that has been raised against LMC is that it treats the modal truths as 
themselves true only contingently.
326
 Usually, modal truths are taken to be true 
necessarily; if it necessary that p, it is necessarily necessary that p. However, LMC treats 
metaphysical modal truth as determined by which linguistic rules happen to be in place, 
and the matter of which rules are in place is not necessary. As a result, the objection runs, 
the contingency of the rules follows through to the modal truths. If the linguistic rules had 
been different, the modal truths would also have been different; as a result, the objection 
suggests that LMC cannot endorse the S4 axiom that if □, □□. As Simon Blackburn 
puts the problem, any theory that claims that ‘Necessarily, p’ is true because of F must 
treat F itself as either necessary or contingent. If the former holds, the necessity itself has 
                                                     
324 See chapter 1 of Tim Maudlin, The Metaphysics within Physics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.)  
325 John W. Carroll, ‘Nailed to Hume’s Cross?’ in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, J. Hawthorne, T. 
Sider and D. Zimmerman eds., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishing, 2008.) 
326 Descriptions of this objection can be found in Alan Sidelle, ‘Conventionalism and the Contingency of 
Conventions,’ Noûs Vol. 43, No. 2 (2009): pp.224-241, Iris Einheuser, ‘Counterconventional Conditionals,’ 
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not been adequately explained. If the latter holds, then the necessity of p is undermined, 
because there will be at least some possibility in which p is false.
327
  
The first point to make in response to this objection is that the truth conditions for iterated 
modal sentences provided in the previous chapter make modal sentences come out 
necessary, rather than contingent. According to semantics set out at the end of chapter 7, 
□□ was treated as true at some maximal possibility so long as □ was true at that 
maximal possibility. And, □ was treated as true so long as  was true at all maximal 
possibilities determined by some world considered as actual (when  is a full sentence). 
As such, the truth of  at all maximal possibilities is sufficient for the truth of □ at all 
maximal possibilities, which is sufficient for the truth of □□ at all maximal possibilities. 
According to LMC, whether or not the modal truths are contingent or necessary is 
determined by whether the linguistic conventions treat them as contingent or necessary. If 
the rules say that ‘necessarily, necessarily’ applies wherever ‘necessarily’ applies, then 
sentences with the form ‘Necessarily, S’ will count as necessary, not contingent.  
Ultimately, when evaluating what is necessary and what isn’t, we must pay attention to 
the rules governing ‘necessarily’. If the rules determine that worlds in which the 
conventions are different are not worlds in which the modal truths are different, then S4 
can be maintained. A simple diagnosis of the objection is therefore that it mistakes use for 
mention. The fact that ‘dog’ might have meant something different in English in virtue of 
being governed by different rules does not show that it is not necessary that all dogs are 
canines. When we assess what is in fact true necessarily, we hold fixed the meanings of 
our terms. Consider the following sentence: ‘If “bachelor” had meant what “unmarried 
woman” means, the sentence “Necessarily, all bachelors are male” would have been 
false.’ This sentence is true because it mentions the sequence of symbols ‘bachelor’ and 
considers how things would have been if that sequence had a different meaning. On the 
other hand, the sentence ‘If “bachelor” had meant what “unmarried woman” means, some 
bachelor might have been a woman’ is false because its consequent uses the English term 
‘bachelor’. No matter what the sequence of symbols ‘bachelor’ had meant, it would 
remain necessary that all bachelors are males. 
Sidelle and Einheuser offer defences to this objection on behalf of conventionalism along 
these lines.
328
 In Einheuser’s framework, a possible world is constituted by a non-
conventional substratum paired with a conventional ‘carving’. However, the conventional 
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328 See Iris Einheuser, ‘Counterconventional Conditionals,’ Philosophical Studies Vol. 127, No. 3 (2006): 
pp.459-482 and Alan Sidelle, ‘Conventionalism and the Contingency of Conventions,’ Noûs Vol. 43, No. 2 
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‘carving’ need not be determined by the practices of the people inhabiting the world in 
question. Instead each substratum can be paired with a number of different carvings, 
based in various different conventional practices. The actual world pairs our actual 
substratum with the carving determined by our actual conventional practices. Einheuser 
says that questions about how things would have been had our conventions been different 
can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, they might be interpreted as asking how things 
would have been had the substratum been different, with our conventions held fixed. She 
says that read as a ‘countersubstratum’ conditional, ‘If our conventions had been 
different, “Necessarily, S” would not have been true’ is false. This is because ordinarily, 
we hold our actual conventions fixed when assessing such conditionals. On the other 
hand, the sentence might be read as a ‘counterconventional conditional’. On this reading, 
we are asked to hold fixed the actual substratum and see how things would have been if a 
different carving were applied to it. Then, the sentence is true. Einheuser’s framework 
explains why S4 can be maintained by conventionalists; when we assess hypothetical 
scenarios where linguistic rules are different, we hold our actual conventions fixed in 
assessing truths. However, she also provides a sense in which different conventions do 
determine different modal truths, by allowing for ‘counterconventional’ conditionals in 
which different conventions are treated as actual. 
  
8.4 Objection: English modal truths cannot be translated into other languages 
According to LMC, the modal truths are determined by rules in English. However, other 
languages are governed by different rules. That suggests that according to LMC, the 
modal truths are specific to English, and cannot be translated into different rule-governed 
languages. What’s more, it suggests that the modal truths for German speakers, for 
example, are different from the modal truths for English speakers. This objection can be 
answered using similar considerations to the previous objection: the rules for use of 
English terms will determine whether it is permissible to translate ‘necessary’, ‘possible’ 
and so on into other languages. More generally, the rules of use for our terms should tell 
us the conditions under which translation is permissible. Plausibly, the rules for English 
say that the modal truths do not depend on the language you speak, just as they say the 
modal truths are not contingent. That suggests that English modal truths ought to be 
expressible in other languages, and that translation must be possible. As you would 
expect, the rules will not allow a translation of a necessary sentence in English into a 
contingent or false sentence in another language. So for example, ‘It is possible that when 
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translated into German “Some bachelor is married” is true’ is false in English according 
to the rules of English.  
Nonetheless, accepting that the rules for English allow for the translation of modals is not 
enough to show that in practice translation can be achieved. The rules governing German 
can be used to represent various modal truths in German. And, the system constructed on 
the basis of German rules will no doubt be different to the system constructed on the basis 
of English rules. As such, it is worth considering how translation between modal 
sentences in the two languages can work, given that they are governed by different rules. 
One way to answer this question is to relax the requirements for translation such that 
exact similarity between the rules of different languages is not necessary for translation. 
This solution is used by Block and Harman in responding to a similar problem that arises 
for meaning holism.
329
 If the meaning of a term is determined by its relationships to other 
terms in a language, or by its conceptual role, no English term will exactly match any 
German term in meaning. Block suggests that usually, ‘close enough’ similarity is enough 
to warrant translation. If approximate similarity is enough, then plausibly many German 
modal truths will translate well into English modal truths. 
 
8.5 Lewis’s objections to linguistic ersatzism 
Given that the system outlined in chapter 7 is a version of linguistic ersatzism, time 
should be taken to respond to the objections Lewis famously raised against linguistic 
ersatzism in ‘On the Plurality of Worlds’.330 There are two main lines of objection Lewis 
presents, one of which will be addressed here, and the other of which has already been 
noted above. The objection noted above relates to the relation of consistency that must 
hold between sentences true at a maximal possibility. Lewis points out that since 
consistency is a modal notion, the linguistic ersatzer cannot claim to have achieved a 
complete reduction of modality so long as the consistency relation between sentences is 
taken as primitive. For LMC, the consistency relation is determined by linguistic rules. 
As such, the prospects for avoiding primitive modality for LMC depend on the prospects 
for articulating the rules, and the dependency relation between rules and modal truths, 
non-modally. Whether this can be done remains an open question; section 8.2 suggests 
some lines of argument LMC might pursue to show that it can.  
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The second class of objections Lewis raises relate to the descriptive power of the world-
making language in which the sentences making up maximal possibilities are expressed. 
The first problem Lewis raises relates to the use of a natural language such as English as 
the worldmaking language, which is a requirement for LMC. Lewis’s objection to using a 
natural language as the worldmaking language is that its vocabulary is too limited to 
distinguish all the possibilities.
331
 He argues that natural languages have finite 
vocabularies, but there are possibilities in which there are infinitely many things. For 
example, he says, there is a possible world where there are continuum many space-time 
points. A finite vocabulary (or even a countably infinite vocabulary) won’t be able to be 
used to describe such a possibility. Lewis’s response to this objection on behalf of 
linguistic ersatzism is to give up on using a natural language. He argues that ersatzers 
should use what he calls a ‘Lagadonian’ language, where every entity represents itself; 
objects function as names for objects, and properties function as predicates, for example. 
Unfortunately, this response is unavailable to LMC, because a crucial feature of the 
theory is that our knowledge of modal truths is explained by our knowledge of the 
conventions governing our own natural language.  
The second problem of descriptive power arises for indiscernible objects. Given that 
linguistic ersatz worlds are descriptions, Lewis argues that the theory will not be able to 
account for descriptively indiscernible worlds or objects. Lewis accepts that indiscernible 
worlds may in fact not exist, but argues that indiscernible objects within worlds do exist. 
He provides the example of a world with ‘eternal two-way recurrence’ where an infinite 
series of qualitatively identical ‘epochs’ occur, in which the same events repeat over and 
over again. An individual in one epoch is indistinguishable from an individual with the 
same role in any other epoch, since the description for each will be the same. A second 
well known example comes from Max Black: a world might contain nothing but two 
exactly similar spheres in space, two miles apart.
332
 Any description true of one sphere 
will be true of the other sphere. Given that individuals are represented as maximal 
consistent sets of predicates, we do not have enough possible individuals at our disposal 
to represent the distinct but indiscernible individuals in each case, as the same set of 
predicates apply to each indiscernible individual.  
Lewis notes one move that he argues will not help with this problem: we could easily 
create more entities to describe indiscernible possibilities by pairing descriptions with the 
positive integers. In Max Black’s case, one of the two spheres would then be represented 
by a description paired with ‘1’ while the other would be represented by a description 
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paired with ‘2’. Lewis argues that this solution won’t work because it creates an 
‘irrelevant multiplicity’. His worry is that the two entities we end up with do not each 
unambiguously represent one of the two spheres. Instead, both entities ambiguously 
represent both of the two spheres; there is no way of determining which description / 
integer pair represents which sphere.  
The third objection of descriptive power is the problem of alien properties.
333
 Lewis 
argues that there are possible features things might have that are not features had by 
anything actual. Given that we do not have any experience of properties that are merely 
possible, we will not have predicates in our language that pick them out. What’s more, 
many ‘alien’ properties won’t be fully describable in terms of the relations they have to 
familiar properties. As such, descriptions will not be able to fully capture those 
possibilities in which alien properties are instantiated. To demonstrate the problem, Lewis 
imagines a philosopher living in a simpler world than ours who wishes to construct a set 
of ersatz worlds using some world-making language.
334
 Perhaps in her world, unlike in 
ours, protons lack parts. As such, the simple world philosopher will have no predicates 
with which to pick out the properties of proton-parts. This means she will not have the 
vocabulary to represent our world and our world will not be represented as a possible 
world according to her ersatz model. Nonetheless, surely our world is possible relative to 
the simple world, and the linguistic ersatzer has therefore failed to adequately represent 
the possibilities. Lewis’s conclusion is that we are likely in the same position as the 
simple world philosopher; we have no reason to think that all possible properties are 
instantiated here, and if they’re not, we will lack the vocabulary to represent some 
possibilities.  
Lewis accepts that while we won’t have names for alien properties, we can speak of them 
by quantification.
335
 This suggests one way the ersatzer might respond to the problem. 
She might say that while the simple world philosopher doesn’t have predicates for the 
proton-part properties in her world-making language, she can still provide a 
representation according to which protons have parts, and there are properties X, Y and Z 
had by proton-parts such that each proton-part has exactly one, and those proton-part 
properties are distinct from other properties, and so on. Unfortunately, Lewis argues, the 
ersatzer will still end up conflating possibilities because she can’t describe isomorphic 
possible scenarios involving alien properties. Say that the description above accurately 
describes the actual world when it comes to proton-parts; there are indeed three different 
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334 Ibid, pp.159-160. 
335 Ibid, pp.161-164. 
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properties had by proton-parts such that each proton-part has exactly one. What should 
we say about a world where the roles of two of the proton-part properties are switched? 
We can describe such a possibility, because we have names for the proton-part properties. 
However, the philosopher in the simple world must conflate the isomorphic possibilities 
because she only has the resources of quantification at her disposal. Her description, in 
which she says that there are three properties had by proton-parts, that are distinct from 
all actual properties, and so on, must be the same for both the distinct but isomorphic 
possible scenarios. 
The problem takes a slightly different form for LMC as compared to how it arises for 
other forms of linguistic ersatzism. Lewis expresses the objection as though it is taken for 
granted that the possibility of alien properties is a modal fact, and the linguistic ersatzer 
has the responsibility of demonstrating that her worlds are able to accurately account for 
that modal fact. For LMC, the possibility or impossibility of alien properties is 
determined by the linguistic rules. So, in order to decide whether this objection must be 
taken seriously, we must first decide whether the rules do in fact allow for the possibility 
of alien properties. It’s plausible though that the answer is that they do allow for alien 
properties, given the notion of an alien property does not seem incoherent or 
contradictory in meaning.  
If the rules allow that alien properties are possible, it must be true at some world that an 
alien property is instantiated. The temptation is to allow for the possibility of alien 
properties by including in world sets sentences like, ‘There is something that instantiates 
a property that isn’t F, or G, or H....’ and so on for all the actually instantiated predicates. 
However, simply adding such a sentence would render the world in question incomplete, 
because at least one object would not be fully described. The description as it stands does 
not say which alien property the object instantiates. However, the linguistic rules 
apparently cannot determine of any particular alien property that it is possible. If they 
could, they would have to provide rules of use for the alien predicate that connects its use 
to other predicates. Then, the property would no longer be truly alien since it would be 
fully specifiable using predicates that are actually instantiated. The same strategy could 
be used to account for worlds with more than countably many objects, but the same 
problem of incompleteness would arise. We could include in a maximal possibility the 
sentence ‘There are continuum many space-time points,’ but our world would be 
incomplete. In order to have a complete maximal possibility, we’d also need each space-
time point to be described individually. 
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Daniel Nolan and Theodore Sider have both made suggestions about how the linguistic 
ersatzer can allow for representations of particular alien properties.
336
 Both take on board 
Lewis’s point that distinct possibilities will be conflated if we attempt to capture the 
possibility of alien properties simply by including sentences in our world sets that 
quantify over properties and describe their patterns of instantiation. Instead, they argue, 
we should describe worlds together rather than separately. Nolan suggests that 
possibilities involving alien properties can be represented using a very long Ramsey 
sentence that makes quantifications over worlds as well as the objects and properties 
within them. The sentence will have variables for worlds, objects and properties, and will 
specify which objects instantiate which properties at which worlds. This sentence, which 
Nolan calls the ‘world-book’, can distinguish between the isomorphic possibilities to 
which Lewis refers. Because worlds are described all at once rather than individually, the 
sentence can say that there is some property X that plays such and such a role in world w, 
and some property Y that plays the same role in world w1. Sider’s solution is similar. He 
argues that rather than constructing possible worlds separately, the linguistic ersatzer 
should construct a single ersatz ‘pluriverse’ that describes worlds together. By describing 
the worlds together using one long sentence rather than separately using different 
sentences for each world, the variables for properties are bound by quantifiers that range 
over everything in the pluriverse, rather than simply the contents of an individual world. 
As a result, the sentence describing the pluriverse or world-book can say of a single 
property that it is instantiated by particular individuals in some worlds, and other 
individuals in other worlds. Finally, individual worlds can be recaptured from the world-
book or pluriverse by introducing what Nolan refers to as ‘dummy’ names for non-actual 
objects and ‘dummy’ predicates for non-actual properties. Using these, it is possible to 
provide a complete description of each world individually, with worlds where alien 
properties play isomorphic roles distinguished by the use of different predicates 
corresponding to different alien properties.
337
  
This solution ought to be attractive to LMC. The linguistic rules governing ‘property’ 
should determine in a general way restrictions on the kind of thing a property can be. 
Given that properties are the things picked out by predicates, the rules governing how 
predicates can be used will also determine the possibilities for properties. Given that 
worlds are linguistic, for there to be an alien property instantiated at a world according to 
LMC must be for there to be a possible predicate that applies at that world that is not part 
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337 See Nolan (ibid) pp.120-126 for details on how to abstract individual possible worlds from the world-
book.  
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of the world-making language (for us, English). After all, if that predicate were part of the 
world-making language, it wouldn’t pick out an alien property. This suggests that alien 
properties at worlds should be represented by LMC by predicates that are not part of 
English, but are permissible relative to the rules of English. Plausibly, the rules for 
English do more than merely specify the application conditions of particular English 
predicates, names and so on. They also specify how terms of various lexical categories 
can be used in a general way. Many of these general rules may be syntactic; they may say 
that a predicate can modify a noun, for example, but cannot modify a connective. The 
general rules of use for nouns, predicates, and so on provide restrictions on the sort of 
role that can be played by a member of that category in the language, and the rules that 
can govern a member of that category. The rules for English might say that ‘F’, ‘G’ and 
‘H’ are permissible predicates, and ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ are permissible names, when the rules 
require ‘F’ to be applied where ‘G’ is applied, that ‘H’ must be applied where ‘b’ is 
applied, and so on, even if some of those predicates and names are not in fact parts of 
English. These general rules could be used to construct the infinitely long ‘world-book’ 
or ‘pluriverse’ with variables for properties, variables for objects and variables for 
worlds. Each property variable will correspond to a predicate-role that is permissible in 
English and each object variable will correspond to a name-role that is permissible in 
English. In some cases, we will have predicates in English that correspond to the role 
played.  In the cases where we don’t, the variables will pick out alien properties.338 
Finally, note that similar resources can be used to account for the existence of 
possibilities in which there are descriptively indistinguishable individuals in a single 
world. Consider Lewis’s example of two-way eternal recurrence. As Lewis says, no 
description will allow us to uniquely pick out an individual existing in one epoch as 
opposed to another. However, the world-book can at least describe this world using 
quantification. Say that one of the things that exists in each epoch is F, G and H. The 
world-book can say that at the world in question Fx, Gx, Hx, Fy, Gy, Hy and x  y. The 
same goes for Black’s spheres. The world book can say that at the world in question there 
is a sphere that is round and large, and a sphere that is round and large, and that the first 
sphere is not identical to the second. Once again, we can introduce ‘dummy names’ 
corresponding to each of the variables, by including ‘x = a’, ‘y = b’, and so on in the 
world-book. Lewis argues if possible individuals are sets of predicates, we cannot 
distinguish between the individuals in each epoch because they will be described by the 
same set of predicates. However, once we have dummy names for each individual, the set 
                                                     
338 Note that switching to a ‘pluriverse’ rather than from individual words would take some considerable 
reworking of the semantics set out in chapter 7. I will not attempt to do so here. 
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associated with ‘a’ for example, will include that it is not identical to b, and the reverse 
will apply for ‘b’. One concern is that the addition of dummy names might be thought to 
create an ‘irrelevant multiplicity’ of the sort that Lewis rejected. However, this objection 
has less force for the conventionalist ersatzer than it does for a realist ersatzer. According 
to LMC, sets of predicates do not merely represent ‘real’ possible individuals. All there is 
for an individual or state of affairs to be possible is for the rules to permit a description of 
that possibility. As such, the question of whether a description ambiguously represents 
more than one possibility doesn’t arise; there is no independently existing possible 
individual that must be matched to each description.   
Unfortunately, the resources provided by Nolan and Sider do not help to counter 
objections that arise from using English as our world-making language. Ultimately, the 
resources of English cannot be used to fully describe worlds with more than countably 
many entities. Even including extra predicates and names for non-actual objects (as 
suggested above) can only allow us to extend the language to include countably many 
predicates, names, variables and so on. As a result, we will run out of predicates for a 
world with continuum many properties, for example. Briefly, here are two options LMC 
could pursue in responding to this objection. The first option is to ‘bite the bullet’ and 
deny that there are any such possibilities. This option, however, requires the implausible 
commitment that the rules of English do not permit the assertion that there are continuum 
many space-time points. The second option is to argue that according to LMC, the rules 
of English are imperfect by their own standards. If the rules of English do in fact permit 
the possibility of worlds in which there are continuum many space-time points, those 
possibilities must always be incompletely described. For example, a maximal possibility 
could include the sentence ‘There are continuum many space-time points’ in its set, 
without including separate sentences to describe each space-time point. In order to fully 
account for Lewis’s objections from descriptive power, LMC must develop one of these 
suggestions, or a new line of response, for how to deal with such infinitely large possible 
worlds.  
 
8.6 Summing up 
In this chapter, I have done two things. Firstly, I have evaluated the extent to which LMC 
is able to keep its epistemological and metaphysical promises. Secondly, I have noted 
some objections that might be raised against LMC and looked at avenues for reply. In 
some cases, how well LMC does at satisfying its desiderata is determined by how well it 
can answer its objections. This is particularly the case when it comes to the question of 
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whether an account of linguistic rules can be given that avoids commitment to primitive 
modality, and permits modal knowledge. While the avenues for response I have explored 
here are by no means exhausted, they demonstrate that the theory goes a significant way 
towards satisfying its empiricist and naturalistic desiderata. 
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CONCLUSION 
Linguistic Modal Conventionalism in the Real World 
Critiques of linguistic theories of modality have tended to centre on Quine’s objections to 
the analytic / synthetic distinction and on the necessary a posteriori. My focus in this 
thesis has been on a different problem: the threat of object conventionalism and truth 
conventionalism. I began in the introduction by setting out the theoretical background of 
linguistic modal conventionalist theories in broad terms, paying particular attention to the 
motivations for the view. Those motivations were translated into a set of desiderata that a 
successful version of the theory should aim to satisfy: empiricism, reductionism, and 
epistemological and metaphysical naturalism. My aim in the introduction was to 
demonstrate that if a plausible version of LMC could be established it would be an 
attractive theory for those inclined towards empiricism and naturalism, doing better on a 
number of fronts than prominent rivals.  
In chapter 1, I described the historical variants of LMC in detail, as well as the major 
objections that those views faced. The purpose of chapter 1 was to provide greater 
clarification on the virtues and vices of the theory by placing it in its historical context. I 
argued in chapter 1 that the Quinean and Kripkean objections that motivated the rejection 
of LMC are not insurmountable. In chapter 2, I described two modern theories that have 
aimed to overcome those objections: Alan Sidelle’s and Amie Thomasson’s. I noted that 
while both theories include promising responses to Kripkean arguments, more work was 
required in order to fully account for the necessary synthetic. I ended chapter 2 by setting 
out parameters for LMC. Specifically, a theory must meet two criteria to qualify as 
linguistic modal conventionalism: it must deny that there is any non-linguistic 
metaphysical modality, and it must take all metaphysical modal truths to be determined in 
a non-trivial way by linguistic rules.  
My project in chapters 3 – 5 was to demonstrate that object conventionalism and truth 
conventionalism are genuine threats to LMC. In chapter 3, I described two arguments that 
show that conventionalism about the modal features of objects leads to conventionalism 
about the objects themselves. The first argument connected the modal properties of 
objects to their conditions of existence, identity and persistence. If what’s possible for an 
object and what’s not possible for an object is a matter of convention, the conditions 
under which the object can exist and persist are also conventional. However, 
conventionalism about such conditions leads quickly to conventionalism about which 
objects in fact populate the world. The second major argument from chapter 3 
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demonstrated that the combination of conventionalism about modal properties and non-
conventionalism about objects leads to a position in which a single object can have 
incompatible modal properties. I argued that Sidelle’s proposed solution of embracing 
object conventionalism is unattractive for LMC, particularly in light of its empiricist and 
naturalistic motivations.  
In chapter 4 I examined whether Amie Thomasson’s work could be used to construct a 
version of LMC that avoids the problematic commitment to object conventionalism. I 
argued that it cannot, and presented a dilemma to help make that case. If we accept that 
objects have modal features, linguistic conventions can play either a weak or a strong role 
in determining truths about them. The weak role is simply to help fix the reference of our 
referring terms such that they pick out the right objects with the right modal properties. 
Such a view does not qualify as a genuine linguistic conventionalist theory however; it 
fails to meet the conditions for LMC set out in chapter 2. On the other hand, the strong 
role for convention is to make it the case that objects have the modal features they do. 
This position meets the conditions to qualify as a version of LMC, but it is committed to 
object conventionalism for the reasons outlined in chapter 3.  
Chapter 5 developed a structurally parallel dilemma in application to the modal status of 
propositions. If we take for granted that propositions have modal truth conditions, 
conventions can play either a weak or a strong role in determining the truth of sentences 
that express such propositions. On the one hand, the weak role for linguistic conventions 
is simply to determine which proposition is expressed by which sentence. This position 
once again fails to meet the conditions to qualify as a linguistic conventionalist theory of 
modality. On the other hand, a stronger role for convention is to make it the case that 
propositions have the modal statuses they do. I provided two arguments to show that this 
position leads to a problematic conventionalism about non-modal proposition truth. These 
arguments paralleled those provided in chapter 3 that led from conventionalism about 
modal properties to conventionalism about objects. Firstly, there is a tight connection 
between the modal consistency relations between propositions and their truth conditions. 
If it is a matter of convention that proposition p is inconsistent with proposition q, it is 
matter of convention that the falsehood of q is a condition of p’s truth. However, 
conventionalism about truth conditions leads quickly to conventionalism about whether a 
proposition is in fact true. Secondly, combining conventionalism about the modal statuses 
of propositions with non-conventionalism about propositions themselves leads to the 
possibility that a single proposition can be both necessary and contingent.  
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Chapters 6 and 7 were devoted to providing a version of LMC that does not fall prey to 
the objections set out in chapters 3 – 5. Chapter 6 argued that the way to avoid these 
problems is to do away with the problematic ontology. Specifically, LMC should deny 
that objects are entities that come with modal conditions of existence, identity and 
persistence; it should also deny that propositions are entities that come with modal 
conditions of truth. In order to explicate this view, I provided an account of the 
metaphysics of objects and propositions LMC ought to endorse. I argued that LMC 
should take objects to be spatiotemporally-extended entities that instantiate non-modal 
properties but lack modal properties. And, I argued that propositions should be treated as 
constructs out of objects and non-modal properties. I finished chapter 6 by providing an 
account of how reference is fixed in a world without modal features.  
Chapter 7 gave a semantics for modal sentences compatible with the metaphysical picture 
described in chapter 6. I argued that LMC should support a version of linguistic ersatzism 
according to which possible worlds are construed as Ramsey sentences expressed in a 
fragment of ordinary English. Which Ramsey sentences qualify as possible worlds is 
entirely conventional on the view described; it is determined by the linguistic rules 
governing English. I argued that the framework of two-dimensional semantics can be 
used to account for the existence of synthetic necessary truths and contingent analytic 
truths. What qualifies as a maximal consistent set of sentences in English is partly 
determined by the nature of the actual world. Then, truth conditions for both de dicto and 
de re modal truths can be given in terms of the truths at conventional maximal 
possibilities.  
Finally, chapter 8 revisited the desiderata established for LMC in the introduction, and 
provided brief responses to a number of objections. The prospects for LMC to meet its 
desiderata are promising. Challenges arise for the theory when it comes to demonstrating 
its ability to be genuinely reductionist. To achieve this goal, the linguistic rules governing 
terms must be spelled out non-modally, and the theory must be able to show that it need 
not rely on modal dependency relations in a circular way. A further challenge for the 
view is to demonstrate that we have the knowledge of linguistic rules required to 
adequately explain our modal knowledge. Nonetheless, there are promising lines of 
response to each of these objections.  
The positivist theories described in chapter 1 treated necessity as the same property as 
analyticity. Since analyticity is a feature of sentences, this traditional approach has 
trouble explaining ‘worldly’ modality such as the modal features of objects and 
propositions. Many authors, following Quine, have argued that the role of convention in 
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truth is trivial only; conventions are for determining what our linguistic expressions 
mean, they suggest, not for founding truths. In this thesis, I have looked at the other side 
of the coin by examining what happens if we treat the world as having modal features that 
really are endowed upon it by convention. My argument has been that opting for that 
position means committing to a far more widespread conventionalism than 
conventionalism about modality; if modality is both worldly and conventional, ordinary 
objects and non-modal truths depend on our conventions too.  
If LMC is to be a viable theory of modality, it must walk a tightrope between ontological 
conventionalism on the one hand and ‘trivial’ conventionalism on the other. I have argued 
that the way to achieve the requisite balance is to confine modality to the realm of 
language: those who are suspicious of modal features of propositions or objects for 
empiricist and naturalistic reasons ought to reject those features altogether. What’s more, 
doing so need not mean giving up on modal truths; the truth of de dicto and de re modal 
sentences can be determined directly by the linguistic rules that govern terms. I have 
argued that constructing possible worlds on the basis of linguistic rules represents a good 
strategy for providing truth conditions for modal sentences. One way of achieving this is 
provided in chapter 7. This method also helps avoid a number of other pitfalls for LMC, 
including the contingent analytic, the necessary synthetic and the treatment of iterated 
modalities. If LMC can avoid trivial conventionalism on the one hand and widespread 
ontological conventionalism on the other, it has the potential to do better than many of its 
rivals. In chapter 2, I described a number of deflationist and conventionalist theories of 
modality. The deflationist theories of Sider and Cameron avoid ontological 
conventionalism, but take modal properties to be real, convention-independent features of 
the world. On the other hand, Goswick and Einheuser’s theories treat both objects and 
modal properties as conventional. The strategy for developing linguistic modal 
conventionalism I have described in this thesis promises the empiricist that she can have 
her cake and eat it too; conventional modal truth need not preclude us from occupying the 
real world. 
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